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COMRISK
Common Strategies to Reduce the Risk of Storm
Floods in Coastal Lowlands: an Introduction
JACOBUS HOFSTEDE
S umm a r y
Storm surges present a major natural hazard in the North Sea region. In this region, coastal
lowlands occupy an area of about 40,000 km2. More than 16 million people live here, and ma-
jor economic activities take place. Without appropriate defence measures these lowlands may
become flooded during severe storm surges. In order to achieve a sharing of knowledge and a
sustainable approach on coastal risk management, the North Sea Coastal Management Group
decided in 2002 to initiate a transnational project: “COMRISK – common strategies to reduce
the risk of storm floods in coastal lowlands”. The project was co-financed by the European
Union under its INTERREG IIIB programme for the North Sea region. This paper introduces
the project that ran from July 2002 till June 2005 as an example of international co-operation of
coastal risk management authorities.
Z u s a mm e n f a s s u n g
Sturmfluten stellen eine wesentliche Naturgefahr in der Nordseeregion dar. In den etwa
40.000 km2 großen Küstenniederungen leben über 16 Millionen Menschen und sind viele wirt-
schaftliche Aktivitäten konzentriert. Ohne Küstenschutzmaßnahmen könnten die Niederungen
bei jeder extremen Sturmflut überschwemmt werden. Im Jahre 2002 initiierte die „North Sea
CoastalManagers Group“ ein transnationales Projekt: „COMRISK – gemeinsame Strategien zur
Reduzierung der Risiken von Sturmfluten in Küstenniederungen“ mit dem Ziel, mittels einem
Austausch von Erfahrungen und Erkenntnissen nachhaltige Verfahren für das Management von
Küstenrisiken aufzuzeigen. Das Projekt wurde von der Europäischen Union im Rahmen des
INTERREG IIIB Programms für die Nordseeregion kofinanziert. In diesem Beitrag wird das
vom Juli 2002 bis Juni 2005 laufende Projekt als Beispiel für eine internationale Zusammenarbeit
von Küstenschutzverwaltungen vorgestellt.
Co n t e n t s
1. Introduction.................................................................................................................................. 2
2. The project .................................................................................................................................... 3
2.1 The subprojects...................................................................................................................... 5
3. The finale conference COMRISK 2005...................................................................................... 6
4. Literature....................................................................................................................................... 7
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1. I n t r o d u c t i o n
Storm surges present a major natural hazard in the North Sea region (NSR). In this
region, coastal lowlands occupy an area of about 40,000 km2 (Fig. 1). More than 16 million
people live here, and major economic activities take place. Without appropriate counter-
measures, these lowlands may become flooded during severe storm surges. To prevent this,
national Governments spend several hundred million Euros per year on coastal defence or,
rather, coastal risk management in the NSR. In future, with an accelerating sea level rise and
changes in storminess (IPCC, 2001), the necessary budget to maintain present safety stan-
dards might increase significantly (CPSL, 2001; Office of Science and Technology, 2004).
Apart perhaps fromBangladesh, in no other region in the world the potential losses (lives and
assets) resulting from storm surges or, rather, coastal flooding are higher. The fact that this is
not so much “in the peoples mind” may result from the success of coastal risk management.
The last catastrophic storm floods occurred in 1953 in the Netherlands and England, and in
1962 inGermany. In all, more than 2,400 people lost their lives. After these catastrophes, nati-
onal governments undertook huge efforts to improve the safety standards, in theNetherlands
by the so-called “Deltawerken”. The risk of coastal flooding was significantly reduced, but
still existent. For example, in Hamburg storm surge water levels of up to 0.8 m higher than
in 1962 have been observed, but no major damage occurred. As a result, people feel safe in
coastal lowlands and may be tempted to ignore the latent hazards.
In the year 1996, on the initiative of the Danish Kystdirektoratet, leading national and
regional coastal risk management authorities in the Netherlands, Belgium, the UK, Ger-
2
Fig. 1: Coastal flood-prone areas (green) in the southernNorth Sea region (Source: JORISSEN et al., 2001)
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many and Denmark started an informal network, the North Sea Coastal Managers Group
(NSCMG). Basic idea was an improved international co-operation and co-ordination of
transnational issues on coastal risk management, including the economics of beach nourish-
ment, the improvement of public awareness and EU-regulations. Later, topics like coastal
risk management strategies, climate change and research in coastal engineering, were intro-
duced. Each year, small national delegations of senior public officers and managers meet in
one of themember states to discuss common issues. From thesemeetings it became clear that,
in order to achieve a sharing of knowledge and a balanced approach, a more comprehensive
co-operation about coastal risk management throughout the NSR is desired. On the basis of
these considerations, the idea for a NSCMG project: “COMRISK – Common strategies to
reduce the risk of storm floods in coastal lowlands” was born.
Under the Community Initiative Program INTERREG IIIB the European Union co-
finances (with 50 %) transnational projects for specific regions like the North Sea region.
Program targets for the NSR are, amongst others: (1) improved compatibility of spatial plan-
ning and strategies at transnational level, (2) increased transnational co-operation through
networks and studies, and (3) strengthen the cohesion and identity of the NSR through
common approaches. One of the themes, under which projects may run, is called: “Risk
management strategies for coastal areas prone to disasters and natural threats and for the
North Sea”. Hence, INTERREG IIIB constituted an optimal umbrella for the NSCMG to
organise the project.
2. T h e p r o j e c t
COMRISK was an INTERREG IIIB project that ran from July 2002 to June 2005 with
a total budget of 1.84 million Euros (50 % co-financing by the EU, 50 % national matching
funds). The project was conducted by a consortium of seven public coastal risk management
authorities in the NSR: Coastal Defence Division of the Schleswig-Holstein State Ministry
of the Interior (GER, lead partner), Lower SaxonyWaterManagement, Coastal Defence and
Nature Protection Agency (GER), Coastal Authority of the Danish Ministry of Transport
(DK), Coastal Waterways Division of the BelgianMinistry of the Flemish Community, Wa-
terways andMaritime Affairs (B), Rijkswaterstaat National Institute for Coastal andMarine
Management of the Dutch Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management
(NL), Rijkswaterstaat Road and Hydraulic Engineering Division of the Dutch Ministry of
Transport, PublicWorks andWaterManagement (NL), andCentre for Risk and Forecasting
of the Environment Agency of England and Wales (UK).
The overall impact that COMRISK wants to achieve is ensuring a sustainable, harmo-
nious and balanced development in the coastal lowlands of the NSR. For this, an adequate
and sustainable coastal risk management is a prerequisite. Risk is a combination of the pro-
bability (or frequency) of occurrence of a defined hazard (e.g., a storm flood) and the mag-
nitude of the consequences (e.g., casualties, damages to properties) of the occurrence. Thus,
COMRISK aimed at improved coastal risk management through a transfer and evaluation of
knowledge andmethods as well as pilot studies. The project was divided into twomain parts,
the umbrella project and nine subprojects. The umbrella project focused on an exchange of
experience and on the co-ordination and integration of the subprojects. It had the following
objectives: (1) to bring together coastal riskmanagement experts from administration, science
and private companies from around the North Sea and beyond, (2) to exchange experiences
and studies of good practise on coastal risk management, (3) to evaluate and further develop
3
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innovative integrated coastal risk management strategies, considering national regulations
and responsibilities, (4) to initiate and support transnational co-operation on integrated coas-
tal risk management (networking), and (5) to integrate coastal risk management into strate-
gies for a sustainable management of the coastal zones in the North Sea Region (ICZM).
The project was divided into three phases. The first (starting-up) phase concentrated on
the substantiation of the project structure (Fig. 2). During this phase, a project secretariat
was established within the lead partners institute and a project manager: M. HAMANN (till
December 2003), D. WITZKI (from April 2004) appointed. Further, a project team with rep-
resentatives from the partner institutes was installed. It consisted of the following persons: T.
VERWAEST (B), M. F. VAN NIELEN-KIEZEBRINK (NL), S. FRAIKIN (NL), A. WOLTERS (NL),
C. LAUSTRUP (DK), T. PIONTKOWITZ (DK), I. MEADOWCROFT (UK), S. HAYMAN (UK), F.
THORENZ (GER), H. BLUM (GER) and J. HOFSTEDE (GER, project leader). During the se-
cond (main) phase, the pilot and evaluation studies were conducted. Part of the work in these
studies was carried out by subcontractors. In order to involve external experts as well as local
authorities, 7 expert workshops were organised and 2 permanent contact groups established
within pilot studies. Main activities during the last phase were the organisation of the final
conference COMRISK2005 (see below), and the synthesis of the subprojects.
In all, about 30 organisations (partners, consultants, local administrations, etc.) were
directly involved in the project. More than 40 individuals (project team, consultants and
contact groups) actively contributed to the project outcomes, and about 150 more persons
were involved through workshops, expert questionnaires, etc.
4
Fig. 2: COMRISK flow diagram
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2.1 The subpro jec t s
The nine subprojects (five evaluation and four pilot studies, Fig. 2) contributed to the
general project objectives (see above), each having one thematic or regional focus. The sub-
projects are described in detail in the following chapters of this volume. As an introduction,
the main activities of the subprojects are described below.
In subprojectone, thenational andregionalpolicies andstrategies for coastal riskmanage-
ment were evaluated in terms of sustainability and with respect to their contexts. After an
inventory of national policies and strategies, an evaluation in terms of their ability to promote
a socio-economic and ecological sustainable development was conducted. The responsibility
for this subproject is with the Rijkswaterstaat National Institute for Coastal and Marine
Management of the Dutch Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management.
Subproject two focused on common strategic planning tools for coastal risk manage-
ment. On the basis of an inventory of non-technical strategic tools and techniques for plan-
ners and risk managers, an evaluation of different approaches taken in terms of their ability
to answer the need of risk managers and strategic planners was conducted. The responsibility
for this subproject is with the Centre for Risk and Forecasting of the Environment Agency
of England and Wales.
In subproject three, a comparative assessment and evaluation of the present state of
public perception and participation in coastal risk management in the participating countries
was conducted. Further, a more general assessment and evaluation ofmethods for public par-
ticipation in coastal riskmanagementwas carried out. The responsibility for this subproject is
with the Coastal Defence Division of the Schleswig-Holstein State Ministry of the Interior.
In subproject fourperformance indicators for coastal riskmanagementwere investigated.
After an inventory of currently applied technical and non-technical performance indicators
in the NSR, an evaluation in terms of the ability of different approaches to answer the needs
of riskmanagers and planners was carried out. The responsibility for this subproject lay is the
Centre for Risk and Forecasting of the Environment Agency of England and Wales.
In subproject five, an inventory of presently applied hydraulic boundary conditions and
safety standards (as a follow-up of an earlierNSCMG-study; JORISSEN et al., 2001) was estab-
lished. In a next step, for two case sites in theNetherlands, the different national and regional
methods to achieve the hydraulic boundary conditions were tested. The responsibility for
this subproject is with the Rijkswaterstaat Road and Hydraulic Engineering Division of the
Dutch Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management.
In the subprojects six, seven, eight and nine, state of the art risk analyses were conducted
for several pilot areas (Flanders, Ribe, Lincshore and Langeoog) in the NSR. Based on inte-
gral inventories of physical and socio-economic conditions as well as existing coastal defence
measures, risk assessments using newest techniques were carried out. The responsibility for
these subprojects lay with the Coastal Waterways Division of the Belgian Ministry of the
Flemish Community, Waterways and Maritime Affairs (Flanders), the Coastal Authority of
theDanishMinistry of Transport (Ribe), theCentre for Risk and Forecasting of the Environ-
ment Agency of England andWales (Lincshore), and the Lower SaxonyWaterManagement,
Coastal Defence and Nature Protection Agency (Langeoog).
5
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3. The f ina l conference COMRISK2005
In April 2005, a three day international conference on coastal risk management “COM-
RISK2005” was organised in Kiel, Germany. The conference ran under the auspices of the
North Sea Coastal Managers Group. In all, 85 representatives from science and administra-
tion participated in the conference (GER 37, NL 19, UK 11, B 9, DK 8, and USA 1). After
welcoming addresses by the Schleswig-Holstein State Government, the North Sea Coastal
Managers Group and the INTERREG IIIB Secretariat for the North Sea region, the confe-
rence theme was introduced to the audience in two key note presentations (see contributions
OUMERACI and ALE in this volume). In six sessions, the results of the COMRISK sub-
projects were presented and discussed:
1) Hydraulic boundary conditions in the context of risk analysis
2) Risk analyses Flanders (B/NL) and Lincshore (UK).
3) Risk analyses Ribe (DK) and Langeoog (GER).
4) Managing coastal risk and performance.
5) Coastal risk perception and participation.
6) Coastal risk policies and strategies.
In two further sessions, researchers presented relevant project-external results. In a
final session, several technical, managerial and policy level statements that were prepared
by the organising COMRISK project team were presented and discussed (see contribution
HOFSTEDE et al. in this volume). The conference ended with a boat excursion to the Probstei
sea wall, the largest coastal risk management measure in the Baltic Sea.
6
Fig. 3: Discussion of project results during COMRISK2005
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Evaluation of Policies and Strategies for Coastal
Risk Management
COMRISK Subproject 1
MARINKA VAN NIELEN-KIEZEBRINK, JEROEN KLOOSTER
S umma r y
40.000 square kilometres in the southern North Sea Region is potentially affected by floo-
ding. In this area 16 million people live and work. The governments of the countries involved
manage this risk. Comparing them, both their actions and their goals have differences as well as
similarities.
This paper presents the results of an evaluation study of policies and strategies in the coun-
tries bordering the southern North Sea.
For the assessment a comprehensive analytical framework is used. In the framework a
distinction between context and policy is made. Policy largely depends on context elements
such as the history of flooding, the cultural, socio-economic setting, institutional setting, public
awareness. Within each country specific context there is however a certain degree of policy free-
dom. This implies that countries can learn from each other. The observed differences between
the countries offer opportunities and challenges to exchange experiences and information. They
might even adopt part of each other’s policies, strategies, measures or instruments within the
country specific context and could even lead to common strategies. Defining common strategies
and policies does not necessarily have to lead to harmonisation of policies.
Although future harmonisation of policies and strategies should not be avoided when desi-
rable and feasible, policy makers have to focus on further mutual understanding and mutual
learning.
Zu s amm e n f a s s u n g
40.000 Quadratkilometer in der südlichen Nordseeregion sind potentiell überflutungsge-
fährdet. In diesem Raum leben und arbeiten 16 Millionen Menschen. Die Regierungen der be-
troffenen Länder gehen mit diesem Risiko um. Einen Vergleich zeigt, dass ihre Maßnahmen und
Ziele Ähnlichkeiten und Unterschiede aufweisen.
In diesem Beitrag werden die Resultate einer Evaluierungsstudie über die Politiken und
Strategien in den Nordsee-Anrainerstaaten präsentiert.
Für die Untersuchung wurde ein umfassendes Analyseverfahren benutzt. Dieses Verfahren
unterscheidet zwischen Kontext und Politik bzw. Strategie. Die Strategie ist zum größten Teil
abhängig vom Kontext, zum Beispiel von der Überflutungsgeschichte, den kulturellen, sozialen,
wirtschaftlichen und institutionellen Rahmen sowie dem Problembewusstsein. Innerhalb dieses
Kontextes existiert jedoch ein gewisser politischer Handlungsspielraum. Somit können die Län-
der voneinander lernen. Die beobachteten Unterschiede zwischen den Ländern bieten Chancen
und Herausforderungen für einen Austausch von Erfahrungen und Informationen. Dies könnte
eine teilweise Übernahme von Strategien, Maßnahmen oder Instrumenten innerhalb des eigenen
Kontextes beinhalten bis hin zu gemeinsamen Strategien. Gemeinsame Strategien und Politiken
zu definieren muss nicht zwangsweise zu einer Harmonisierung der Politiken führen.
Obwohl künftige Harmonisierung von Politiken und Strategien nicht vermieden werden
sollten wenn sie wünschenswert und machbar ist, sollte der Fokus auf dem Vorantreiben des
gegenseitigen Verständnisses und dem Lernen voneinander liegen.
K e yw o r d s
Coast, risk management, flood defence, risk strategies
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1. I n t r o d u c t i o n
40.000 square kilometres in the southern North Sea Region is potentially affected by
flooding (figure 1). In this area 16 million people live and work. The governments of the
countries involved try to manage this risk. Both their actions and their goals have differences
as well as similarities.
The concept of coastal flood risk management was derived from safety science theory
(KIRWAN et al., 2002). Risk is a combination of the probability (or frequency) of occurrence
of a defined hazard and the magnitude of the consequences of the occurrence. It is not ne-
cessarily a number.
Risk management is the process of implementing decisions about accepting or altering
risk, based on an assessment of various costs and benefits. This also implies decisions about
acceptable risk levels and appropriate measures.
In applying risk management to the field of coastal flood risk management the following
steps are identified:
• Identification of the nature and extent of flood risks;
• Understanding and addressing the relevant public perceptions;
• Establishing goals and standards with respect to the flood risk;
• Establishing strategies and policies to achieve these goals;
• Finally minimizing the costs of achieving the goals, whilst ensuring the risk remains accep-
table.
On behalf of the Rijkswaterstaat Dutch National Institute for Coastal and Marine
Management / RIKZ, a consortium of KPMG Strategy Economics, Atos KPMGConsulting
and TUDelft carried out an evaluation of policies and strategies for coastal risk management
(KLOOSTER en VAN RAAK, 2004). This paper presents the results of this evaluation study.
For this evaluation the following specific objectives were formulated:
• An inventory of different levels (strategic, institutional, instrumental and operational) of
coastal risk management in present national policies of the 5 countries in the North Sea
region, involved in the COMRISK project.
• An assessment of the present national policies in terms of legal, social, technical, financial,
socio-economic, ecological and managerial aspects (including the ICZM-principles for
sustainability).
2. M e t h o d o l o g y : c o n t e x t v e r s u s p o l i c i e s
The strategies and policies of the countries involved were identified, reviewed and com-
pared within an analytical framework.
For the inventory national policy documents and a selection of documents of lower
governments relevant to coastal, flood risk and water management were studied. In addition,
10
Die Küste, 
Heft 70 (2005), Special Editon COMRISK,  Seiten 184, E 35 255 Lit.
11
Fig. 1: Flood prone area in the North Sea region (source: JORISSEN et al., 2001)
Fig. 2: Analytical framework
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earlier cross-country studies into North West European flood risk management and coastal
managementwere studied. To fill specific information gaps and to find themotivation behind
the policies, 25 interviews with coastal flood risk policy-makers and experts were held.
The analytical framework (figure 2) distinguishes between the context and policy. The
context comprises the important challenges that governments in the regions face in relation
to the management of the risk of flooding from the sea. Challenges can be threats to be con-
fronted or avoided, but may also be opportunities to be explored and possibly exploited.
Governments develop policies to manage the risk of flooding within the country specific
context but may not be able to influence the context directly. Depending on the socio-econo-
mic and socio-cultural setting, countries may adopt different forms of coastal risk manage-
ment policies. For this reason we have refrained from taking one country as ‘best practice’
or to speak of the optimal coastal risk management process, as this will differ from country
to country, to fit the particular context.
The key focal points within a policy can, however, be indicated. For this purpose the
ICZM-criteria as formulated by the EuropeanCommission are used as a startingpoint. These
principles offer various ways of good coastal zone management. The EU-ICZM principles
however are formulated at quite a high and abstract level. Furthermore they relate to both the
institutional structure and to the policy of coastal management. To make the ICZM princip-
les more concrete, they are translated to possible focus points for coastal risk management.
The results of the assessments are discussed in the following sections and summarized
in table 1, 2 and 3. The challenges in context and focuses in policies are indicated with dots
in table 1 and 2. A black dot indicates a major challenge or focus and an open dot indicates
significant challenges or focuses.
3. Cha l l enges in the context
The challenges experienced by the governmensts in the 5North Sea countries in relation
to the risks of flooding from the sea are summarized in table 1.
All countries regard climate change and the corresponding sea level rise as major chal-
lenge (table 1). Keeping this in mind, the Dutch physical context is both in absolute and
relative terms the most challenging, although it has some protective dunes, it has the largest
and deepest floodprone areas (polders) of all countries. To make things even more urgent
the Netherlands major cities are situated in flood-prone areas. The German coastline offers
the least natural protection, but the hinterland has much smaller and less deep floodprone
areas. The major city of Hamburg is partly situated in one of them. Also London is partially
located in one of Englands floodprone areas. Development pressure is a major issue for the
Netherlands and England, but less so in the other countries.
Ecological regulation is a complicating factor to policy-making, but in most cases not
regarded as a major challenge to the existing policy. Policymakers in almost all regions are
confronted with sensitive natural habitats at their coast, which brings limitations and condi-
tions to coastal defences.
The common challenge for policy-makers in England, Flanders, the Netherlands and to
a lesser extent Niedersachsen, is to raise the sense of urgency among their citizens to make
them either support governmental action or take action themselves. In Schleswig-Holstein,
citizens are also noted not to be very aware of the risk of flooding, but this has not lead to
practical difficulties in implementing policy. Hamburg and Denmark in general feel that the
demand and support for action is about right.
12
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Limited budgets is a common challenge for policy makers in all countries. The challenge
of integrating of policy across different fields and at different scales, is more ambiguous.
In some cases policy integration is not strong, but often the primary policy-makers do not
consider this as a major problem. The vertical integration in England has improved accor-
ding to all interviewees, however at the local level a ‘national policy vacuum’ was reported
by some.
4. F o c u s p o i n t s i n p o l i c i e s a n d s t r a t e g i e s
Different countries focus on different aspects of policies and strategies in order to ma-
nage the risks of coastal flooding. These ‘focus points’ are summarized in table 2. The poten-
tial focus points are derived from the ICZM criteria. In some respects they also relate to the
organisation of flood risk management.
With respect to goal-setting, England and the Netherlands have a multi-generation time
horizon in common. Both countries have explored the long-term demands for coastal pro-
13
England Flanders Nether-
lands
Nieder-
sachsen
Hamburg Schlesw.
Holstein
Den-
mark
Challenges from external developments
Relative sea level rise       
Ecological regulation       
Pressure for development    
Physical opportunities and threats
Large amount of flood-prone
area  
   
Deep flood-prone areas      
Natural coastline offers little
protection  
  
Challenges from the socio-economic functions
Major cities threatened    
Designated nature areas       
Challenges from societal perceptions
Low sense of urgency citizens     *
Challenges from the institutional context
Limited staff capacity 
Limited budget       
Limited relation to disaster
management policy 
*
Limited relation to spatial
planning policy  
Limited vertical integration ** 
 Major challenge  Challenge
* Limited relation, but not regarded as a problem;
** According to the local level, there is a policy vacuum
Table 1: Challenges in the context
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tection. The other countries generally have limited themselves to study how – in the long run
– the current level of protection could be maintained.
England has a strong focus on costs and benefits; for every project a benefit/cost ratio
is calculated. In the Netherlands and Denmark current safety standards were set decades ago
with much consideration to costs and benefits. These are currently being updated. Ham-
burg and Niedersachsen (in the Weser-Ems region) take some account of potential damages.
However, since the dike design regulation does not allow for variable protection levels, this
aspect cannot be directly incorporated in decision-making. Schleswig-Holstein however has
incorporated this type of information in setting priorities in implementation of measures:
locations with highest monetary or other value are first on the list. The way the ecological
carrying capacity is taken into account is quite similar in all countries, as EU law regulates
matters such as the Environmental Impact Assessments and the protection of habitats.
The allowance of dynamics of the coast is very much connected to erosion policy, which
is outside the scope of this study. England allows largely for dynamics, including the setting
back of dike lines. In Flanders, the Netherlands, Niedersachsen (for the islands) and Den-
mark some dynamics are allowed, though in general the currently protected areas will remain
protected. In Germany a retreat policy for the main land might be followed in exceptional
cases.
England has permissive legislation, like Denmark. National governments in these coun-
tries have the right to fund measures, if budgets allow, and if justified. They also give policy
and procedural guidance to lower governments and operating authorities. However there is
no legal duty to take action. Denmark and England thus place much emphasis on the initia-
tive and freedom of the counties and boards, whereas the Niedersachsen high level policy is
strictly prescribing and local policy-making is limited. The Schleswig-Holstein high level po-
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Table 2: Focus points policies and strategies
Eng-
land
Flanders
Nether-
lands
Nieder
sachsen
Ham-
burg
Schlesw.
Holstein
Den-
mark
Goal-setting
Taking into account the needs of
many generations
 
Economical costs and benefits taken
into account
     
Ecological carrying capacity taken
into account
      
Focus points in measures
Allowing dynamics    
Allowance of local tailor-made
solutions
    
Variety of measures   
Variety of methods to achieve
measures
   
Monitoring and evaluation
Performance monitoring of
measures 
     
Reconsideration at strategic level   
 Major focus  Some focus
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licy-maker leaves freedom to the water boards with regard to the secondary dikes. Hamburg
is itself practically a local authority and also leaves freedom to industry areas to arrange their
own protection measures. In the Netherlands and Flanders standards are set at the central
level. However local ‘tailoring’ is receiving more and more attention. Alternatives to reach
the safety standard are discussed with local communities and municipalities. The difference
in the role of authorities in England and the Netherlands is well illustrated with fig. 2.
As pointed out, England, Denmark and to some lesser extent Hamburg use a variety
of measures to manage the risk of flooding from the sea (see also table 3). Besides coastal
protection these authorities also take acount of the possible consequences of flooding more
explicitly than Flanders, the Netherlands and the other German states, which concentrate
mostly on coastal defence. The Netherlands, though focused on coastal defence, is also more
and more searching for more holistic approaches to managing coastal risks.
With respect to monitoring and evaluation all countries try to improve their actions
by learning about their performance. However, only few countries are reconsidering their
general set of goals andmeasures or have done so recently (England, Flanders and theNether-
lands).
Fig. 3: Differences in the role of authorities in the Netherlands and England in relation to flood risk
management as illustrated by public communications
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5. C o n c l u s i o n s a n d r e c omm e n d a t i o n s
The concept of flood risk management – optimizing both the probablities and the con-
sequences of flooding – is emerging in all five countries in the North Sea region, although in
some countries more pronounced than others. In England and Denmark governments have
chosen more points for intervention than for instance in the Netherlands and Germany,
where focus is mainly on prevention of flooding. The actual translation of the concept of
risk management into formalized policies and strategies has not happened in all countries
andmight face some serious obstacles. For example inGermany, where according to national
regulations, every inhabitant has the right to the same level of protection against flooding.
Harmonization on all aspects of coastal flood risk management does not seem to be feasable
due to the differences in the contexts and approaches in the five countries, which are in some
cases (the Netherlands, Germany) even laid down in national legislation. Definition of a
common strategy however does not have tomean harmonization of policies. Although future
harmonisation of policies and strategies should not be avoided when desirable and feasible,
16
Point of
inter-
vention
Instruments Eng-
land
Flan-
ders
Nether-
lands
Nieder-
sachsen
Ham-
burg
Schlesw.-
Holstein
Den-
mark
R
ed
u
ct
io
n
o
f
p
ro
b
-
ab
il
it
y
o
f
fl
o
o
d
in
g
C
o
as
ta
l
fl
o
o
d
p
ro
te
ct
io
n Primary sea
defences l l l l l l l
Secondary sea
defences
l l l l l
Prepare for
emergency
strengthening
l l l l l l
R
ed
u
ct
io
n
o
f
co
n
se
q
u
en
ce
s
o
f
fl
o
o
d
in
g Avoid development in
flood prone areas* l l l l l l
Flood resistant building l l l l
C
ri
si
s
m
an
ag
em
en
t Forecasting and
warning l l l l l l l
Evacuation and
rescue operations l
l l l l l l
R
ec
o
ve
ry Prepare to
restore land and
infrastructure
l l
C
o
m
-
p
en
-
sa
ti
o
n Redistribution of
costs or damages l l
l l l l l
l Used limited, considered unimportant; l Used, considered of some importance
l Used, considered important; l Used, considered crucial
*) TheNetherlands, Schleswig-Holstein,Niedersachsen en Flanders only have restrictions for building
in the first (or first few) 100 m of dunes. Denmark applies a wider zone, related tot protection of the
landscape.
Table 3: Selection of instruments with respect to point of intervention.
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at the moment it is more appropoiate to focus on further mutual understanding and mutual
learning. Elements that seem especially interesting in this respect include: public awareness in
relation to responsibility of acting (government versus ‘self acting’ of individuals), insurance
versus compensation, evacuation and crisis management.
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Strategic Planning in Coastal Risk Management
COMRISK Subproject 2
PAUL SAYERS, IAN MEADOWCROFT
S umm a r y
Strategic planning describes the planning framework to translate policy aims into practical
decisions. The planning framework needs to reflect the policy in each case, so frameworks will
differ. But there will also be common principles and common elements. Sub-project 2 in COM-
RISK aimed to understand the process of strategic planning, to explore how it can support flood
risk assessment and management, and to identify common elements of strategic planning – and
contrasting approaches – in North Sea coastal countries.
We identified the following elements in a risk-based strategic planning process: problem
formulation; flood risk analysis; options generation and decision-making; implementation; and
monitoring and review. The objectives for the plan will normally be determined by the policy
aims (SP1) and through participative processes (SP3). Flood risk analysis will draw on analysis
of the hydraulic boundary conditions (SP5). The ‘options selection’ and ‘monitoring and review’
stages will need to take account of the performance of risk management measures (SP4).
Finally, as in SP1, we note the importance of context in determining the best form of stra-
tegic planning. We find that the benefits are greatest where there are complex extensive flood
plains and flood defence systems, where long term planning is needed, and where the solutions
are potentially complex, relying on a suite of complementary risk management measures such as
flood defence, warning and land use planning. In these circumstances a structured approach to
strategic planning will have significant benefits in terms of flood risk management.
Z u s a mm e n f a s s u n g
Strategische Planung beschreibt den Rahmen für die Umsetzung der politischen Ziele in
praktische Entscheidungen. Dieses Rahmenwerk soll die jeweilige Strategie reflektieren, wes-
halb sie unterschiedlich ausfallen werden. Andererseits werden gemeinsame Prinzipien und Ele-
mente existieren. COMRISK Teilprojekt 2 zielte darauf ab, den strategischen Planungsprozess
zu verstehen, zu untersuchen wie es Flutrisikomanagement unterstützen kann, und gemeinsame
Elemente sowie unterschiedliche Ansätze in der strategischen Planung in den Nordsee-Anrainer-
staaten zu identifizieren.
Die folgenden Elemente in einem risikobasierten Planungsprozess wurden ermittelt: Pro-
blemstellung; Flutrisikoanalyse; Variantenerstellung und Entscheidungsfindung; Umsetzung;
Überwachung und Prüfung. Die Ziele eines Planes werden normalerweise bestimmt durch die
politischen Ziele (Teilprojekt 1) und durch Beteiligungsverfahren (Teilprojekt 3). Die Elemente
„Variantenauswahl“ und „Überwachung und Prüfung“ müssen die Leistung der Maßnahmen
zum Risikomanagement berücksichtigen (Teilprojekt 4).
Letztendlich wird, wie in Teilprojekt 1, die Bedeutung des jeweiligen Kontexts bei der Er-
mittlung der optimalen strategischen Planung betont. Es wird gefolgert, dass die Vorteile der
strategischen Planung dort amGrößten sind, wo großräumige und komplexe Küstenniederungen
betroffen sind die langfristige Planung benötigen und wo die Lösungen relativ komplex ausfallen
werden (bestehend aus einem Mix von komplementäre Lösungen wie Hochwasserschutz, Flut-
warnung und Raumplanung). In diesen Fällen wird ein strukturierter Ansatz wie strategische
Planung signifikante Vorteile bezüglich eines Flutrisikomanagements aufweisen.
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1. S t r a t e g i c p l a n n i n g a s p a r t o f COMR I S K
Strategic planning is the process for defining how policy aims are translated into action.
Policy is produced with the intention of reducing undesirable outcomes and promoting desi-
rable ones. Often, however, this is not straightforward reflecting the complexity of the flood
system and the need to appraise and implement both structural and non-structural options
in a logical manner. Particular difficulties arise when:
• problems are of a large-scale and solutions of a long-term nature are involved;
• works need to be implemented, monitored and adapted over a long time scale;
• there are process connections and interactions between different areas and options;
• the relationships between cause and effect is complex involving interconnected benefit
areas and environment, social and economic impacts.
The process of strategic planning must therefore facilitate:
• the integration of short and long term actions
• the structured implementation of a combination of actions
• the translation of Policy to practice.
To develop an optimum ‚mix‘ of risk management measures and policies requires a good
understanding of present and future risks; spatial distribution of flood risk, natural and man-
made pressure on flood risk, and appraisal of flood risk management measures within a
context of coastal zone and spatial planning policies.
The term ‘strategic planning’ is therefore used to mean the co-ordinated analysis, plan-
ning and decision-making to achieve flood management policy objectives.
2. A i m s a n d o u t p u t s o f s u b - p r o j e c t 2
The subproject has the following specific objectives:
• To provide a non-technical overview of the strategic tools and techniques for planners and
risk managers in each partner country.
• To evaluate these approaches in terms of their ability to answer the needs of managers and
strategic planners.
• Provide recommendations to improve cross-border dissemination and application of com-
mon strategic and spatial planning methods.
A consultation workshop for sub-project 2 was held in Den Hague in the Netherlands
at the offices of RIKZ on 17th and 18th of February 2004.
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The Workshop programme also included a visit to a number of flood defence structu-
res, and areas where flood risk management poses particular challenges in the Netherlands.
These provided excellent examples of the challenges and solutions to flood risk problems,
and prompted much discussion.
Finally findings from the workshop and next steps were discussed and summarised.
3. A n i n t r o d u c t i o n t o s t r a t e g i c p l a n n i n g
As outlined in Section 1, strategic planning the co-ordinated process of analysis, plan-
ning and decision-making to achieve flood management policy objectives. All of the partner
countries, to some extent, have policies regarding the standard and sustainability of flood
defences, flood warning systems and evacuation plans for areas with significant flood risk.
Once policy has been established there is a range of different methods though which it can be
implemented. The emphasis that each partner countries places on a particular option varies
according their approach to risk and their perception of risk. Strategic planning is the process
by which these various actions are identified, analysed and selected.
Planning relates to a specific spatial unit i.e. to a particular length of coastline and flood
cell. It may include some or all of the following stages:
• Problem formulation: Establishing the policy aims, identifying the flood defence pro-
blem, establishing the spatial / temporal scale for the analysis. Key linkages in COMRISK:
SP1 (Policies and Strategies)
• Flood risk analysis: Assessing flood risk for the present day, and in the future, generally
including hazard identification, assessing probabilities and consequences of flooding, and
presentation / communication of risk. Key linkages in COMRISK: SP4 (Performance In-
dicators), SP5 (Hydraulic Boundary Conditions)
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Fig. 1: Workshop attendees – A site visit to a dune system in the Netherlands
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• Options generation and appraisal, and decision-making: Identifying options for future
risk management, and assessing these options against specific criteria (including policy
aims). Key linkages in COMRISK: SP1 (Policies and Strategies), SP3 (Perception and Par-
ticipation).
• Implementation (e.g. carrying out the flood management plan): This may include
conducting more detailed analysis, or improving or managing flood defences, develo-
ping flood warning and forecasting systems and communication with stakeholders. Key
linkages in COMRISK: SP3 (Perception and Participation) and SP5 (Hydraulic Boundary
Conditions)
• Monitoring and review: Evaluating the outcome in terms of risk reduction (usually using
performance indicators). Key linkages in COMRISK: SP4 (Performance Indicators) and
SP1 (Policies and Strategies)
This process is cyclic. The results of the monitoring / review feed back to refine and,
if necessary, revise the problem formulation stage. The framework is also ‘hierarchical’. For
example, large scale plans may be made to establish the strategic aims for a length of coast,
while more detailed plans for strategies and schemes will be made to realise those aims. Some
stages will be more highly developed than others and this will differ between countries.
Once drafted a Strategy Plan provides broader benefit than simple a programme of
actions. It also provides an effective framework for wide consultation in relation to the key
flood and coastal defence issues for the study area. In turn, this enables the ownership of both
problems and opportunities to be shared amongst all stakeholders (with a legitimate interest
in these issues) facilitating the emergence of common goals.
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Fig. 2: The flooding system
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Strategic planning is about making choices and managing change in a structured way.
Good management of flood risk requires many decisions to be made, often based on con-
flicting aims. For example, across all partner countries the flooding systems are complex
and can be characterised as a variety of interacting elements and processes (see Fig. 2 and 3).
Satisfying floodmanagement objectives, alongside other social, economic and environmental
aims, requires careful planning and Sub-Project 2 has been mainly concerned with the me-
thods for achieving this.
Fig. 3: The flood management system is continually modified by drivers and responses. Strategic
planning aims to understand how these affect the flood risk in order to make better decisions to manage
the risk
4. S t r a t e g i c p l a n n i n g i n t h e p a r t n e r c o u n t i e s
Each partner country has adopted a particular approach to strategic planning for mana-
ging coastal flood risks. These different approaches are outlined in the sections below.
Belgium
Belgium has 65 km of coastline. The coastal lowlands of Belgium are focused in Flanders
and are interconnected with the Dutch Region of Zeeuws-Vlaanderen. As such the flood-
plain behaves as a single flood cell, where if a defence breaches in either the Netherlands or
Belgium significant inundation can be expected in both countries.
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Although sharing a common floodplain the responsibilities for coastal defence are di-
vided between Belgium and the Netherlands at their respective national boundaries. Both
countries have slightly different approaches to coastal management and notions of acceptable
risks (translated through to a so-called safety standard).
Historically, a resistance based approach has been adopted. This has led to a focus on
strengthening the flood and coastal defences themselves with direct translation of policy to
action with only limited “strategic planning”. For example, the main actions have been to:
• Strengthen the existing flood defences through a programme of raising and widening – pri-
oritised according to structural reliability using methods developed in The Netherlands.
The target safety standard was fixed at 1:1000 year return period.
• To “fix” the coastline at a pre-defined location and prevent through active intervention
retreat – managed through monitoring (including yearly surveys using laser altimetry) and
direct local action.
Previous strategic assessments identified many weak links in the defences; with sea dy-
kes being too low in places and being of uncertain condition. Recent assessments found
that, although the natural beach/dune systems generally performed well in terms of strength
and height problems arose however, where infrastructure had been built directly within the
beach/dune system. In terms of position, a comparison of detailed Digital Terrain Models
(DTM) over a 20 year time period have been used to identify the extent of dune erosion. This
analysis has highlighted significant losses.
Determining action based on these results has been difficult. In particular, there is a
complex relationship between the flood defence needs and the broader process of planning
via the Master Plan, including a lengthy process of Environmental Impact Assessment, buil-
ding permits and other licenses. The ‘Master Plan’ should consider and evaluates not only
flooding risks but different perspectives (e.g. ecology and tourism) and involves not only
flooding experts but other administrations.
Following a major storm in 1990, a Strategic Investment Plan was developed to improve
the defences and improve safety against flooding. The Strategic Investment Plan was desig-
ned mainly to guide coastal flood risk managers, prescribing a detailed set of actions both in
regard to policies and specific defence schemes. It included a requirement for new schemes
to allow for 30cm sea level rise due to climate change.
In the future Master Plans, the provision of new defences is likely to form only part of
a broader strategy to manage future flood risk. This is likely to include contingency plans;
flood warning systems; insurance systems; spatial planning decisions (relocation of activities,
differentiation of safety standard); education and preparation of the public in addition to
defence improvements.
The future aim is to continue to address flood risk issues in a more strategic and ho-
listic way. Interestingly the broadening of goals and the move to flood risk management
rather than flood defence is led by the civil engineers responsible for flood risk management.
Budgetary constraints require a more flexible approach at a time when environmental and
biodiversity objectives are coming to the fore in the general move to Integrated Coastal Zone
Management (ICZM).
Netherlands – Overview of the present approach
After the severe flooding in 1953, the Delta commission initiated the development of
an engineering led approach to flood management with an emphasis on the resistance of
engineered defences. The required resistance of the defences was expressed through a ‘safety
standard’ which in turn was enshrined in law. The current standards are shown in Fig. 4.
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In addition to setting safety standards, the law requires that the reliability of flood pro-
tection structures are reviewed about every 5 years (lower circle in the Figure 5). Recently a
first round of assessment of the flood defences was performed. For the flood defences that
did not perform adequately, plans are being made to improve them.
When works are carried out, the ability to adapt the defence in face of a climate change
is built in. In particular, it is expected and accepted that the defence will need to be increased
in height and width in the future and reservation of space for future adoption of the defence
is enshrined within the spatial definitions of the defences.
The national budget for coastal defences is reviewed every year. Prioritisation of expen-
diture is based first on the safety case and then on consideration of the magnitude of possible
(not probability of) consequences - represented by the capital value of assets in flood prone
areas.
The reassessment of the potential impact of social, economic and technological develop-
ments on the flood risk in terms of expected damages or casualties would ideally take place
about every 50 years (upper circle in Fig. 5). In response to this requirement, new methodo-
logies are being developed that express safety levels in terms of a ‘risk’ i.e. taking account of
both probability and consequences.
25
Fig. 4: Current safety standards in the Netherlands
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The new approach is being developed under a project entitled FLORIS commissioned
by client the Netherlands Directorate General for water. Rijkswaterstaat is co-ordinating
the project in close co-operation with the waterboards and provinces. The project has the
following main goals:
• The assessment of the actual flood risk safety situation for the whole of the Netherlands
by determining the probability of flooding associated with each of the 53 main dike rings
which make up the country. Special attention is being paid to structures that have been
identified as being weak spots in previous studies.
• The identification of the actual weak spots in the flood defence infrastructure.
• The assessment of the consequences of flooding and hence the determination of flood risk
(probability x consequence), with a clear view on the uncertainties associated with this
assessment.
Following the analysis of the flood risks, the FLORIS Project is also tasked with evalu-
ating the physical measures required to improve the identified weak spots and determining
the associated revised (reduced) probability of flooding for the relevant dike ring.
England and Wales
Three different scales of studies provide a framework for strategic planning in the UK
(Fig. 5). At the broadest scale the UK coastline has been split up into 11 sediment cells and
26
Fig. 5: Strategic planning process in the Netherlands
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a series of sub-cells. Within each sediment cell longshore processes are largely considered
self-contained.
The development of plans based on sediment cells signalled: a move away from adminis-
trative boundaries to process boundaries; a move towards regional management and shared
responsibilities, and a recognition of the wider demands on the coastal zone.
The strategic planning process starts with the development of a Shoreline Management
Plan (SMP) that are each between 50 and 150 Kilometres long and combine multiple local
authorities and interested stakeholders through a series of Coastal Groups. Forty-nine have
been completed so far. These studies consider time horizons of 20, 50 and 100 years and
develop management policy identifying one of four policies of each Management Unit. The
available policies are:
• Do nothing
• Hold the line
• Advance the line
• Retreat the line.
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As shown in Fig. 6, Strategy Plans flow from the SMP process. These more detailed in-
clude more local analysis of defence performance, flood risk and the preferred programme of
intervention options. As necessary local management plans are then developed to implement
preferred options identified at higher levels.
The regional Shoreline Management Plans (SMP) and more local Strategy Plans are up-
dated on a rolling five year programme. The results of the SMPs and Strategy studies are
supplemented by national reviews of needs through bi-yearly review of budgets and flood
risks by Defra as part of the UK Governments Comprehensive Spending Review.
The recently completed Foresight Flood and Coastal Defence study has taken a long-
term look into the future in an attempt to inform policy direction and promote sustainable
development.
The Foresight project produced a long-term (30–100 year) vision for the future of UK
flood and coastal defence which is robust against a range of possible futures and can be used
Fig. 6: Hierarchy of management plans in England and Wales
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as a basis to inform policy, and its delivery. This vision is challenging and independent and
relies upon an integrated portfolio of measures and actions covering:
• Managing the rural landscape (e.g. run-off)
• Managing the urban fabric (e.g. sewer networks)
• Managing flood events (e.g. emergency responses)
• Managing flood losses (e.g. resilient buildings)
• Engineering and other large scale interventions.
Germany – Overview of Present Approach
In German North Sea coastal regions, significant coastal flood prone areas exist (as
illustrated in Fig. 8).
The approach to flood management varies between the regional governments. Howe-
ver all adopt a Master Planning approach covering all coastal flood and defence issues as
the primary strategic planning document. In Schleswig-Holstein, for example, within the
Master Plan the 10 most important issues are identified and actions discussed. In the case of
flood defences, the actions undertaken reinforce the underpinning management paradigm of
improving / maintaining the resistance afforded by the defences.
For example, in Lower Saxony the present approach to strategic planning is described in
the Lower SaxonyDike Act and within theMaster Plans for Coastal Defence for the districts
of Weser-Ems from 1997 and Lower Saxony from 1973 (see www.nlwkn.de/ (Home/Was-
serwirtschaft/Küstenschutz/ Generalplan Küstenschutz ), in Krause (1999) and Thorenz et
al. (2004).
As in theNetherlands there is a defined procedure formaintaining and improving dykes.
According to the State Water Acts the flood and coastal defences must be inspected at least
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Fig. 7: Flood prone coastal lowlands along the North Sea coast of Germany
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once a year and once in 10 to 20 years detailed safety assessments should be carried out (the
actual timing varies between States)
When works are carried out the ability to adapt the defence in face of a climate change
is built in. In particular, it is expected and accepted that the defence will need to be increased
in height in the future and adequate space is enshrined within the Master Plan to allow the
dyke footprint to be expanded. For Lower Saxony, this regulation is laid down in the Lower
Saxony Dike Act and a strip of land 50m wide is allocated to future dike widening.
The national budget for coastal defences is reviewed every year. Prioritisation of expen-
diture is based first on the safety case.
A new approach is under development, incorporating both probability and magnitude
of damage (Fig. 8), although at present this is part of ongoing research and development and
not implemented.
Denmark – Overview of current practice
Denmark has approx. 7,300km of coastline divided into 4 geomorphologic cells (as
shown in fig. 9). The 7 administrative areas do not coincide with these and relate to more
traditional governance boundaries. Flood prone areas in Denmark are protected by some
70km of dykes.
The policy background to the process of strategic planning is enshrinedwithin theCoas-
tal Protection Act that allows coastal protection where necessary, but promotes natural pro-
cesses where possible. In particular:
• coastal/flood protection can be allowed only where significant assets are at stake
• nature preservation is of high priority especially the maintenance of natural coastal dyna-
mics
• if old coastal/flood protection works are refurbished, the work must be minimal and red-
undant protection removed
• coastal/flood protection works must be technically optimised and fitted into the existing
environment in a discreet way.
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Fig. 8: Possible risk based management approach to flooding
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The main guidelines with respect to maintaining the performance of flood and coastal
defences are focussed on finding the optimal technical solution to protect the value of the
assets at stake whilst minimising disruption to the natural environment.
Visual inspection of the defences is required two times per year. Assessments of the
defence profiles, extreme water levels and wave conditions are performed every five years.
Coastal retreat and changes in dune width are monitored once per year and also five yearly
evaluations of the hydraulic climate are made.
The approach to the planning of actions follows the basic process outlined below:
• defence inspections (2x per year, embedded in law)
• inspection and monitoring of forelands (by the Danish Veterinary and Food Administra-
tion)
• surveying of defence profiles (every 5 years in order to monitor consolidation)
• monitoring and evaluation of water levels (analysis of extreme water levels every 5 year)
• research and development programs. These focus among others on the efficiency of sand
nourishment and on the natural variation of beach width, benefit/cost ratio.
This process delivers a prioritised programme of actions for the central part of the Da-
nish North Sea coast based on risk. Two time horizons, 10 and 25 years into the future, are
used to develop plans.
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Fig. 9: Map of flood prone areas in Denmark
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5. C o n c l u s i o n s
Sub-Project 2 has reinforced the belief that across Europe there is common understan-
ding of the meaning of strategic planning; as a process undertaken to determine an approp-
riate programme of measures to implement stated policy aims and objectives. More specially
Strategic Planning is defined as follows:
• it a proactive rather than reactive process of analysis
• it considers a board range of options – both structural and non-structural such as:
– all key consequences associated with action and in-action
– regulation of urban development
– structural intervention
– improved public preparedness
– better emergency responses
– insurance / compensation
• it encourages co-operation between stakeholders (includingNGOs, Governments and the
public)
• it promotes long-term thinking and sustainability
• it provides an opportunity to undertake assessment of risks at the widest possible scale.
The process of Strategic Planning is, however, approached differently and has a different
emphasis within each COMRISK partner country. In all Partner countries steps have been
made towards this goal and tools are being developed to support (for example the RASP me-
thods in the UK). These differences reflect different risk perceptions, society expectations and
tradition. For example, throughout the continental European partners legislative instruments
continue to provide the primarymanagement tool, with prescribed safety standards (reflecting
land use) and inspection intervals. Within England and Wales a more risk-based approach is
adopted based on a more explicit trade-off of benefits and costs of action against the dis-bene-
fits of in-action (with the exception of Londonwhere prescribed safety standards are provided
by law). These differences are reflected in the way expenditure is prioritised. Within the con-
text of a safety standards led approach prioritisation of expenditure is given little prominence
within the strategic planning process and it is difficult (and often politically undesirable) to
explicitly prioritise improvement to one defence over an other. The approach adopted in En-
gland and Wales, however, has a primary focus on prioritising actions in order of economic
efficiency (taking account of both tangible and intangible benefits where possible).
Today across Europe, most countries are moving towards flood risk management based
not just on predictions of the probabilities of defence overtopping under given events but
also on prediction of the probability of an overall defence failure (e.g. dike breaching), the
flooding consequences and their assessment in socio-economic terms. It will take time to
establish a fully risk-based approach to strategic planning. This will need to consider a ‘whole
system’ model of flooding including source, pathways and receptors, over the relevant plan-
ning timescale. It will also need to include a wide range of flood risk management options.
While widely accepted as a key requirement for better flood risk management in the future,
it is not yet fully reflected in present day practice.
6. L i t e r a t u r e
SAYERSPB andMEADOWCROFT IC. –Report ofCOMRISK Subproject 2: Strategic Planning.HR
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Performance of Flood Risk Management Measures
COMRISK Subproject 4
JONATHAN SIMM, IAN MEADOWCROFT
S umm a r y
In managing the risk of flooding in the southern North Sea Region, both physical defences
(dikes and sea walls) and non-structural measures play a significant role, but their performance
must be clearly understood, monitored and managed.
This paper presents the results of an comparative study of approaches to performance ma-
nagement in the countries bordering the southern North Sea, with a particular focus on perfor-
mance indicators.
The paper introduces concepts of performance and performance evaluation in the context
of flood management, building on a source- pathway-receptor conceptualisation. Flood risk
assessments are promoted as providing an overall measure of the performance of the system of
flood risk management measures.
In all countries performance of linear defences remains a key feature. In managing defence
assets the concepts of defence fragility and a geographical, geometrical and structural hierarchy
of performance assessment are found to be helpful. Reliability analysis is seen as a way forward
to achieve a consistent estimate of defence failure probability.
The paper concludes that more work is required to develop better and more consistent per-
formance indicators for NSR countries, distinguishing between output performance measures
for organisations and outcome performance measures related to the actual reduction of flood
risk.
Z u s a mm e n f a s s u n g
Beim Management der Risiken von Sturmfluten im südlichen Nordseeraum spielen sowohl
technische Maßnahmen (Deiche) wie auch nicht-technische Maßnahmen eine signifikante Rolle.
Ihre jeweiligen Leistungen sollten jedoch eindeutig verstanden, überwacht und gehandhabt wer-
den.
In diesem Beitrag werden die Resultate einer vergleichenden Untersuchung über die jewei-
ligen Ansätze zum Umgang mit Leistung in den Nordsee-Anrainerstaaten mit einem Fokus auf
die benutzten Leistungsindikatoren dargestellt.
Der Beitrag stellt Leistungskonzepte und deren Bewertung im Kontext des Flutmanage-
ments vor, aufbauend auf dem sog. „Source-Pathway-Receptor-Prinzip“. Flutrisikoanalysen
werden befürwortet als allgemeine Grundlage für die Leistungsbewertung von Maßnahmen des
Flutrisikomanagements.
In allen Partnerländern ist die Leistung von linienhaften Schutzmaßnahmen Hauptaugen-
merk.DieUntersuchung hat gezeigt, dass in der Pflege undUnterhaltung der Schutzmaßnahmen
der Unterhaltungszustand sowie eine geographische, geometrische und strukturelle Hierarchie
der Leistungsermittlung hilfreich sind. Sicherheitsanalysen stellen eine Verbesserung dar um eine
konsistente Einschätzung der Versagenswahrscheinlichkeit von Schutzwerke zu ermitteln.
Es wird gefolgert, dass weitere Untersuchungen erforderlich sind um zu besseren und kon-
sistenteren Leistungsindikatoren für die Nordsee-Anrainerstaaten zu gelangen. Dabei soll unter-
schieden werden zwischen Leistungsindikatoren für die Verwaltung und solchen für die tatsäch-
liche Reduzierung der Risiken.
K e yw o r d s
Coast, risk management, flood defence, performance indicators
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1. I n t r o d u c t i o n : a s s e s s i n g p e r f o r m a n c e o f r i s k m a n a g e m e n t
m e a s u r e s a s p a r t o f COMR I S K
The risk of flooding inNorth Sea coastal lowlandsmay bemanaged by physical defences
(eg embankments, sea walls, dunes), flood warning and response, and non-structural measu-
res such as control of development in flood prone areas. The performance of these measures
under a range of possible conditions including extreme storms needs to be understood in or-
der to assess and manage risk. This report on the performance of risk management measures
comprises the outcome of sub-project 4 of the COMRISK study (COMmon strategies to
reduce the RISK of flooding in coastal lowlands).
An earlier study by the North Sea Coastal Managers Group showed that the quality
and type of performance indicators varies considerably between member states. A more
consistent approach to establishing the performance of flood risk management measures will
improve flood risk management in coastal lowlands. Sub-project 4 (SP4) within COMRISK
aims to support the development of best practice in the North Sea Region and contribute to
improved flood risk assessment and management.
2. A i m s a n d o u t p u t s o f COMR I S K s u b - p r o j e c t 4
The aims of COMRISK Subproject 4 (SP4) – “Performance of risk management measu-
res” were:
• to create an inventory of current performance indicators in the NSR including a technical
review based on case studies
• to evaluate the ability of different approaches to answer the need of risk managers and
planners
• to recommend international best practice and to improve cross-border dissemination and
application of methods.
The anticipated outputs of SP4 were to include:
• an inventory of performance indicators used in the NSR, including data requirements,
information content and usage for decision-making
• a meta-database of performance indicators
• to produce a comparative review of the set of performance indicators to establish common
ground, and to identify gaps among the participating countries.
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3. F l o o d d e f e n c e p e r f o r m a n c e
Flooding from rivers, estuaries and the sea poses a threat to many millions of the citi-
zens of Europe and remains the most widely distributed natural hazard in Europe leading
to significant economic and social impacts. For example, the 1953 North Sea floods caused
about 2500 deaths across the UK,Netherlands, Belgium andGermany and concentrations of
fatalities in river floods are associated with flash floods, such as Vaison-la-Romaine (1992),
and the mudflows at Sarno (1997). Over half of the population of the Netherlands lives be-
low mean sea level; in the UK about 10 % of the population lives in areas of fluvial, tidal or
coastal flood risk. The national scale of economic importance of flood and coastal defence
activities has been documented for England and Wales (BURGESS et al, 2000) as preventing
annual average damages of approximately 4 Billion, with the value of assets at risk of river and
coastal flooding being about 300 Billion. In theNetherlands estimates of the possible damage
due to flooding vary from 300 to 800 Billion. These and other floods in the past decade in
many parts of Europe have focussed attention nationally and within the EU on the need to
understand and manage flood risks. The potential for flood damage is also increasing from
social and economic development bringing pressures on land use.
In the UK, the autumn of 2000 featured a number of extreme weather events over 25
days that were the wettest for 270 years. 10,000 properties were flooded costing the insu-
rance industry over £1 billion. Various types of flooding occurred including fluvial, pluvial
and coastal. The UKGovernment, the Environment Agency, stakeholders and the public all
had to “heed the wake up call” to the risks and consequences of extreme flooding events. An
analysis of the causes of the property flooding in 2000 showed that the source risks were split
between four causes; overtopping of or breaching of river defences, lack of flood protection
on rivers, exceedence of capacity in streams and ditches, and inadequate drainage.
The performance of local flood defence measures also came under closer scrutiny and
interest rose dramatically in temporary protection systems and barriers and available measu-
res to protect domestic property.
4. D e f i n i t i o n o f p e r f o r m a n c e a n d p e r f o r m a n c e e v a l u a t i o n
A useful definition of ‘performance’ is ‘The creation or achievement of something that
can be valued against some stated aim or objective.’
Evaluating performance is important so that:
• we can report on achievement
• we can learn from experience
• we can identify problems
• better links can be formed between the observed state and what we’re trying to achieve
• we can focus on what’s important - outcomes
• we can review the past and manage the future
In the case of flood and coastal erosion management, the objective is to reduce risk to
the developed and natural environment. An essential aspect of the risk management process
is ongoing monitoring of flood and coastal erosion risks. Monitoring takes place on a range
of scales from local site-specific measurements to data that is assembled on a national basis
by NSR countries. Performance Evaluation will then be able to contribute to ongoing risk
monitoring by providing a periodic insight into the efficiency of investment in risk manage-
ment actions and a periodic opportunity for reflection on the information being provided by
ongoing monitoring activities.
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Performance evaluation is applicable to all areas of significant investment in flood and
coastal risk management, including:
• capital works of flood and coastal defence (design, procurement and implementation)
• operation and maintenance of flood and coastal defences
• major monitoring programmes
• flood forecasting and warning
• informing the statutory planning process in order to control development in flood risk
areas
• policy development
• plan and strategy development
• research and development.
A useful way of thinking of these activities is as a hierarchy of processes, from high le-
vel policy and strategic processes to more detailed implementation and operation processes.
The underlying concept is that of a tiered approach to risk-based decision-making with an
interactive suite of tool, models and data addressing the national, catchment / coastal cell, and
local (i.e. asset/defence management and river reach) levels.
Flood defence assets can also be thought of in a hierarchical way, with three main levels
in the hierarchy:
• the geography of the defence asset – where it is, specifically its alignment
• the geometry of the defence asset – its overall physical shape, which is particularly impor-
tant in limiting overtopping and flooding
• the structure of the defence asset – its physical condition which is important in terms of
ensuring integrity under loading and avoidance of breach or erosion.
The advantage of this type of approach is that it has the potential to capture all of the
diverse activities that contribute to flood and coastal management in one coherent picture.
The majority of Performance Evaluation will focus on site-specific, detailed processes, but
the results can also be aggregated to provide higher level measures of performance. Aggre-
gation should take account of the criticality of low-level processes to the performance of
higher level processes.
Performance evaluation involves collecting evidence about how a given flood or coastal
management process is performing when compared with its objectives. The high level aim is
likely to be associated with a desire to reduce flood or coastal erosion risk. This overall aim
is then reflected in increasingly detailed andmore specific objectives for subsidiary flood and
coastal erosion management processes. (For example, a dike in a particular locality might
have objectives set for it related to resisting overtopping and avoiding breaching.)
Performance Evaluation therefore involves consideration of both objectives and beha-
viour. PerformanceObjectives are statements of one or more target levels of behaviour of the
process under consideration. Information on how the process behaves relative to the stated
objectives can be obtained from measurable characteristics known as Performance Indica-
tors. In the case of flood risk management these will have to take account (see Fig. 1) of:
• sources of flooding
• pathways for flooding
• receptors of flooding
• consequences of flooding
Thus the key steps in Performance Evaluation are:
1. Establish clear Performance Objectives for the process being evaluated.
2. Identify characteristics (Performance Indicators) of that process that can be used to
measure how it is performing relative to objectives.
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3. On the basis of measurable evidence, establish how the process is performing compared
with objectives.
4. Communicate the results of the evaluation as appropriate.
5. Decide what further action needs to be taken as a result.
In general Performance Indicators lie on a range from ‘hard’ to ‘soft’ measurements.
Hard Performance Indicators have widely accepted methods and scales of measurement
(such as weight and cost). Soft Performance Indicators cannot be precisely measured and
are often expressed in linguistic terms (e.g. High, Medium or Low). Soft Performance In-
dicators are therefore inevitably less informative than hard Performance Indicators and the
method of measurement (for example elicitation from experts or stakeholders) will tend to
be more prone to bias. But there are important aspects of system performance that can only
be measured in soft terms.
Performance Indicators may be directly informative in the format in which they are
measured, or they may require some processing or analysis in order to be useful. Processing
may, for example, involve summing or averaging several measurements.
5. F r a g i l i t y c u r v e s
Often, in order to be useful, some analysis of the context or environment in which Per-
formance Indicators were measured will be required. This will be essential for measurements
of system (or more specifically defence structure) response to random loading. In order to
obtain information about whether the response was satisfactory or not it is essential to ana-
lyse the loading conditions and to do so may require additional data collection or modelling
(for example hindcasting). A convenient way of separating system response from the loading
imposed upon it is to use a fragility function as a performance indicator. A fragility function
(see example fragility curve in Fig. 2) is the defence response, P(D|x), conditional upon a given
loading condition, x.|
There will usually be more than one performance indictor for any given process, but
the number of Performance Indicators should be efficient and should as far as possible relate
directly to objectives.
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Fig. 1: Source / Pathway / Receptor / Consequence model for flood risk
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6. D e f e n c e a s s e t c o n d i t i o n a s s e s s m e n t
Management of defence assets is a particularly important part of the overall performance
management process described in the previous section. Performance-based defence asset ma-
nagement of the system must consider:
• the whole life cycle of systems (to secure the greatest return on investment)
• maintenance, renewal, and replacement options with the goal of optimising defence asset
performance.
The objective must be to assess performance on a continuous basis and at appropriate
times. Maintenance, renewal or replacement interventions are initiated to restore the original
performance capability and to extend or re-initiate the residual life of the system or defence
asset (Fig. 3). For such a process, it is essential that the monitoring involves a process of con-
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Fig. 2: Typical fragility curve
Fig. 3: Condition-based defence asset management (CIRIA/CUR, 1991)
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dition characterisation which is unambiguously related to performance levels and not just to
a subjective assessment of structural condition.
Together, condition assessments and fragility curves can give an indication of the current
and likely future ability of a structure to perform to its original design limits.
7. P e r f o r m a n c e I n d i c a t o r s u s e d i n N S R c o u n t r i e s –
s i m i l a r i t i e s , d i f f e r e n c e s a n d g a p s
a. Using assessments of future flood risk as a performance indicator.
Most countries are considering a move from a safety standard approach towards flood
risk assessment. This will be based not just on predictions of the probabilities of defence
overtopping under given events but also on the flooding consequences and their assessment
in socio-economic terms. However, so far only the United Kingdom and the Netherlands
have made decisions to move towards this goal. Work still to be completed to enable such
overall flood risk assessments to be carried out includes:
• obtaining appropriate data and/or setting up databases on defences and flood risk areas
• agreeing on national methodologies for flood risk assessment.
When such work is complete it should be possible to set up measures such as:
• Effectiveness of measures in reducing the economic value of national or regional assets at
risk from flooding
• Efficiency of measures in reducing national or regional flood risk per Euro invested. This
is the annual Benefit to Cost ratio for the national spend on flood risk management.
Such work will also enable the significance of a particular defence asset in providing
flood risk reduction to be assessed.
b. Geographic indicator of shoreline position.
Most countries have some kind of objective in relation to the future shoreline position
and are undertaking monitoring of that to identify whether the objective is being achieved
or indeed is appropriate for the long term. The basic questions to be answered in terms of
performance indicators are:
Where is the defence asset?
Is it moving, and at what rate?
Are these answers acceptable?
c. Geometric indicators for shape and crest elevation of defences, including dunes
The assessment of likely future loadings, whether an individual event or amore risk-based
approach is a key condition for proper geometrical performance assessment. This includes pre-
dicting all sources risk, such as rainfall, river flow, wind, waves etc. This service includes:
• Development of design information for defences, based on data collection, analysis and
prediction of river or sea conditions.
• Real time flood warning services for the public.
Given an understanding of the likely loadings, in most cases the performance indicator
for defences is still set in rather deterministic terms as a maximum allowable overtopping rate
(typically 2 l/s/m) not to be exceeded under a given design event.
In the future this will be modified as a more risk-based approach is adopted for linear
defences, taken on a cell by cell basis. Key geometric performance indicators used to confirm
acceptable performance include:
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• Crest elevation. Both global settlement is assessed and also localised depressions which
give rise to weak spots. In lower Saxony, for example, defences are designed for certain
design conditions and crest levels are checked 20 years or more frequently
• Slope gradients (also used as a structural indicator of movement of defences)
• For sand dunes and beach systems, overall volumetric assessment of material within a
defined geographical band is normally used
The basic questions to be answered can therefore be summarised as:
• What is the current level of risk associated with the defence asset?
• What is the geometry associated with that level of risk?
• Are these changing and at what rate?
• Are these answers acceptable?
Note that secondary defences are also important in some countries, designed to mitigate
flooding should the main defences be overtopped. Performance objectives for such defences
are quite variable.
d. Structural indicators for the condition of the defences themselves and their vulnerability to
breach under extreme loading.
A wide range of approaches are adopted for assessing defence condition. These include
• Visual loss – exposure of clay
• Degree of clay deterioration/erosion
• Slope gradients. (In Germany, for example, a maximum slope of 1/3 is permitted)
• Piping and fissuring (tested by non – intrusive tests or by internal measurement)
• Assessments of safety factors against geotechnical failure
Whatever indicators are used, the basic questions to be answered are:
• What are the potential failure modes?
• What inspection, data collection and analysis are needed to assess these modes?
• What is the defence asset condition now and is it adequate for purpose?
• How quickly will the defence asset deteriorate?
• When will maintenance (or further inspection) be needed?
e. Performance indicators for pumps and gates.
More significant pump/gate assets have specific operations manuals setting detailed per-
formance requirements. This may not be the case for smaller and/or older less significant
assets. Where performance assessment guidance is provided, it usually requires answers to
questions of the form:
• What is the pump/gate asset condition?
• What inspection, data collection and analysis is needed to facilitate assessment of pump/
gate asset condition?
• How quickly will the pump/gate asset deteriorate and what is its future residual life?
• How frequently will inspection and/or maintenance be needed?
In most cases the overall performance requirements for barriers are:
• That their overtopping performance should be consistent with the associated linear de-
fences
• That they should be closed properly and in time to defend against an extreme event.
In the case of pumps and culverts, the overall questions to be answered are more of the
form:
• What flow capacity does the pump/gate asset provide?
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• Is the pump/gate asset actually available when needed?
• How reliable is the pump/gate asset when capacity is demanded of it?
f.Objectives for reducing the consequences of flooding should it occur
A wide range of objectives were noted here but include:
• Control of new property development in flood risk areas
• Educating and making the public aware of the possibility of flooding and its conse-
quences.
• Flood proofing of properties by individual members of the public.
• Person and property emergency rescue. This includes the rescue of individuals, plus mo-
vement of valuable property to avoid damage.
The overall questions which the performance objectives and indicators need to be able
to answer here is “What are the receptors and associated risk consequences and how have
they changed?” For example, if flooding or coastal erosion occurs, then its impact will be
affected by changes in:
• The degree of development in a flood risk area or area at risk from erosion.
• The ability to issue accurate flood or erosion risk warnings.
• The ability to respond to issued warnings, includingmoving flood prone people and goods
out of the flood risk zone.
• The availability and speed with which temporary or demountable flood defences can be
installed either as defences to individual properties or communities.
g.Non-flood-risk objectives
Most countries have other objectives other than flood risk reduction which they must
also meet in the integrated management of their coastal zones. Some of these are legal re-
quirements. They include:
• environmental acceptability, particularly in terms of reducing impacts on designated habi-
tats, geological exposures, water quality, etc.
• contribution to public safety and reduction of social vulnerability
• amenity and tourism requirements
• sustainability objectives
The EU ICZM (Integrated Coastal Zone Management) Recommendation and the
Water Framework Directive are expected to have a significant impact on such broader
objectives
However, in these cases it is generally not possible to give clear expression for perfor-
mance indicators. Rather the evaluation should be a more general one, examining the extent
to which the original performance objectives have been met.
8. A p p r o p r i a t e n e s s o f p e r f o r m a n c e i n d i c a t o r s f o r n e e d s
o f r i s k m a n a g e r s a n d p l a n n e r s
Most of the outcome performance indicators used by risk managers and planners in re-
gard to flood risk reduction in the coastal regions of theNorth Sea seem to be appropriate for
their purpose, particularly those which are focussed on the sources, pathways and receptors
of flooding.
In most of the NSR countries there is some kind of national database in which flood risk
management data is held. Generally this includes socio-economic and defence asset data and
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hydrodynamic data (perhaps real -time). In some cases there are also records of flood defence
works and costs and information about planned works.
However, much of the raw data that are collected and stored in databases are, on the
whole, not tailored to the needs of Performance Evaluation. Additional processing and / or
data collection is generally needed to isolate specific performance indicators. Many of the
databases were developed for other purposes and were now being adapted to meet the needs
of risk and performancemanagement; however, the information and even the structure of the
databases is not necessarily ideal for this purpose.
Better performance indicators need to be developed to assess the social impacts of policy.
Without such data and indicators, it is difficult to assess the impacts of a particular policy
option on societal behaviour.
Some risk managers and planners also collect output performance measures (e.g. Defra
High Level Targets in the United Kingdom.) These are mainly intended to monitor and
audit the effectiveness and efficiency of the coastal management organisation in meeting
operational targets. As such they do not refer directly to flood risk reduction and their role
in assessing outcome performance is limited.
9. C o n c l u d i n g s t a t e m e n t s
1. Flood risk management (FRM) objectives come from national policy/law via strategic
planning.Outcome performance indicators can be defined from FRM objectives.
2. Performance of linear defences (dikes) remains a key element of FRM; reliability analysis
permits a consistent estimate of structure failure probability.
3. Whilst necessary, output performancemeasures of FRMorganisations do not refer directly
to flood risk reduction and their role in assessing outcome performance is limited.
4. More work is required to develop better and more consistent performance indicators in
NSR countries, tailored to the policies and strategies being pursued.
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Hydraulic Boundary Conditions for Coastal
Risk Management
COMRISK Subproject 5
JOHANN DEKKER, AED WOLTERS, FRANK DEN HEIJER, SANDRA FRAIKIN
S umm a r y
An inventory of the methods used to determine the hydraulic boundary conditions for the sea
defences in the countries participating in the North Sea Coastal Managers Group was conducted. Based
on the results of this inventory the various methods have been analysed and compared for a sea dike and
a dune profile on the North Sea coast in The Netherlands. Though the general approach to determine
the hydraulic boundary conditions is fairly similar, the differences in details of the methods can lead
to crest heights that can vary several meters for the same return period. The approaches in the safety
assessment of dune coasts are quite different, though a number of methods go back on the same research
from the 1980-ies.
Due to these differences results of the various conducted risk-assessments are hardly comparable.
The other way around, a common approach to risk assessment might thus lead to adaptations in safety-
assessment methods in the various countries. On the other hand the knowledge questions, i.e. to reduce
uncertainties in risk-analysis, are rather similar in the various countries. Joint research and further ex-
change of knowledge can and might lead to a convergence of the methods for risk assessment used in
the various countries.
Z u s a mm e n f a s s u n g
Eine Bestandsaufnahme der Methoden zur Ermittlung der hydraulischen Randbedingungen für
Küstenschutzbauwerke in den in der North Sea Coastal Managers Group vertretenen Ländern wurde
durchgeführt. Basierend auf der Bestandsaufnahme wurden die verschiedenen Methoden vergleichend
für einen Deich und eine Düne an der niederländischen Nordseeküste analysiert. Obwohl die Verfahren
zur Bestimmung der Randbedingungen generell vergleichbar sind, können die Detailunterschiede in
den angewandten Methoden zu Unterschieden von mehreren Metern in der resultierenden Deichhöhe
für den gleichenWiederkehrintervall führen. Die Verfahren zur Ermittlung der Sicherheitsstandards für
Dünen variieren stark, obwohl mehrere Methoden auf die gleichen Forschungsergebnisse aus den frühen
1990ern beruhen.
Wegen dieser Unterschiede sind die Ergebnisse der durchgeführten Risikoanalysen kaum vergleich-
bar. Umgekehrt, ein gemeinsamer Ansatz zur Risikoanalyse kann zu Anpassungen bei den Ermittlungen
der Sicherheitsstandards in den verschiedenen Ländern führen. Die Forschungsfragen hinsichtlich der
Reduzierung der Unsicherheiten in Risikoanalysen sind in allen Ländern vergleichbar. Gemeinsame
Forschung und weiterer Austausch von Erfahrungen können zu einer Harmonisierung der angewandten
Ansätze zur Risikoanalyse in den Ländern führen.
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1. I n t r o d u c t i o n
In 1996 national and regional coastal defence authorities in the United Kingdom,
Belgium, The Netherlands, Germany and Denmark initiated a high level network of co-
operation, the North Sea Coastal Managers Group (NSCMG). It was realised that, in order
to achieve a transfer of knowledge and a balanced approach, a more comprehensive trans-
national co-operation about riskmanagement throughout theNorth Sea Region is indispens-
able. The NSCMG initiated a study to make an inventory of the risks, adopted safety levels
and used techniques with regard to flooding of coastal areas in five countries to improve
communication on this subject between the partners (DWW, 2001).
This previous study covered many aspects of flood risk in coastal areas, ranging from
policy aspects and safety levels adopted in the various countries to technical aspects of dike
design. One of the conclusions of this study was that the structural aspect is closely related to
the way hydraulic boundary conditions are assessed. It was recommended to study the total
process of hydraulic conditions together with the structural aspect to allow better compari-
son of the safety standards and methods applied in the various countries. In such a study the
scope should include the structural aspects of dikes and dunes.
In Subproject 5 the focus is on the more technical aspects related to the design and safety
assessment of the sea defences. In this subproject theway that hydraulic boundary conditions
for the sea defences are derived and used is compared. The Road and Hydraulic Engineer-
ing Division (DWW) of the Directorate-General of Public Works and Water Management
(in short Rijkswaterstaat) is coordinator of this subproject. DWW contracted WL | Delft
Hydraulics to assist in the inventory and comparison of the methods.
2. A p p r o a c h
2.1 I n v e n t o r y
Subproject 5 started in 2002with an inventory of themethodologies adopted by the vari-
ous partners to assess the hydraulic boundary conditions (water level and wave conditions)
and the way these are used in the design and/or safety assessment of the sea defences. This
inventory was based on the response on a questionnaire that was sent to the partners together
with a description of the methodology in The Netherlands. The information received from
the partners has been summarized in WL | Delft Hydraulics (2005).
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2.2 A n a l y s i s f o r s e l e c t e d l o c a t i o n s
To get somemore insight in possible reasons for the differences in the methodologies to
determine the hydraulic boundary conditions, the results of the inventory have been brought
a step further by comparing the results of the various methods. It would be interesting to
see whether the heights of sea dikes in the six North Sea countries would be different if they
were designed using the methodologies from other countries when adopting the same safety
level.
Ideally all methods should be applied to a typical site in each of the partner countries.
In this way differences due to different geography could be detected. This would mean 36
combinations of methods and sites, which was not feasible within the framework of the
COMRISK project. The closest alternative was to apply all methods to a few selected sites.
For practical reasons such as easy access to relevant data regarding water level, waves, wind
and bathymetry, this was limited to sites in TheNetherlands. Both a sea dike and a dune sec-
tion have been considered. The following sites on the North Sea coast were selected:
– Petten sea defence, the sea dike near Petten,
– Dune coast at Callantsoog.
Both sites are in the province of North-Holland, north-northwest of Amsterdam. The
location of these sites is shown in Fig. 1.
The Petten sea defence (Fig. 1, top right) is a sea dike with a crest at about 12.75 m
above NAP (MSL). The lower part of the seaward side has a slope of 1:4.5, the upper part
a slope of 1:3. Between those slopes is a 14 m wide berm at about 5.35 m above NAP. The
inner slope is 1:3.
The dunes near Callantsoog consist of a single row with a width of about 100 m and a
maximum height of about 20 m above NAP (Fig. 1, lower right).
Based on the information gathered through the questionnaires, the descriptions in ear-
lier study (DWW, 2001) and other information (e.g. found on the website of the partners),
Fig. 1: Location of the selected sites (left) and typical sections of the dike at Petten (top right) and the
dune at Callantsoog (lower right)
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the procedures used in the six countries are described and compared based on data for the
selected sites of Petten andCallantsoog. The procedure to design or evaluate a sea dike gener-
ally consists of two steps: determination of the hydraulic boundary conditions at the toe of
the dike and calculation of the required crest height. The safety assessment of sandy coasts
involves similar steps, themain difference being that the wave conditions are usually required
in deeper water. This study therefore compares first the way the hydraulic boundary condi-
tions are derived.Water level andwave conditions are treated separately. Then the procedures
to determine the required crest height are compared. This includes a comparison of formulae
for wave run-up and overtopping. These are used to assess the required crest height for the
Petten sea defence according to the various methods.
The comparison presented in this study is based on a deterministic approach. All coun-
tries are developing probabilistic techniques to support assessing the risk of flooding of
coastal areas. Comparing these by application to a selected case was not feasible within the
present study. However, aspects such as wave run-up and overtopping formulae and criteria
for these factors are also key elements in probabilistic methods. Thus, the values given in
this report can not be used for actual assessment of water levels, crest levels and so on, they
are indicative values to study differences between approaches in the various countries. Risk
assessment using probabilistic techniques has been conducted in some of the case studies
treated in the COMRISK subprojects 6 to 9.
3. H y d r a u l i c b o u n d a r y c o n d i t i o n s
3.1 W a t e r l e v e l s
All countries have fairly extensive networks of water level stations. These are used as
basis to determine extreme water levels required as input for design and safety assessment of
the sea defences. The number of stations in the countries ranges from 3 in Belgium, which
has a fairly short stretch of coast along theNorth Sea to about 40 in the United Kingdom and
even more in Germany, which has a long coast line with various estuaries. National authori-
ties gather the data and the available information goes for some stations back for more than
100 years.
Recent data are generally stored as 10-minute averages after a quality check. Before data
are used to determine design conditions by extreme value analysis the historic data are cor-
rected for trends in sea level and/or the tidal amplitude over period of observations. In this
way each record can be considered to be representative for the present situation. In most of
the countries the required water levels for design and safety assessment are determined us-
ing probabilistic methods. This can be based on extrapolation of observed water levels (e.g.
Denmark and The Netherlands) or on extrapolation of measured surges that are combined
with the tidal component (e.g. Belgium). In the United Kingdom each of these methods may
be applied as the contractor carrying out the study can use his own methods. In Niedersach-
sen (Germany) a deterministic method is used, which combines the tide with the highest
observed surge. Schleswig-Holstein (Germany) combines this deterministic methodwith the
probabilistic approach by using the maximum of the two. Most countries increase the design
level to account for factor such as local wind set-up and relative sea level rise.
The results of the various methods to assess the design water levels are summarised in
Fig. 2. The most striking in this figure is of course the single value independent from the
probability of occurrence following themethodNiedersachsen. This is inherent to the design
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method Einzelwert-Verfahren, which “aims to avoid any exceedance” (quote from response
to questionnaire; WL | Delft Hydraulics, 2005). It can be seen that the value for Petten fol-
lowing thismethod has a probability of occurrence between 1/400 (Dutch&Belgianmethod)
and 1/800 (Danish method). In the comparison of methods for the Petten sea defence the
results from the Belgian method have also been adopted for the United Kingdom.
It is further interesting to note that thewater levels using themethod of TheNetherlands
are for short return periods equal to those following the Belgian method, but for longer re-
turn periods closer to those from the Danish method. The differences between the results of
these methods are in the order of 0.25 m, depending on the return period and method. For
the longer return periods this is actually fairly small considering that the 95 %-confidence
interval for the 1/10,000 year surge is in the order of 1 m. For the shorter return periods of
50 and 100 years, however, a better agreement was expected between the various methods.
The difference for these return periods may be due to the use of not completely consistent
data for the comparison (WL | Delft Hydraulics, 2005).
3.2 W a v e c o n d i t i o n s
Most countries use fairly similar methods to assess the wave conditions in the vicinity
of the sea defences. Only Schleswig-Holstein has a quite different approach. Though deep
water waves and wind are measured on a location off Sylt since 1984 (21 years) as a basis for
sand nourishment, the nearshore design wave conditions are direct assessed by correlating
with the still water level. The approach in the other countries is based on a statistical evalu-
ation of deep water wave data (either from measurements or hindcast) combined with wave
propagation modelling to determine the corresponding conditions near the coast. In The
Netherlands and Belgium relatively long datasets of wave measurements in deep water are
available (20-25 years), which allows extreme value analysis directly on the measured wave
heights. In Denmark time series of 8 years are available for most of the wave gauges, while
Fig. 2: Comparison of design water levels following different methods for Petten, The Netherlands
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in the United Kingdom the available timeseries of wave measurements cover periods of 1 to
4 years. In these countries the wave measurements are combined with wind data that cover
longer periods using hindcast techniques.
For this study the deep-water station Eierlandse Gat (ELD, see Fig. 1) is the reference
relevant for the coast of Petten and Callantsoog. The official Dutch values extreme wave
conditions for this station (RIKZ, 1995) have been compared with an independent analysis
of the data. The resulting wave heights for the selected return periods are included Table 1.
It can be seen that the difference in wave height is 0.3–0.5 m. As it appeared that this differ-
ence has no significant effect on the nearshore conditions near the Petten sea defence (the
remaining difference is only 1–2 cm) other methods to assess the deep water wave conditions
have not been tested. In the comparison the official values were used for the method of The
Netherlands, the results of the independent analysis for all other methods.
As mentioned above, all countries except Schleswig-Holstein use numerical models to
determine the design wave conditions at the toe of the sea defences. Within the scope of the
present comparison of methods it was not feasible to carry out wave propagation simulations
with the various models used in the different countries. Instead, the wave conditions at the
toe of the Petten sea defencewere determined by interpolation in the results of a large number
of wave runs with the model SWAN, that have been stored in a database. This database
contains for a large number of locations the characteristic wave parameters (Hm0, Tp, Tm02,
Tm-2-1, direction) of SWAN runs for 3 water levels, 14 wind directions and 5–7 combinations
of wind speed and offshore wave conditions. Based on the derived water level and deep water
wave height, the significant wave heightHm0, mean wave period Tm02 and the peak wave pe-
riodTp near the Petten sea defence were determined by bilinear interpolation from the results
for the wind and wave direction 285 °N, which is the most unfavourable direction in this
location. The results are shown in Table 2. It appeared that the results were fairly insensitive
to the deep water wave height and that the water level is in fact governing the nearshore wave
conditions. This is illustrated by the results for Niedersachsen, for which the water level is
the same for all return periods.
In Schleswig-Holstein the nearshore wave conditions are determined by correlation
with the water level using the following relations:
H1/3 = (SWL – DZ) * Gr
Tz = a + b * H1/3
whereH1/3 is the significant wave height and Tz is the mean zero-crossing wave period. The
coefficients DZ, Gr, a and b are parameters determined based on measurements. For the
present comparison these parameters have been derived based on measurements from the
Petten site for the season 2003–2004 (RIKZ, 2004). The results are included in Table 2. It
is remarkable that the wave heights are significantly higher than those based on the SWAN
simulations.
method waves 1/50 waves 1/100 waves 1/1,000 waves 1/10,000
Hs [m] Tm [s] Hs [m] Tm [s] Hs [m] Tm [s] Hs [m] Tm [s]
NL 8.05 9.5 8.37 9.7 9.24 10.2 10.00 10.6
other 7.52 7.82 8.80 9.72
Table 1: Extreme wave conditions at Eierlandse Gat adopted in the comparison
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3.3 W a v e p e r i o d s
The database provides the spectral wave periods Tm02, Tm-2-1 and Tp whereas the datafiles
from the field measurements at Petten that were available provide the wave periods Tm02 and
TH1/3. The formulae forwave run-up andovertopping that are used in the various countries con-
tain characteristic wave periods that are not directly available. These wave periods have there-
fore been determined by assuming a certain constant ratio between different wave periods.
The formula for wave run-up used in Denmark contains the wave period Tm (DWW,
2001), without providing the definition. ANDERSEN (1998) gives the same formula with Tˆ,
also without defining this parameter. Here the expression from DWW has been adopted, as
this reference provides also values for the coefficients in the equation. The wave period Tm
was approximated by Tp/1.15, similar to the relation adopted in DWW (2001).
In the overtopping formulae used in Schleswig-Holstein, Niedersachsen and the United
Kingdom the mean wave period Tm is used. This is the mean period of the waves in time
domain also known as the zero-crossing period Tz. This characteristic wave period is not
available in the database. Energy balance models such as SWAN can only provide wave
periods in the frequency domain such as Tp, Tm–10, Tm01 and Tm02. For the present study rela-
tions between time-domain period Tm and the frequency domain periods Tp and Tm01 have
been derived from flume test on the Petten profile that were performed for a large range of
conditions (WL | Delft Hydraulics, 1999). The ratio between Tm and Tp shows a fairly large
range, but seems to depend on the ratio of Hm0 over the water depth. Based on the results
of tests for conditions similar to the extreme hydraulic conditions used in the comparison a
ratio ofTp/Tm= 1.45 has been adopted in this study. As the ratioTp/Tm02 for themost relevant
conditions in the database was around 2, the ratio Tm/Tm02 was taken as 1.4.
The formulae for wave overtopping applied in The Netherlands and Belgium use the
spectral mean period Tm–10. This period is not available within the database. The ratio be-
tween Tm–10 and Tm02 depends largely on the spectral shape. For the present comparison the
ratio has been estimated based on the nearshoremeasurements at the Petten site. From graphs
presentingTm02 andTm–10 for two storms in the season 2003–2004 (RIKZ, 2004) it can be seen
that the ratio between the two is quite different before, at and after the peak of the storm.
At the peak of the storm the ratio Tm–10/Tm02 is about 1.6–1.7. Before the peak the ratio is
smaller, after the peak, the ratio is larger. For the comparison of the various methods a ratio
of 1.65 has been adopted. This value is rather large, but this is because the wave spectra at the
toe are non-standard spectra.
Table 2: Wave conditions at the toe of the Petten sea defence.
method waves 1/50 waves 1/100 waves 1/1000 waves 1/10000
Hs [m] Tm02 [s] Hs [m] Tm02 [s] Hs [m] Tm02 [s] Hs [m] Tm02 [s]
DK 2.61 6.56 2.74 6.66 3.19 6.93 3.69 7.15
SH 3.53 6.68 3.53 6.68 3.58 6.74 4.18 7.39
Nds 3.12 6.84 3.13 6.88 3.15 6.91 3.16 6.84
NL 2.78 6.71 2.91 6.80 3.31 6.97 3.66 7.11
B 2.76 6.64 2.90 6.75 3.37 7.03 3.80 7.22
UK 2.76 6.64 2.90 6.75 3.37 7.03 3.80 7.22
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4. A p p r o a c h e s t o d i k e e v a l u a t i o n / d e s i g n
4.1 C om p a r i s o n o f m e t h o d s
All partners determine the crest height from the design water level and the wave condi-
tions near the sea defence. In the safety assessment of existing coastal defences additional
margins are in some countries included for factors such as long waves, harbour resonance
and trends in the sea level. In the design of new dike sections factors such as sea-level rise and
the expected subsidence of the crest is taken into account.
The required height to account for waves is determined using a criterion either for wave
run-up (DK, SH, Nds) or for wave overtopping (SH, NL, B, UK). For the wave run-up
criteria, the run-up height follows directly from the formulas for wave run-up, which read
in general form
(1)
where Zn% is the run-up level exceeded by n% of the waves, C is a coefficient, i reduction
factors for effects such as slope roughness, berms and angle of wave attack.
To allow comparison of the formulas for run-up and overtopping, the wave overtopping
formulas have been rewritten to obtain a direct expression for the required crest level above
the still water line. Where the general shape of the formulas for the overtopping rate is
(2)
with a maximum of
(3)
where q is the overtopping rate, Rc the crest height above the still water level and c1, c2, c3
and c4 are coefficients. Rewriting these equations, it follows that the crest level above the
still water line as function of the criterion for the overtopping rate and the wave conditions
is given by
(4)
with a maximum of
(5)
The expressions for the wave run-up and wave overtopping that are used in the different
countries have been compared by calculating the required crest level above the still water line
as function of the wave height. This comparison is carried out for a straight smooth 1:4 slope.
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This is similar to the representative slope of the Petten sea defence under design conditions.
The effects of berms, surface roughness, shallow foreshores or wave attack under an angle
with the dike have not been considered.
The wave periods corresponding to the significant wave height have been calculated as-
suming JONSWAP type spectrum with •0 = 3.3. (It should be noted that the spectral shape
in shallowwater close to the dike is usually significantly different due to breaking.) The peak
wave period has been calculated using the relation Tp = in whichC is 4.5 correspond-
ing to a wave steepness of sp = 0.03. Other wave period parameters (e.g. Tm and Tm–10)
have been calculated from the peak period using the relations Tm = Tm02 = Tp/1.28634 and
Tm–10 = Tp/1.10706.
For this combination of slope and wave conditions (steepness) the overtopping for-
mulae for breaking waves are governing. The left panel of Fig. 3 shows that the required
relative crest levels show a considerable scatter. The ratio between the highest and lowest
value is in the order of 1.5, which means a difference in crest height of several meters for
a significant wave height of 2–3 m. To compare the formula for non-breaking waves, the
required crest levels were computed for a slope of 1:2.5. The right panel of Fig. 3 shows
again the large spread in the crest level required to have the same amount of overtopping.
It is interesting to note that the formulae used in Niedersachsen and The Netherlands give
nearly the same results in this case. Note that in Belgium the formulae from The Nether-
lands are used.
One of the obvious observations from the figures above is that the shape of the curves
for the relationHs – Rc for methods based onwave run-up is different to those based onwave
overtopping. The curves based on wave run-up show a linear relation, whereas the curves
for overtopping criteria show a non-linear relation: the required crest level is progressively
increasing with the significant wave height.
Fig. 3: Comparison of the crest level above MSL for breaking (left) and non-breaking (right) waves
following different methods
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It is further interesting to note that the different countries make different distinctions
in their criteria for wave overtopping. Denmark is the only country where the angle of the
inner slope is an explicit factor in the allowable percentage of overtopping. Both Denmark
and TheNetherlands have further different criteria depending on the quality of the top layer
of the inner slope for grass dikes, whereas other countries use a single criterion.
The required hydraulic boundary conditions for the various applied methods to assess
the design height of the sea defences are the water level and the wave height and period at
the toe of the sea dike. The wave height parameter can beHs orHm0; the difference between
these two is usually not very large. For the wave period different characteristic parameters
are being used of which the mean period Tm is mostly used (DK, SH, UK). Other character-
istic periods that are used are the peak period Tp (Nds) and the spectral mean wave period
Tm–10 (NL, B and recently in Nds).
4.2 T h e h e i g h t o f t h e P e t t e n s e a d e f e n c e
The formulae for wave run-up and overtopping were applied to the data for the Petten
sea defence to assess the required height of this sea defence. Where the comparison of the
various formulae in Section 4.1 was carried out without the effects of reduction factors for
roughness, berm etc., it was ensured that the right corrections were included when applying
the formulae to the Petten sea defence. It was found that these reduction factors are calcu-
lated differently in the various methods, especially the factors for the effect of a berm and
for the effect of the angle of wave attack. The latter has no influence on this comparison as
the waves are assumed to approach the coast perpendicularly.
The required crest levels according to the various methods are shown in left panel of
Fig. 4. This comparison is based on the water levels, wave conditions, run-up or overtop-
ping formula and associated criteria for run-up or the overtopping discharges as applied in
the six countries. Note that for Niedersachsen accidentally overtopping has been considered
instead of run-up.
Fig. 4: Required crest level above NAP (•MSL) for the Petten sea defence following different methods; left
panel: basic comparison, right panel: comparison of modified methods for SH, Nds and UK (see text)
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It can be seen that three methods give results that differ up to about 1m, three other
methods show much larger differences. The fairly flat line for Niedersachsen is caused by
the design water level, which is independent of the return period. Investigation of the large
differences for Schleswig-Holstein, Niedersachsen and the UK showed that these could be
traced back to a few specific factors that are discussed below.
For Schleswig-Holstein three factors cause a large part of the differences. The first factor
is the reduction factor for a shallow foreshore that is applied in agreement with the original
expression by Van der Meer (TAW, 1999). This factor (approx. 0.83), which causes the dif-
ference between the results for 50 and 100 year for Schleswig-Holstein and Niedersachsen,
has not been included in the most recent formulae used in the Netherlands (TAW, 2002), as
the use of another representative wave period (Tm–10) left insufficient evidence for retaining
this factor. The Schleswig-Holstein expression for non-breaking waves includes further a
reduction factor for a berm, a factor that is not included in the formulae for non-breaking
waves from other countries. Finally, the formula for breaking waves contains a factor 1.25Tm
to approximate the peak periodTa in the original expression of Van derMeer (TAW, 1999) on
which the formula of Schleswig-Holstein is based. Asmentioned above, this factor is more in
the order of 1.45 for the considered conditions at Petten. The right panel of Fig. 4 shows the
required crest level with these three modifications to the expressions of Schleswig-Holstein.
It can be seen that the results are more in line with those of the other countries.
The expression for overtopping given in the EAK (2002) appears to contain the factor
cotwhere several similar equations for the other countries have the square root of this factor
on the same position (see Eq. 4). Using the square root leads to a higher crest level as shown
in the right panel of Fig. 4.
For the United Kingdom the main cause of the differences seems to be the way the
representative slope is calculated in the presence of a berm. Following the expression used in
the United Kingdom this slope is around 3.2, whereas other methods lead to values around
4.0. This has a significant effect on the required crest level as can be seen in the right panel of
Fig. 4, where the expressions from the United Kingdom have been combined with the Dutch
equation for the effect of a berm. The line for the United Kingdom nearly coincides with the
curve for Denmark.
Fig. 4 shows further that the methods of Denmark, The Netherlands and Belgium give
fairly similar results for shorter return periods, but for the longer return periods the differ-
ences are increasingly larger. For the return period of 10,000 years the difference is up to
1.5 m. As the overtopping formulae are the same, the different results for the methods of
Belgium and The Netherlands are entirely caused by the difference in water level: the 0.27 m
higher water level leads to a 0.8 m higher required crest height (10,000 year return period).
The results of the various methods were further analysed by varying certain input pa-
rameters and criteria so that these are gradually the same for all methods. Using the same
hydraulic input conditions (water level and waves) in the (modified) methods appears to lead
to fairly small differences between the results (Fig. 5, left panel). Note that for each method
the appropriate characteristic wave period has been used. These were all based on the same
deep water conditions, the SWAN results in the database and the ratios between these char-
acteristic periods mentioned in section 3.3.
Using both the same hydraulic boundary conditions and the same criteria for wave over-
topping (2 l/s/m) and a comparable criterion for run-up (2 % run-up level) clearly increases
the differences in the required crest level (Fig 5, right panel). It can be seen that increasing the
overtopping criterion from 1 l/s/m to 2 l/s/m (Nds, NL, B methods) leads to crest heights
that are lower by about 1 m. Given the fairly explicit statement in e.g. the German guidelines
Die Küste, 
Heft 70 (2005), Special Editon COMRISK,  Seiten 184, E 35 255 Lit.
68
(EAK, 2002) that “the criteria must be used with utmost care” and that “further research is
required to complete” the information “and to specify the criteria with greater accuracy” this
seems to be one of the larger gaps in present knowledge regarding sea dikes.
If the safety level adopted in the countries is also taken into consideration, the difference
in crest level is even larger. The safety level adopted in Denmark is between 50 and 200 yr, in
The Netherlands 2,000, 4,000 or 10,000 yr and in Belgium 1,000 yr. In the United Kingdom
a cost-effective solution is determined without adopting a specific uniform safety level.
From the comparison and the analysis it appeared further that it is important that the
formulae are used with the appropriate characteristic wave period. In the nearshore zone
often adopted relations between the various characteristic wave periods based on a standard
spectral shape such as a JONSWAP spectrum are not valid and their use may lead to errone-
ous results for the required crest height.
Testing the sensitivity of the crest height for the wave height and the wave period it ap-
pears that a 10 % different wave period has for the Petten sea defence a larger effect on the
required crest height than a 10 %higher wave height. If wave propagationmodels are used to
assess the conditions at the toe of the dike, it is therefore important that the model not only
predicts the wave heights well; a correct prediction of the characteristic wave period is even
more important. This means for generally applied wave models such as MIKE21 and SWAN
that they must capable of accurately predicting the spectral shape in complex shallow water
areas. It is known that e.g. SWAN has to be improved in this aspect.
5. A p p r o a c h e s t o t h e s a f e t y a s s e s s m e n t o f d u n e s
5.1 D e s c r i p t i o n o f m e t h o d s
Denmark uses a fairly simple criterion for the safety assessment of the dunes. Thesemust
have a minimum width of 40 m at a height of 5 m above MSL for unprotected dunes and 30
m for dunes protected by a revetment.
Fig. 5: Required crest levels above NAP with the same hydraulic boundary conditions (left panel) and
with the same hydraulic boundary conditions and the same criteria (right panel)
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In Schleswig-Holstein the sandy coasts are not included in the regular assessment of
safety against flooding. This is due to the different concept adopted here. According to the
coastal defence concept no dune erosion is allowed at all. Where necessary sand depots are
created high on the beach which should be sufficient to prevent erosion of the actual dunes
under design conditions. Calculations of the cross-shore transport are carried out to assess
the required reserve of sand on the beach.
In Niedersachsen numerical simulations are used to determine the dune erosion during
a design storm. Up to 2003 the model NEWDUNE was used. This model is comparable
with the model EDUNE by KRIEBEL (1989), which is briefly described in (EAK, 2002). The
NEWDUNE model was developed by Newe at LWI University of Braunschweig. NEW-
DUNE is based on an equilibrium profile. The transition slope in deeper water of 1:12.5 and
the 1:1 slope of the dune above the zone of wave attack are taken after VELLINGA (1983). Since
2003/2004 the numerical model UNIBEST-DE (English version of DUROSTA; STEETZEL,
1993) is used in addition to the NEWDUNEmodel. The experience in Niedersachsen shows
that both models give comparable results for design conditions, but that NEWDUNE over-
estimates the erosion for more regular events. After the numerical simulations are carried
out the remaining dune width at a level of NN+8 m (approx. 8 m above MSL) is taken as an
indicator for the strength of the considered dune profile. A width of 15 m remaining after a
simulated storm surge event is judged to be sufficient.
The method to calculate dune erosion in The Netherlands (and also in Belgium) is based
on an equilibrium profile after VELLINGA (1983) consisting of a dune front with a slope of
1:1 above the water line, a parabolic beach profile of to a depth of about 0.75H0,s and a the
transition to the original seabed on the seaward side with a slope of 1:12.5 (Fig. 6, top). This
Fig. 6: Principles of the calculation of the profile after dune erosion in The Netherlands
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equilibrium profile is fitted to the cross-section of the dune in such a way that the amount of
erosion of the dune is equal to the amount of deposition below the water level. An additional
amount of erosion equal to 25 % of the erosion above the still water level is added to account
for the uncertainty in storm duration and the inaccuracy of the model. The remaining profile
must have certain minimum dimensions (Fig. 6, bottom).
In the United Kingdom the dune erosion is considered to be part of the beach response
to storms. Both numerical and physical models are used to predict the beach response to
extreme conditions. A certain length of retreat implies failure.
Several countries use methods or criteria for dune erosion that are based on the method
developed by VELLINGA (1983). This method has been derived for peak wave periods up
to 12 s. A few years ago it was recognized in The Netherlands, based on much longer time
series, that longer wave periods have to be taken into account for the design conditions.
Recent small-scale flume tests have shown that the erosion is significantly more for longer
wave periods. The method to determine dune erosion after VELLINGA (1983) is not valid for
these longer periods. Further research and development of new procedures to calculate dune
erosion more accurately for these conditions is therefore relevant.
5.2 T h e s t r e n g t h o f t h e C a l l a n t s o o g d u n e p r o f i l e
The methods to assess the strength of the dune profile from Denmark and The Nether-
lands have been compared for the selected profile at Callantsoog. The numerical method used
inNiedersachsenwas not available. The erosion according to themethod of TheNetherlands
was computed using UCIT (Universal Coastal Intelligence Toolkit), a program developed
at WL | Delft Hydraulics for coastal management applications. In UCIT the erosion can
be calculated for a few selected return periods between 500 and 10,000 years. The result is
shown in Fig. 7.
Fig. 7: Comparison of the Dutch and Danish safety criteria for dune erosion for the profile at
Callantsoog
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As Denmark uses a safety levels in the order of 100 years and the probability of the de-
terministic design water level in Niedersachsen is in the order of 400–800 years, the criteria
for dune erosion in these countries have been comparedwith the calculated erosion according
to the original method in TheNetherlands for a return period of 500 years (Fig. 8). It appears
that the dune width at NAP+5 m is about 95 m, which is well above the Danish criterion of
40 m at a level of 5 m above MSL. The Danish criterion of 40 m is just equal to the calculated
retreat of the dunefront following the Dutch method for a 2,000 year return period. This
indicates that the criterion seems to be adequate for the safety levels usually adopted in Den-
mark, but that depends also on the height of the dune: for a dune with the same width but a
lower height the retreat according to the Dutch method would be larger. For the safety level
adopted in The Netherlands (10,000 years) the Danish criterion would be insufficient.
The indicator used in Niedersachsen, the remaining width at 8 m above MSL, is for the
500 year return period close to 50 m. This is well above the criterion of 15 m used that is ap-
plied in Niedersachsen. For the 10,000 year return period the remaining width at NAP + 8 m
is about 30 m, still sufficient according to the criterion applied in Niedersachsen.
Fig. 8: Comparison of the calculated dune erosion for the Callantsoog dune profile according to the
Dutch method with criteria for Denmark, Niedersachsen and The Netherlands (500 yr return period)
6. D i s c u s s i o n , c o n c l u s i o n s a n d r e c omm e n d a t i o n s
6.1 D i s c u s s i o n
From the comparison of the various methods to assess the hydraulic boundary condi-
tions and their use for safety assessment of the sea defences it can be concluded that the
general approach in the North Sea countries is fairly similar. The boundary conditions are
usually obtained by statistical evaluation and extrapolation of water levels and deep-water
wave conditions followed by numerical modelling to obtain the wave conditions nearshore.
The results are used in fairly similar expressions for run-up and overtopping. The differences
are mostly in the details such as coefficients and some specific aspects of the applications.
Water levels at different return periods are usually based on extrapolation of long time-
series of measured data. Remarkable here is the method used in Niedersachsen which leads
to a single design level irrespective of the probability. This is not suitable in a risk-based ap-
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proach. In the method used in Denmark to predict water levels for extreme events, different
statistical distributions are used for different locations (Weibull and Log-Normal) depending
on the quality of the fit.
The different methods to assess the design water levels lead to differences in the water
level of 20–30 cm. For the shorter return periods, that are similar to the period of observa-
tions, this is more thanmight be expected. This may be caused by differences in the used data.
For the longer return periods of 1,000 and 10,000 years the difference of 20–30 cm is not very
large considering that the confidence interval which is in the order of 1m for these return
periods. The fairly small difference in water level may have larger effects on the required crest
level due to the effect that this difference has on the wave height near the toe of sea dikes and
subsequently on the wave run-up and overtopping. For the Petten sea defence a difference
in water level thus leads to a difference in crest height of 0.6–1.0 m.
The formulae to determine the required crest height of the dikes use the wave conditions
at the toe of the structure as input parameter. These wave conditions are often limited by the
local water depth. In the commonly adopted method to determine the wave conditions at
the toe of the sea dikes using numerical models, the design water level and the applied model
are factors determining for the nearshore wave conditions. In these depth-limited conditions
the deep-water wave conditions has a negligible influence on the nearshore conditions. The
quality of the input for the crest level calculation depends therefore largely on the ability of
the model to predict the correct wave height and the required characteristic wave period.
From the comparison of the various methods to determine the required crest height of
the Petten sea defence it is concluded that the different methods lead to crest heights that vary
in the order of magnitude of meters for the same return period. This confirms the results of
the earlier study (DWW, 2001). The largest differences are caused by the formulae used to
calculate wave run-up and overtopping. If some specific factors in the formulae are modified
and the same hydraulic boundary conditions are used, the remaining difference is still in the
order of 1 m. but a difference of a few decimetres in the water level or a different overtopping
criterion lead also to differences in crest height in the order of 1 m.
The countries use different overtopping criteria for their sea dikes. The guidelines used
in Germany and the United Kingdom give rather vague ranges for the conditions were dam-
age may occur. Denmark and The Netherlands give clear criteria, which depend on the con-
dition of the toplayer of the dike. These criteria require a somewhat subjective judgement of
the quality of the grass cover and sand/clay layer in which the grass grows. The choice of the
overtopping criteria is therefore to some extent a subjective decision and can be a reason for
differences, especially because the required crest level is fairly sensitive to the applied crite-
rion. Increasing the allowable overtopping rate from 1 l/s/m to 2 l/s/m leads for Petten to a
crest height that is 0.6–1.0 m lower; a more strict run-up criterion of 2 % instead of 10 % in
the Danish method leads to a crest that is about 3 m higher.
Even if the dike fails to meet the given criterion for overtopping or run-up, the dike does
not necessarily fail immediately. The structure still has a certain remaining strength. For the
development of risk-based approaches it is necessary to obtain more insight into the criteria
for overtopping and run-up and the remaining strength once these are exceeded.
The approaches to the safety assessment of sandy coasts are quite different and range
from time-dependent simulation of dune erosion (Niedersachsen) via an equilibrium profile
method (TheNetherlands, Belgium) to a simple criterion for the required width of the dunes
(Denmark), though the latter is also based on erosion estimates using an equilibrium profile.
The fixed criterion for the dune width used in Denmark is not related to a probability of
exceedance. This is not suitable in a risk-based approach of flooding.
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Several countries use methods or criteria for dune erosion that are based on the method
developed by VELLINGA for wave periods up to 12 s (1983). Recent studies have shown that
the erosion is significantly more for longer wave periods. Further research and development
of new procedures to calculate dune erosionmore accurately for these conditions is therefore
relevant.
6.2 C o n c l u s i o n s a n d r e c omm e n d a t i o n s
Based on the comparison and analysis of the appliedmethods to determine the hydraulic
boundary conditions and their use in the safety assessment of the sea defences the following
general conclusions can be drawn:
• The methods used in the various countries to determine the required crest level lead to
dike heights that can vary several meters for the same return period.
• Major factors for these differences in the crest height of sea dikes are:
– The statistical methods to assess the design water level;
– The quality of the prediction of the wave parameters at the toe of the dike;
– The run-up and overtopping formulae including specific reduction factors and the way
the representative slope is calculated for compound slopes and berms;
– The strength criteria for overtopping and run-up.
• For the safety assessment of sandy coasts several countries use methods based on the work
of VELLINGA (1983). The way in which this has been implemented in tools and criteria is
quite different.
• Due to differences in methods adopted to determine the hydraulic boundary conditions
and the strength criteria the results of risk assessments are hardly comparable. The other
way around, a common approach to risk assessment might thus lead to adaptations in dike
design in the various countries.
Based on the above conclusions the following general recommendations can be made:
• To further improve insight in the differences in the various methods to determine the hy-
draulic boundary conditions and in the strength formulations combined research, either in
joint projects or by exchange of results, is recommended. On the longer term, this might
lead to a convergence of the methods for risk assessment used in the various countries.
Relevant aspects may include:
– Statistical methods for determination of design water level for very long return
periods;
– Improving the quality of wave modelling tools by extensive validation for typical
applications such as open coasts, estuaries andWadden sea areas, including exchange of
data for this purpose;
– Development for better defined criteria for wave run-up / overtopping that leave less
opportunity for subjective choices and that have a clear relation with the actual risk of
failure and flooding.
• To obtain more insight into differences due to the geographical situation in each country,
it is recommended to carry out a comparative risk analysis using a single method to derive
hydraulic boundary conditions for a number of selected sites in the countries of theNorth
Sea Coastal Managers Group.
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Risk Assessment for Flanders
COMRISK Subproject 6
TOON VERWAEST, KOEN TROUW
S umm a r y
The coastal lowlands of the Belgian region Vlaanderen and the Dutch region Zeeuws-
Vlaanderen constitute one cross-border flood unit. If a dike breaches in the Dutch part of this
flood unit, the water might well flow into Belgium and vice versa.
This paper presents the results of a case study of calculation of coastal flooding risk for
a cross-border coastal flood unit from Zeebrugge in Belgium (Vlaanderen) to Breskens in the
Netherlands (Zeeuws-Vlaanderen), abbreviated within the COMRISK project as the „Flanders“
case study area. The goal of the study was to investigate how good a flood risk assessment can be
done with state of the art knowledge. The approach chosen was to do a case study with the avai-
lable risk assessment methods and to evaluate the effects of the different sources of uncertainties
by means of a sensitivity analysis.
Hydrometeorological boundary conditions characterising extreme storm events were ana-
lysed. The return period of an extreme storm resulting in serious flooding is of the order of
magnitude of 1.000 years or more, whereas data of hydrometeorological characteristics of storms
are limited to a series of less than 100 years. Therefore a very large uncertainty exists on the expec-
ted return period of extreme storm events causing serious flooding. The storm surge level of an
extreme storm event is the most determining storm characteristic with respect to the associated
flooding. Wave characteristics are also important, but found to be relatively well correlated with
the storm surge level.
Different modes of failure of the sea defences were investigated. The most relevant in this
case were erosion of beaches in front of sea defence structures followed by instabilities of parts
of these structures due to wave attack and/or overtopping, followed by erosion of the core of
these structures untill breaching. Dune erosion was also investigated. Where dunes still exist as
the natural sea defences no breaching occured.
Flood modeling results were sensitive to the various estimates made for breach growth, in
depth as well as in width. Stability of the secondary dikes existing in some parts of the coastal
plain was assumed. With or without temporary blocking of the flooding propagation by se-
condary dikes the model results showed that the more distant parts of the coastal plain were
not flooded.
As consequences of a flooding event direct economic damage and human casualties were
caculated on a GIS-based approach. Thus significant consequences are not taken into account,
e.g., damage to nature, psychological damage, damage to the economy outside the flooded area.
For a series of return periods (1,000 years, 4,000 years, 10,000 years and 40,000 years) ex-
pected values of the consequences were calculated. The annual risk was calculated as a sum of the
probabilities times the consequences. The propagation of the different sources of uncertainties
results in an uncertainty with a standard deviation of a factor 10 (order of magnitude) on the
annual risk.
It is concluded that, on the one hand, further research is essential to reduce the very large
uncertainty on the results. Research is most needed on the failure behaviour of the sea defences
in the time domain (beach erosion, initiation of damage, breaching, breach growth...). On the
other hand, the risk calculations that are feasible at present, with very limited accuracies, are ne-
vertheless very useful for coastal defence management actions like informing the public, defining
research priorities, comparing the relative importance of measures and defences, and elaborating
contingency plans for possible scenarios of breaching of defences.
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Z u s a mm e n f a s s u n g
Die Küstenniederungen in der belgischen Region Vlaanderen und der niederländischen Re-
gion Zeeuws-Vlaanderen stellen einen grenzüberschreitenden Flutraum dar. Wenn ein Deich im
niederländischen Teil bricht wird das Wasser auch in Belgien einströmen und vice versa.
In diesem Beitrag werden die Resultate einer Fallstudie zur Berechnung der Überflutungs-
risiken für einen grenzüberschreitenden Flutraum von Zeebrugge in Belgien bis Breskens in den
Niederlanden dargestellt, die sog. Fallstudie Flanders. Ziel war es zu untersuchen, inwieweit mit
dem heutigen Kenntnisstand eine Risikoermittlung durchgeführt werden kann. Mit den heute
verfügbaren Methoden wurde das Risiko ermittelt und die Auswirkungen der verschiedenen
Quellen für Unsicherheiten mittels einer Sensitivitätsanalyse bewertet.
Hydrometeorologische Rahmenbedingungen für Extremereignisse wurden analysiert. Der
Wiederkehrintervall für Extremereignisse die zu einer Überflutung führen liegt bei 1,000 Jahren
und mehr, während die entsprechenden Datenbestände weniger als 100 Jahre lang sind. Daher
existiert eine große Unsicherheit hinsichtlich der Wiederkehrintervalle für Überflutungsereig-
nisse. Der Sturmwasserstand ist der bestimmende Parameter hinsichtlich der Überflutung. Auch
Wellenparameter sind signifikant, aber korrelieren relativ gut zu den Sturmwasserständen.
Verschiedene Versagensmechanismen wurden untersucht. Der relevanteste Mechanismus
war die Erosion der Strände vor Schutzwerken, gefolgt durch Erosion des Kernes dieser Schutz-
werke bis zum Versagen (Durchbrechen). Dünenerosion wurde ebenfalls untersucht. Dort, wo
Dünen als natürlicher Schutz noch vorhanden sind trat kein Versagen auf.
Die Resultate der Überflutungssimulation reagierten empfindlich auf die verschiedenen
Annahmen für die Bruchentwicklung, sowohl in der Breite wie in der Tiefe. Die Standfestigkeit
von vorhandenen zweiten Deichlinien wurde angenommen. Mit oder ohne zeitliche Blockierung
der Flutwelle durch zweite Deichlinien zeigten die Simulationen, dass die küstenfernen Regionen
nicht überflutet wurden.
Die aus einer Überflutung resultierenden direkten wirtschaftlichen Schäden undMenschen-
verluste wurden GIS-gestützt ermittelt. Signifikante Schadenskategorien wie Schäden an der
Natur, psychologische Schäden und indirekte wirtschaftliche Schäden außerhalb des überfluteten
Raumes wurden nicht berücksichtigt.
Für verschiedene Wiederkehrintervälle (1.000, 4.000, 10.000 und 40.000 Jahre) wurden
die Werte ermittelt. Das jährliche Risiko wurde berechnet als das Produkt aus der Summe der
Versagenswahrscheinlichkeiten und der Konsequenzen (Schäden). Die Fehlerfortpflanzung der
verschiedenen Unsicherheitsfaktoren resultiert in einem Faktor 10 für die Standardabweichung
(Größenordnung 10) für das jährliche Risiko.
Es wird gefolgert, dass weitere Forschung unabdingbar ist um die sehr großen Unsicher-
heiten zu reduzieren. Forschungsbedarf besteht insbesondere beim zeitlichen Versagensverhal-
ten der Schutzwerke (Stranderosion, Schadensinitiierung am Bauwerk, Bruchentstehung und
-Entwicklung). Trotzdem sind die Risikoermittlungen mit den bestehenden Unsicherheiten von
großem Wert für Bestandteile eines Risikomanagements wie die Information der Öffentlichkeit,
die Definition von Forschungsprioritäten, den Vergleich der (relativen) Bedeutung der einzelnen
Maßnahmen und Schutzwerke, und für die Erstellung von Katastrophenplänen für verschiedene
Bruchszenarien.
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1. I n t r o d u c t i o n
The coastal lowlands of the Belgian region Vlaanderen and the Dutch region Zeeuws-
Vlaanderen constitute a single cross-border coastal flood unit with a length along the coast-
line of 25 km and an landwardth width of 15 km (Fig. 1). If a dike breaches in the Dutch
part of this flood unit, the water might well flow into Belgium and vice versa. For historical
reasons, both countries have rather different coastal defence approaches and safety standards.
These different approaches might result in unbalanced investments for coastal defence sche-
mes in the two sections of the flood unit.
The responsibilities of Dutch and Belgian coastal defence administrations end at the
respective national borders. In order to achieve common approaches, a cross-border project,
including some form of transnational co-operation with the responsible local authorities like
the "Zeeuws-Vlaanderen Water Board”, became necessary. Within the INTERREG IIIB
project COMRISK (EU-project – www.comrisk.org) and under the auspices of the North
Sea CoastalManagement Group, an international platform to implement such a cross-border
pilot study is founded. The Coastal Division of the Flemish Community leads the subpro-
ject about the Flood Risk in the cross boundary area Vlaanderen-Zeeuws-Vlaanderen. The
study is carried out by the consultant IMDC and subcontractors. A steering committee was
established to guide and discuss the results. The committee consists of governmental organi-
zations of Belgium (Coastal Division and Flanders Hydraulic Research) and theNetherlands
(Rijkswaterstaat, the province and the polder board).
Fig. 1: Coastal flood unit from Zeebrugge in Belgium to Breskens in the Netherlands
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2. R i s k a s s e s s m e n t m e t h o d
Future coastal flooding damage (e.g. in euro) for a certain area and within a specified
time horizon, is an extremely stochastic quantity, mostly due to the fact that coastal flooding
events are very rare in comparison to the time horizons considered in day to day coastal
defence management practice. In this case the return period of a coastal flooding is of the
order of magnitude of 1.000 years. Time horizons for specific coastal defence management
measures are in the order of magnitude of 10 years (e.g. sand nourishment) to 100 years (e.g.
dike construction). The risk for a certain area and within a specified time horizon is defined
as the coastal flooding damage that can be expected on average, hypothetically considering
manyfolds of futures within the specified time horizon that all have a certain probability of
occuring. Because of very rare occurance of coastal flooding events, the risk is approximately
linear with the considered time horizon. Therefore it is customary to divide the risk by the
time horizon and thus calculating the annual risk (e.g in euro/year). Another way to explain
the annual risk is as the product of the probability of occurrence of an event and the damages
(or more general the consequences, comprising economical damages, casualties etcetera), in-
tegrated for all possible extreme events. Knowledge of the annual risk can be interesting for
a number of reasons: as a basis for comparison between different areas in order to set priori-
ties, to balance insurance premiums with damage compensations, to carry out a cost-benefit
analysis to evaluate investments in coastal defence works (e.g. dikes/ beach nourishments),
to elaborate contingency plans for possible scenarios of breaching of defences, to compare
the relative importance of defences, to inform and sensitize the public about the importance
of defences etcetera. But, for coastal defence management purposes one always has to keep
in mind that risk and annual risk are only average quantities. One has to be aware when
using risk calculation results not to forget the inherent extremely stochastic nature of coastal
floodings. In addition to information about the risk, for coastal defence management one has
to know about the return period of significant coastal flooding events. This characteristic
is left out in the final results of a risk calculation, due to the very definition of risk itself as
an average quantity, however intermediate results of a risk calculation can be used to give
information about return periods.
The risk assessment method consisted of calculating the expected consequences for a
limited number of representative storm events associated with a certain return period. Each
of these representative storm events is taken to represent a cluster of possible storms, so that
all clusters together represent all possible storm events. Hydrometeorological characteris-
tics are assumed to be comparable for all storm events within the same cluster. The annual
risk was calculated as a weighted sum of the probabilities times the consequences for the
representative events. Thus the integration over all possible extreme events is discretised as a
summation of a limited number of representative events. In this case study 4 representative
events were defined, with characteristic return periods 1.000 years, 4.000 years, 10.000 years
and 40.000 years. Expected values of the consequences were calculated for each of these. Risk
is calculated as a summation for the 4 events of the product of damage and probability. By
chosing this risk assessment method we assured that the results of the calculation provided
information not only on the risk but also on the return periods of coastal flooding conse-
quences.
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3. I n v e n t o r y
3.1 H y d r om e t e o r o l o g i c a l b o u n d a r y c o n d i t i o n s
Seventy five years of measurements of water levels and twenty five years of deep water
wave measurements at the Belgian coast are available. The return period of extreme storm
events resulting in serious flooding is of the order of magnitude of 1.000 years or more,
whereas data of hydrometeorological characteristics of storms are limited to a series of less
than 100 years. Therefore a very large uncertainty exists on the expected return period of
extreme storm events causing serious flooding. For example the standard deviation on the
water level of 40 cm for the 1 in 10.000 year storm, corresponds with an order of magnitude
of 10 in return period introducing a factor of 10 uncertainty on the calculated annual risk.
The storm surge level of an extreme storm event is the most determining storm charac-
teristic with respect to the associated flooding. Wave characteristics are also important, but
found to be relatively well correlated with the storm surge level.
3.1.1 W a t e r l e v e l
Water level is the most important parameter and is modeled by sommation of surge
and tide variations. Fig. 2 shows the variation of the water level, obtained as the sum of the
astronomical tide and the storm surge.
The storm duration (and hence the duration of the simulations) was set at 45 hours,
following an analysis of historical storms. A spring tide was taken as the water level, with a
storm development superimposed. The maximum storm surge is the difference between the
water level at the return period concerned and the maximumwater level at the selected spring
tide. The storm surge varies during the duration of the storm according to a square cosine
function, with a surge of 0 m at the beginning and at the end of the storm.
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Fig. 2: Model for water level variation during extreme event
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3.1.2 Wa v e s
Water level dependent statistics on wave heights and periods were established at measu-
rement locations. These wave statistics have been transformed to nearshore wave characte-
ristics using a calibrated numerical wave model (SWAN). The results of this consist of wave
parameters at a line along the coast, with a water depth at about –5 m below low water, a
position at which the bathymetry will not change considerably during storms.
The wave height variation in time is modeled with a square cosine function with the
maximum in accordance with the maximum of the water level but with a period of 125
hours. For the peak period, it is assumed that the steepness of the wave remains constant with
respect to the steepness at the storm maximum.
During a storm the beach in front of the dike will erode. Due to the lowering of the bed
level, waves will travel more easily towards the toe of the dike, hence to know thewave height
at the toe of the dike, it is important to calculate the erosion of the beach.
The erosion of the beach during the stormwas determined with DUROSTA (STEETZEL,
1993). This is a time-dependent, one-dimensional model which determines the transforma-
tion of the wave height for a given bathymetry using an internal wave model. The most
important parameters in the model are the hydrodynamic parameters and the grain diameter.
The model takes the effect of hard structures such as sea dikes into account. The transformed
waves cause a cross-shore transport of sand and a possible loss of sand at the sea side. After
the storm, a new beach profile is obtained. For this profile, the hydrodynamic parameters are
determined using the parameters at storm maximum as input. This is slightly conservative,
since the profile is further evolved after the peak of the storm.
In principle, the wave height must be determined at the toe of the dike. However, most
wave models (Swan, Endec, etc.) produce less reliable wave heights at very shallow water
depths. Therefore the wave height at a distance of half a wave length from the toe of the dike
is used. However, it is evident that the wave height can never exceed the water depth at the
toe of the dike. This is therefore used as a limiting value.
The period to be entered in the overtopping calculations is Tm-1.0. In DUROSTA the
period is assumed to have a constant value. Swan (1D) gives a better prediction of Tm-1.0.
However, for Ostend an underestimate of 11 % was found compared to the measured va-
lues. It is not clear to what extent this underestimation is a function of the water depth. It is
proposed to use the wave period obtained from Swan, augmented by 20 %, with a minimum
of the deep water peak period divided by 1.1 (because the spectrum may be double peaked
on shallow water).
Fig. 3 shows an example of the evolution of the beach profile during a storm. Without
erosion, the waves are not able to reach the dike, but after erosion, the water depth at the
toe is 1.5 m.
3.2 Information on the sea defences
Design drawings of the dikes were supplemented with recent beach profiles and dike
crest surveys. In addition to existing geotechnical data, soundings and drillings were carried
out along the Flemish dikes. Most of the dikes have a complex subsoil structure. The dikes
often contain the historical sea defence, which has been breached and repaired on several
occasions through time (past millennium). Also water level variations inside the dike are
recorded, in order to predict the water level in the dike during an extreme storm.
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Various data of beach and dune grain size are available from past measurement cam-
paigns. The topography of the beaches and the dunes was taken from airborn laser altimetry
measurements. Possible future changes of this topography (erosion / sedimentation) have
not been taken into account.
4. F a i l u r e m e c h a n i s m s
4.1 D u n e b r e a c h i n g
To estimate the erosion risk of the dunes, the Vellinga approach was used (VELLINGA,
1986). An equilibrium profile is fitted to the existing (pre-storm) profile such that the eroded
volume in the dune equals the volume deposited in front of the dune (e.g. Fig. 4). The Vellinga
profile depends on the water level, the waves and the grain size. A breach is assumed to occur
if the dune volume above the maximum water level is smaller than a critical volume.
4.2 D i k e b r e a c h i n g
Dike breaching results from a cascade of mechanisms. Instabilities of parts of the dikes
caused by wave attack and/or overtopping are followed by erosion of the core of these struc-
tures untill finally breaching.
4.2.1 W a v e o v e r t o p p i n g
Wave overtopping is calculated using the formula of VANDERMEER (TAW, 2002).Wave
overtopping is of importance if :
Fig. 3: Example of effect of beach erosion
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a) the volume of overtopping water is too large, causing floodings in the inhabited area
behind the dike, or
b) the overtopping rate causes erosion of the crest/inner slope of the dike, eventually resul-
ting in breaching of the dike.
Thewater velocities over the dike caused by the overtopping are calculated with the formulae
of SCHÜTTRUMPF (2003).
4.2.2 M a c r o s t a b i l i t y o u t e r s l o p e
The macro stability of the front slope of the dikes has been tested by means of the
SLOPE/W software (Geo-Slope, 2002). The method of Bishop has been used. In general,
this method compares the moment of the resistance forces to the moment of the driving
forces. The ratio of both moments is the safety coefficient. The resistance forces consist of
the shear resistance of the soil, cohesion and the weight of a part of the structure and the soil.
The loads consist of the other part of the structure and the soil that result in shear driving
moment. To determine the weight of the structure and the soil, the level of the groundwater
inside the dike (calculated with GEUZE and ABOTT, 1961 and verified with groundwater level
measurements in the dike) is of uttermost importance. For a large number of predefined slip
surfaces, the safety coefficient has been calculated. The smallest value of the safety coefficient,
which should be larger than 1, corresponds to the most critical slip surface. The most critical
situation occurs at low water after the highest high water.
4.2.3 R e v e t m e n t
The revetment consists mostly of armed concrete (Belgium) and asphalt or stones (the
Netherlands). The stability of the revetment is evaluated with the Duth safety assessment
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Fig. 4: Dune erosion with indication of original and equilibrium profile
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methods (TAW, 2004). The armed concrete does not contribute to failure, the asphalt or
stones fail, but mostly they are coveredwith a layer of sand, which does not erode completely
during a storm.
4.2.4 E r o s i o n o f t h e c o r e u n t i l l b r e a c h i n g
To calculate the erosion process during overtopping the sand transport is calculated
as the product of a flow rate and an average sand concentration. The assumed average sand
concentration is 5 % (based on physical model results). The erosion of the dike body after
failure of the outer slope revetment is based on the wave height at the toe of the dike.
4.2.5 B r e a c h g r o w t h
Breach growth information was derived from literature data of historical breach forma-
tion. A breach grows quite fast in depth (1 to 2 hours).Widthways breach grow data between
0,5 m/hour and 82 m/hour were found. Taking into consideration the extreme hydromete-
oconditions at sea, with waves and wind, a rather large value of 30 m/hour was chosen to be
used in this case study as expected value. But it is also found by sensitivity analysis that the
effect of this breach growth assumption is large.
5. F l o o d m o d e l l i n g
A two-dimensional hydrodynamic model (Mike21) was used for the flood modelling.
The Digital Elevation Models of both Zeeuws-Vlaanderen and Vlaanderen were used for the
altimetry. The Zeeuws-Vlaanderen model was available as a 5 m grid, the Vlaanderen model
consisted of points with an average density of 3 per 10 m2. These DEMs were further im-
proved with land survey data of canal dikes inside the flood plain: these narrow elements are
important for controlling the water levels and extend of the inundated area. The final model-
ling grid is rectangular with a grid size of 25 m. The water level at sea was used as a boundary
condition. The roughness is taken uniformly over the entire terrain because sensitivity tests
indicated that the roughness values don’t significantly influence the extension of the flood
area. Stability of the secondary dikes existing in some parts of the coastal plain was assumed.
With or without temporary blocking of the flooding propagation by secondary dikes the
model results showed that the more distant parts of the coastal plain were not flooded.
6. C o n s e q u e n c e s
To calculate the consequences of flooding, the method developed by Flanders Hydrau-
lics Research is used for Vlaanderen, and the method of Rijkswaterstaat (Directorate General
of public works and Water management, the Netherlands) is used for the Netherlands. The
twomethods are similar. Direct economic damage and human casualties are considered as the
consequences of a flooding event. Thus significant consequences are not taken into account,
e.g., damage to nature, psychological damage, damage to the economy outside the flooded
area.
83
Die Küste, 
Heft 70 (2005), Special Editon COMRISK,  Seiten 184, E 35 255 Lit.
Themethods are based on aGIS-approach. Themaximum damage per cell is determined
on the basis of land-use maps and information obtained from the National Bureau of Stati-
stics. The damage in the area is then calculated for each category of damage (housing, pos-
sessions, agriculture, industry) based on damage functions. Damage functions represent the
development of the damage as a function of the depth of inundation, and replacement values
or maximum damage values for these categories. This can be done for all potential damage
categories. Combining the two sets of data produces the damage per cell. A similar method
is used for casualties, with the difference that the maximum rise velocity (Vlaanderen) or the
maximum horizontal velocity (the Netherlands) is also used as an input parameter.
7. R e s u l t s a n d C o n c l u s i o n s
The calculated damages and casualties for the different representative events ar shown
respectively in Table 1 and Table 2.
Table 1 : Direct economic damage
Return period Vlaanderen (B) Zeeuw-Vlaanderen (NL) Total
1.000 years 0 5.000.000 euro 5.000.000 euro
4.000 years 80.000.000 euro 20.000.000 euro 100.000.000 euro
10.000 years 400.000.000 euro 30.000.000 euro 430.000.000 euro
40.000 years 700.000.000 euro 300.000.000 euro 1.000.000.000 euro
Table 2: Casualties
Return period Vlaanderen (B) Zeeuw-Vlaanderen (NL) Total
1.000 years 0 4 4
4.000 years 0 6 6
10.000 years 2 8 10
40.000 years 4 24 28
Most damage is in the Flemish part. This is correlated with the relatively high wealth of
the coastal community of Knokke-Heist. Most casualties are in the Dutch part. This can be
explained by the high rise velocities caused by secondary dikes blocking the flood propaga-
tion for a while.
The annual risk was calculated from the numbers in Table 1 resulting in a relatively
small value of 100.000 à 200.000 euro/year. However the propagation of the different sources
of uncertainties results in an uncertainty with a standard deviation of a factor 10 (order of
magnitude) on the annual risk.
It is concluded that, on the one hand, further research is essential to reduce the very
large uncertainty on the risk results. Research is most needed on the failure behaviour of the
sea defences in the time domain (beach erosion, initiation of damage, breaching, breach
growth ...). On the other hand, the risk calculations that are feasible at present, with very
limited accuracies, are nevertheless very useful for coastal defence management actions like
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informing the public, defining research priorities, comparing the relative importance of
measures and defences, and elaborating contingency plans for possible scenarios of brea-
ching of defences.
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Risk Assessment for the Ribe Area
COMRISK Subproject 7
THORSTEN PIONTKOWITZ, ANDREAS KORTENHAUS, HOCINE OUMERACI
S umm a r y
Within COMRISK subproject SP7, a risk assessment of the coastal defence system in Ribe/
Denmark has been performed based on the state-of-the-art of flood risk analysis methods. The
flood risk has been defined as the product of the flooding probability and the expected con-
sequences of flooding. This paper describes the detailed hazard analysis by which the overall
flooding probability of the Ribe defence system has been achieved. Results of sensitivity analyses
regarding the assessment of uncertainties for input parameters and models used, the considera-
tion of other special constructions such as one sluice and three outlets as well as an approach
of dividing the defence system into ‘homogenous’ sections with respect to governing load and
resistance parameters are also described.
Furthermore, the paper provides information about the vulnerability analysis, which has
been performed to evaluate the consequences in case of flooding. Relevant damage categories,
comprising vulnerable assets or non-material values, have been selected and valued together with
the derivation of depth-damage functions for each damage category. Seven breach and inunda-
tion scenarios have been defined to assess the range of expected damage due to flooding in the
flood prone area. Finally, risk values have been assessed.
Z u s a mm e n f a s s u n g
Innerhalb des siebten Teilprojekts von COMRISK wurde eine Risikoanalyse des Hoch-
wasser- und Küstenschutzsystems (HuK-System) in Ribe/Dänemark durchgeführt. Das Über-
flutungsrisiko wurde hierbei definiert als das Produkt aus Versagenswahrscheinlichkeit des
HuK-Systems und dem zu erwartenden potenziellen Schaden im Falle einer Überflutung. Dieser
Beitrag beschreibt zunächst die detaillierte Gefahrenanalyse mit der die Gesamtversagenswahr-
scheinlichkeit des HuK-Systems in Ribe ermittelt wurde. Die Ergebnisse einer Sensitivitätsana-
lyse bezüglich der Abschätzung von Unsicherheiten der Eingangsparameter und Modelle, die
Berücksichtigung von Sonderbauwerken (eine Schleuse und drei Auslässe), sowie die Einteilung
des HuK-Systems in ,homogene‘ Abschnitte abhängig vonmaßgebenden Belastungs- undWider-
standsparametern werden ebenfalls beschrieben.
Zusätzlich wird die Vulnerabilitätsanalyse beschrieben, die durchgeführt wurde um die be-
drohten Werte und die potenzielle Schädigung im Untersuchungsgebiet abzuschätzen. Hierzu
wurden maßgebende Schadenskategorien, die Vermögensobjekte oder nicht materielle Werte
umfassten, ausgewählt und Schadensfunktionen für jede Schadenskategorie hergeleitet. Sieben
Versagens- und Überflutungsszenarien wurden definiert, um die Größenordnung des durch
Überflutung verursachten potenziellen Schadens ermitteln zu können. Abschließend wurden
szenarienabhängige Risiken bestimmt und beurteilt.
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1. I n t r o d u c t i o n
More than 16 million people, corresponding to approx. 20 % of the total population in
theNorth Sea region, live in coastal lowlands. Major economic activities, such as the seaports
of Rotterdam, London andHamburg or the tourist industry, have been increasingly concen-
trated in coastal regions over the last centuries. In addition, storm surges have increased over
the last decades, both in frequency and intensity, increasing the hazard to the coastal regions.
This has led to an increase of vulnerability to natural hazards within these regions.
Defence structures (e.g. sea dikes) to protect the flood prone areas have been designed
by means of purely deterministic approaches or based on experience. Due to decreasing
resources and increasing costs it is more and more desirable to optimise the cost-benefit-
ratio for these structures (OUMERACI, 2004). Within the COMRISK subproject SP7, a risk
assessment of the coastal defence system in Ribe/Denmark has been performed based on the
state-of-the-art of flood risk analysis methods. The overall flooding risk has been defined as
the product of the flooding probability Pf and the expected consequences of flooding E(D).
The study has been performed in two major steps which comprises (I) the hazard ana-
lysis (calculation of the overall flooding probability) and the (II) the vulnerability analysis
evaluating the expected consequences of flooding. Latter has been performed by the Danish
Coastal Authority (DCA), being responsible for subproject SP7. The hazard analysis has
been carried out together with the Leichtweiß-Institute for Hydraulic Engineering at the
Technical University Braunschweig, Germany.
The overall aim of this paper is to describe the risk analysis of the Ribe area. For this
purpose, the defence system and its components, the input parameters and their uncertainties
as well as the limit state equations (LSE) and the probabilistic calculations will be described.
Damage categories applied within the vulnerability analysis will be listed and their valuation
will be explained togetherwith the derivation of the depth-damage functions for each damage
category. Seven breach and inundation scenarios are defined to assess the range of expected
damage due to flooding in the flood prone area. Finally, the overall results will be critically
discussed and remarks for future developments will be given.
2. C o a s t a l D e f e n c e S y s t e m i n R i b e
The Ribe defence system is located about 50 km north of the German-Danish border at
the Wadden Sea coast protecting approximately 95 km2 low-lying flat marsh land surroun-
ding Ribe town. Ribe is the oldest town in Denmark with about 9000 inhabitants. Three
streams and a large river, Ribe Å, cross the flat marshland on their way towards their mouths
88
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(see Fig. 1). The river flows through Ribe town and passes a sluice shortly before reaching
its mouth. The three streams pass the defence line through three outlets.
In this way, the 15.3 km long defence line consists of a main dike structure, a sluice
and three outlets. The main dike is characterised by a sand core and a clay/grass cover. The
standard profile shows a 1:10 seaward slope and a crown height of 6.88 mDVR90. The stan-
dard cross section and the key geometric parameters are shown in Fig. 2. The dike structure,
the sluice and outlets are described in more detail in OUMERACI et al. (2004) and DANISH
COASTAL AUTHORITY (2004).
Fig. 1: Map of the Ribe flood defence system
Fig. 2: Standard cross-section of the main dike in Ribe (km 6,644 as an example)
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3. H a z a r d a n a l y s i s
For the deterministic and probabilistic calculationswithin the hazard analysis, themodel
by Kortenhaus (2003) for sea dikes has been used. It comprises 25 failure mechanisms with
a total number of 87 input parameters. The input parameters were grouped into parameters
describing (I) the geometry of the structure, (II) the hydromechanic boundary conditions,
and (III) the geotechnical properties of the structure.
3.1 I n p u t p a r a m e t e r s
I. Geometrical parameters
Topographic measurements were available for six cross sections along the main dike
line which were regarded as the weakest points of the main dike. Thus, it was concluded that
analysing these profiles would account for the potential weak spots of the dike.
The crest heights of themain dike were taken from availablemeasurements performed in
different years. The dimensions and constructional details of the sluice and the outlets were
taken from technical drawings which were made available by the DCA.
II. Hydraulic boundary conditions
The design water level for all cross sections, the sluice and the outlets is a pre-described
value which was determined from measurements at the Danish coast. It is defined as hw =
5.22 m for a 200-year return period.
The input parameters for wave height andwave periods resulted from a study performed
by Danish Hydraulic Institute (DHI). The offshore input parameters for this study were
given by DCA so that 21 simulations with different input parameters were performed. The
results of these runs are given as wave heights Hm0 and wave periods Tm for specific points
along the coastline (100 m distance) for water depths corresponding to 50 m and 300 m dis-
tance to the toe of the dike, respectively.
Angles of wave attack were based on instructions given by the DCA and corresponded
to the most unfavourable conditions for the specific cross sections. The duration of design
storm surge was assumed to be constant as ts = 6.5 h.
III. Geotechnical parameters
All geotechnical parameters like the shear strength of the clay were predefined by the
DCA. This information was based on geotechnical investigations which were performed
close to the six cross sections during reinforcement works in 1980.
3.2 D e t e r m i n i s t i c c a l c u l a t i o n s
3.2.1 L i m i t s t a t e e q u a t i o n s
For deterministic calculations of the dike sections a total number of 23 failure mecha-
nisms were considered. Due to the lack of stone revetments at the Ribe main dike all failure
mechanisms associated with stone revetments were not considered for the calculations. Fig. 3
gives an overview of failure mechanisms of a sea dike considered in the method by KORTEN-
HAUS (2003).
Die Küste, 
Heft 70 (2005), Special Editon COMRISK,  Seiten 184, E 35 255 Lit.
91
For deterministic calculations of the sluice, the failuremechanismsdescribed inKORTEN-
HAUS (2003) could not be used. Therefore, OUMERACI et al. (2004) have formulated further
limit state equations (LSE) describing e.g. the stability of the gates, piping underneath the
sluice, wave overtopping over the gates and human error.
The failure mechanisms for the Ribe outlets are a combination of the failure mechanisms
for the sluice and those for the dike sections. This combination was chosen since the outlets
are partly sluices (walls, gates, etc.) but also show the characteristics of a dike (slope, grass
cover, crest, etc.). Details of this approach are described in OUMERACI et al. (2004).
3.2.2 C a l c u l a t i o n o f d i k e s e c t i o n s
A deterministic calculation for all failure mechanisms described in section 3.2.1 was
performed for all six dike sections showing that the failure mode “erosion of grass cover at
the seaward side” will lead to failure for all cross sections. This means that for a design water
level of hw = 5.22m and a storm surge duration of ts = 6.5 h the grass cover both at the seaward
and shoreward side of the dike will fail.
3.2.3 C a l c u l a t i o n s f o r s l u i c e a n d o u t l e t s
The results of the deterministic calculation of the sluice and the outlets showed that there
is failure for the LSE “wave overtopping” under design conditions. Consequently, there is
also a total failure (inundation of flood prone areas) for the sluice and the outlets. The safety
coefficients for wave overtopping and overflow are significantly lower as compared to the
dike cross sections. A reason for this observation is that the seaward slope is much steeper
in the case of the outlets. Furthermore, the water depth in front of the structures is signifi-
cantly larger (up to 5.0 m) than in front of the dikes, thus allowing higher waves to occur at
the structures.
Fig. 3: Overview of failure mechanisms of a sea dike considered in the method after KORTENHAUS (2003)
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3.3 U n c e r t a i n t y o f i n p u t p a r a m e t e r s
Uncertainties indicate the variation of parameters around their mean values. They can
be estimated using either a full statistical distribution or a mean value and a standard devi-
ation assuming a Normal distribution. For some parameters, which were considered to be
important for the failure mechanisms (a sensitivity analysis was performed beforehand), the
uncertainties were evaluated in more detail (water level, dike height, wave height and wave
period, geotechnical parameters, model uncertainties). Tab. 1 shows the results of the uncer-
tainty evaluations used in this study.
3.4 P r o b a b i l i s t i c c a l c u l a t i o n s
In a first step, the failure probability Pf of each mechanism was determined. Level II
(FORM) or Level III (Monte Carlo Simulation) calculations were performed depending
on the complexity of the limit state equations. The calculated failure probability is given as
Pf/year. Failure probabilities smaller than Pf = 1 · 10
–10 were taken as Pf · 0 and were ignored
for subsequent calculations.
To calculate the temporal dependencies of the failure mechanisms, a scenario approach
proposed by KORTENHAUS (2003) was used. In the scenario approach, the chronology of
time-dependent failure mechanisms was achieved by defining “scenario blocks”, which com-
prise several individual failure mechanisms in logical and temporal order.
3.4.1 C a l c u l a t i o n o f d i k e s e c t i o n s
In Tab. 2 an overview of all results for the probabilistic calculation of all dike cross
sections and all individual failure mechanisms is given. The failure probability for breaching
is extremely high since the LSE does not consider the temporal development of the erosion
process. The same missing temporal dependency accounts for the failure mechanism ‘grass
erosion seaward slope’. The very high failure probability does not have a significant impor-
tance for the overall failure probability since it only represents the start of the erosion process
at the seaward slope.
Therefore, in the following the results of the calculation for a scenario approach (inc.
temporal relations between failure mech.) and the related fault tree analysis will be discus-
sed.
Parameter Uncertainty Restriction Remarks
Crown heigh hk Sdev = 0,10 m – Uncertainty in measurements
Water level hw Sdev = 0,47 m – Extreme statistics from available
measurements
Wave heigh Hs CoV Hs = 0,55*d Breaker criterin, d = local water
depth
Wave period Tp CoV = 0,20 Tp = (Hs/0,0938)^0.5 Restriction by wave steepness
Tab. 1: Overview of uncertainties of most relevant parameters
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A simplified ‘scenario fault tree’ for dike cross section km 8,422, ignoring all branches
in the fault tree with Pf < 10
–10, is shown in Fig. 4. The failure probabilities for the scenarios
were calculated using the Level III approach (Monte-Carlo simulation). The results are sum-
marised in Tab. 3.
Tab. 2: Overview of failure probabilities for all failure modes of all dike cross sections
No. Failure mechanism Dike section
3156 6644 8422 9400 10403 14499
Global failure mechanisms
1 Overflow 1,0E-06 2,0E-07 2,3E-06 1,0E-0,6 3,4E-06 5,0E-07
2 Wave overtopping 3,0E-05 0,0E-06 4,1E-05 3,5E-05 6,6E-05 9,0E-06
3 Breaching 4,3E-02 1,8E-02 7,4E-02 4,2E-02 8,9E-02 3,6E-02
4 Sliding 3,4E-07 3,3E-07 4,1E-07 3,3E-07 3,5E-07 3,4E-07
Failure mechanisms at the seaward slope of the dike
6 Impact 8,0E-06 5,0E-06 2,0E-06 4,0E-06 7,0E-06 8,0E-06
8 Velocity seaward slope 2,2E-02 1,8E-02 3,4E-02 1,9E-02 3,4E-02 3,2E-02
9 Crass erosion seaward slope 2,9E-01 2,4E-01 6,8E-01 2,6E-01 3,3E-01 3,0E-01
10 Clay erosion seaward slope 1,3E-05 5,6E-05 3,6E-05 1,3E-05 3,7E-05 4,6E-05
11 Erosion dike core seaward
slope
1,7E-05 7,6E-05 4,8E-04 1,1E-04 3,2E-04 5,6E-04
12 Stability seaward slope 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Failure mechanisms at the shoreward slope of the dike
13 Velocity overflow 2,0E-06 3,0E-06 3,0E-06 2,0E-06 2,0E-06 0,0E+00
14 Velocity wave overtopping 2,6E-05 3,3E-05 1,4E-04 1,2E-05 1,9E-04 2,2E-05
15 Grass erosion shoreward
slope
1,6E-04 1,0E-04 5,7E-04 8,5E-05 6,9E-04 1,2E-04
16 Clay erosion shoreward
slope
6,3E-05 1,6E-05 6,6E-05 2,3E-05 7,6E-05 1,7E-05
17 Infiltration 0,0 8,0E-06 2,1E-04 1,0E-06 0,0E+00 1,6E-04
18 Kappensturz 1,4E-02 1,1E-02 7,6E-03 2,3E-02 4,1E-03 1,4E-02
19 Seepage 1,0E-06 1,0E-06 1,0E-06 2,0E-06 0,0E+00 1,0E-06
20 Uplift clay on shoreward
slope
1,0E-06 2,0E-06 1,0E-06 1,0E-06 0,0E-06 0,0+00
21 Sliding clay shoreward slope 4,1E-04 5,4E-04 1,4E-04 1,3E-03 1,4E-03 2,4E-04
22 Stability shoreward slope 0,0 0,0 9,6E-05 0,0 0,0 0,0
23 Erosion dike shoreward
slope
0,0 0,0 3,2E-05 3,0E-06 7,0E-06 0,0
Failure mechanisms in the dike
24 Piping 9,6E-07 2,0E-06 2,0E-06 6,8E-07 1,1E-06 5,4E-7
25 Matrix erosion 2,5E-01 1,4E-01 2,7E-02 2,6E-02 3,8E-03 2,8E-04
Overall failure 3,1E-05 9,2E-06 4,3E-05 3,6E-05 6,9E-05 9,5E-06
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For most of the scenarios the overall failure probability resulted in Pf · 0. Scenario I
comprises the grass erosion, the clay erosion, the cliff erosion and the breaching of the dike
and Scenario I + II (cliff erosion and breaching) result in failure probabilities larger than
Pf = 1 · 10
–10. For cross section km 8,422, Scenario I gives Pf = 3.5 · 10
–5. In comparison to the
traditional fault tree approach where temporal relations of the failure modes are not consi-
dered sufficiently, the failure probability for the seaward side of the dike was Pf ~ 5 · 10
–8, i.e.
three orders of magnitude smaller.
The increased failure probability for the seaward slope including the grass erosion now
comesmuch closer to the failure probability for wave overtopping so that the erosion process
gets increasingly important for dikes investigated here.
Overall, the flooding probabilities using the scenario approach results in 3–5 % higher
values for four cross sections (6644, 8422, 9400 and 10409). All other cross sections do not
seem to be affected by the use of a scenario approach. This result is only valid for the Ribe
case since the failure probability for wave overtopping is rather high in this case.
The influence of mean values of some key input parameters on the failure probability of
individual mechanisms, scenarios and the overall flooding probability has been investigated.
An increase, for example, of the mean water level hw by 0.50 m yields an increase of the fai-
lure probability for wave overtopping by a factor of 10 and a reduction by 0.50 m results in
a lower failure probability by a factor of 10. The overall flooding probability is changed by
the same order of magnitude. Moreover, the influence of mean values of further parameters
on the failure probability for wave overtopping was investigated in detail (wave overtopping
was selected since it has the largest influence on the overall flooding probability). In this
connection, the key parameters, which affect the failure probability for wave overtopping
and the overall flooding probability most, were determined as the water level and the wave
period. Uncertainties for both parameters should therefore be evaluated very carefully.
Tab. 3: Failure probability of scenarios for all dike cross sections of the Ribe sea defence
Individual
mechanisms
Dike cross section
No. (see Tab. 4–7 for def.) 3156 6644 8422 9400 10403 14499
Sc 1 9+10+11+3 3,0E-06 6,0E-06 3,5E-05 1,4E-05 3,4E-05 7,0E-06
Sc 2 11+3 3,0E-05 2,6E-04 1,1E-03 6,9E-05 4,9E-04 7,7E-04
Sc 3 15+16+18+3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sc 4 17+21+18+3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sc 5 19+20+21+18+3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sc 6 15+16+23+3 0 0 1,5E-05 0 4,0E-06 0
Sc 7 17+21+23+3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sc 8 19+20+21+23+3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sc 9 23+3 0 0 3,8E-05 0 9,0E-06 0
Sc 10 19+24+23+3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sc 11 19+25+23+3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Overall failure 3,10E-05 9,6E-06 4,50E-05 3,70E-05 7,10E-05 1,00E-05
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3.4.2 C a l c u l a t i o n o f t h e R i b e s l u i c e a n d o u t l e t s
The failure probability of the Ribe sluice and the outlets was calculated using theMonte-
Carlo method. The results are shown in Tab. 4.
The failure probabilities for the outlets are all in the range of Pf · 5·10–1, which means
that flooding occurs once every 2 years, approximately.
Calculations showed, that the key failure mechanism for all structures is wave overtop-
ping where a tolerable wave overtopping rate of qtol = 20 l/(sm) has been assumed. Variations
of the tolerable overtopping rates (qtol = 100 l/(sm), 200 l/(sm) and 515 l/(sm) where the latter
corresponds to the overtopping rate for zero free-board as the maximum possible value were
performed to study its influence on the results.
Increasing the tolerable wave overtopping rate to 100 l/(sm) and 200 l/(sm) results in
a decrease of the failure probability for wave overtopping by a factor of about 10 and 100
for all outlets and the sluice, respectively. If the tolerable wave overtopping rate is set to 515
l/(sm), the failure probability for wave overtopping will be in the range of 10–4 for the sluice
and 10–5 or 10–6 for the outlets.
3.5 F a i l u r e p r o b a b i l i t y o f f l o o d d e f e n c e s y s t e m
In order to determine the overall flooding probability of the Ribe defence system, a
division into several dike sections was made. The division into several dike sections assu-
med for one section very small variation of the input parameters for either the stress or the
resistance of the limit state equations. The crown height hk of the dike and the peak wave
period Tp were finally selected as the key criteria for the division of the defence system into
‘homogenous’ dike sections.
In all, 15 sections were defined as shown in Fig. 5. Four sections were defined to be close
to section km 6,644, two sections close to km 14,499 whereas all other sections differ from
each other. Section 4 in Fig. 5 could not be assigned to one of the investigated cross-sections
since the crest height hk = 7.53 m was significantly higher than for the other sections. This
section was ignored for the subsequent probabilistic calculation. The sluice and the three
outlets were defined as separate sections.
The failure probabilities of all sections (dike sections, sluice outlets) were linked to each
other by means of a fault tree with just one OR gate, which was used to calculate the overall
flooding probability of the hinterland.
Tab. 4: Results of probabilistic calculations for the sluice and the three outlets
(selected failure mechanisms)
No. Failure mechanisms Kammer Outlets
sluice V.Vedsted Konge Å Darum
1 Overflow 5,3 E-02 1,5E-04 2,5E-04 7,9E-05
2 Wave overtopping 6,1E-01 5,6E-01 4,7E-01 4,9E-01
3 Hydraulic heave 1,0E-10 1,0E-10 1,0E-10 1,0E-10
4 Gates not closed 1,2E-03 1,0E-04 1,0E-04 1,0E-04
Overall failure 6,3E-01 5,6E-01 4,7E-01 4,9E-01
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The fault tree calculations including all sections resulted in an overall flooding proba-
bility of Pf = 9.5 · 10
–1. This result was considered to be much too high since it solely de-
pends on the failure probabilities of the sluice and the outlets which are mainly governed by
wave overtopping. Due to small inflow volumes during wave overtopping (limited stretch
of sluice/outlets), a second calculation ignoring sluice and the outlets resulted in an overall
flooding probability of Pf = 2.5 · 10
–4.
Despite the fact that the sluice and the outlets are very narrow structures, calculations
showed that the sluice and the outlets are the weakest elements in the defence line. An ex-
ample calculation showed that flooding from wave overtopping over the sluice would result
in a water level in the flood prone area of less than 1 mm only. However, structural failure of
the sluice or one of the outlets would cause major flooding of the hinterland. It is therefore
essential to investigate the sluice and the outlets in more detail to finally determine the overall
flooding probability. For the time being it is recommended to use a flooding probability of
Pf = 2.5 · 10
–4 for the flood defence system in Ribe.
4. V u l n e r a b i l i t y a n a l y s i s
As cartographic basis for the vulnerability analysis, altitude data in a grid net of 25x25
metres was used to generate a topographical map of the flood-prone area, being delimited
by the 5.0 m DVR90 altitude line. The altitude data was supplemented by altitude data from
road surveys. Fig. 6 presents the topography of theRibe flood-prone area, showing low-lying
delta areas surrounding the watercourses far into the hinterland.
Fig. 5: Division of the Ribe flood defence system into representative sections
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4.1 D am a g e c a t e g o r i e s a n d d a t a s o u r c e s
Within the flood-prone area of Ribe six categories of direct, tangible damage were selec-
ted (buildings, movable property, agricultural acreage, livestock, electric installations, traffic
system). Additionally, four damage categories (inhabitants, employees, vehicles, tourism)
subject to intangible, direct/indirect damage were considered in a descriptive form. Typi-
cally, data was available at national registers, such as the Building and Housing register or
the Central Livestock register. In other cases, data was provided by research centres or the
responsible county. The request of data from national registers or public administrations
about the damage categories showed however clear differences in data quality and format.
This fact complicated the procedure of geocoding each risk element by means of a GIS soft-
ware application.
Fig. 6: Topography of the Ribe flood-prone area
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4.2 V a l u a t i o n a n a l y s i s
The valuation analysis showed the location of most of the assets on high ground around
the low-lying delta area of Ribe River. For example, only 7 % of the accumulated property
value is located below 2.5 m DVR90. About 45 % of the accumulated property value is
placed below 4.0 m DVR90 and about 30 % of the total property value is located between
4.5 and 5.0 m DVR90. Fig. 6 illustrates the total property value of buildings distributed over
ten altitude intervals.
This distribution of assets over altitude has been characteristic for most of the damage
categories. However, a differentiation of the total profit of all kinds of crop over altitude
showed an almost linear distribution, which differed remarkably from the other damage
categories.
4.3 D am a g e a n a l y s i s a n d i n u n d a t i o n s c e n a r i o s
To determine the possible damage for each damage category, seven breach and overtop-
ping scenarios were defined. In five scenarios inundation occurs due to one or more dike
breaches, whereas two scenarios consider wave overtopping and the structural failure of
both gates of the sluice, respectively. The seven scenarios are defined as follows (sections as
referred to in Fig. 5):
Sc1: one dike breach in section 6
Sc2: one dike breach in section 2
Fig. 7: Total property value distributed over altitude intervals
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Sc3: one dike breach in section 9
Sc4: wave overtopping in section 9
Sc5: three dike breaches in sections 2, 6, and 9
Sc6: four dike breaches in sections 2, 6, 8, and 9
Sc7: failure of both gates at the sluice
Depth-damage functions were derived for each damage category where the damage de-
pends on the inundation depth. In case of depth-independent damage, damage factors were
derived to quantify the damage.
For buildings and movable property depth-damage functions could be derived from
data about compensation payments regarding real flood damage to buildings and movable
property inDenmark. The assessment of flood damage to agricultural acreage was performed
by external experts. Their assessment comprised damage factors for different kinds of crop
and inundation periods of 5, 14 and 28 days.
Based on the seven scenarios, inflow volumes between 0.5 and 127 million m3 were
calculated. Input parameters, such as a standardised storm surge hydrograph, the failure
probability of defence system sections, the time-dependent development of a dike breach
as well as an assumed time of failure during storm surge were considered in the calculations
of the inflow volumes. Based on these input parameters, the flood-prone area is differently
inundated depending on the location and the number of failure events.
Due to differences in inundation behaviour, damage within each scenario varies between
1.15 and 424.5 million DKK (56.9 million Ð). Only the scenarios Sc5 and Sc6 resulted in da-
mage exceeding 100 million DKK (13.4 million Ð). The scenarios Sc1, Sc2 and Sc7 showed
comparable inundation behaviour and resulted in the same total damage for all three scena-
rios. Tab. 5 gives the final results of the calculated damage for the seven scenarios.
Tab. 5: The calculated damage for all inundation scenarios (‘trafic system’ and ‘elec. installations’
have been grouped together as ‘infrastructure’
Risk
element
Sc1/Sc2/Sc7 Sc3 Sc4 Sc5 Sc6
Buildings DKK 4.937.000 DKK 0 DKK 0 DKK 54.179.000 DKK 203.555.00
€ 662.685 € 0 € 0 € 7.272.349 € 27.322.819
Movable
proberty
DKK 4.640.000 DKK 0 DKK 0 DKK 37.538.000 DKK 146.905.000
€ 622.819 € 0 € 0 € 5.038.658 € 19.718.792
Agricultural
acreages
DKK 2.208.000 DKK 933.000 DKK 211.000 DKK 7.098.000 DKK 9.489.000
January € 296.376 € 125.235 € 28.322 € 952.752 € 1.273.691
Livestock DKK 0 DKK 0 DKK 0 DKK 1.232.500 DKK 7.978.000
€ 0 € € 0 € 165.436 € 1.070.872
Infra-
structure
DKK 7.226.000 DKK 844.000 DKK 942.500 DKK 22.862.000 DKK 56.554.000
€ 969.933 € 113.289 € 126.510 € 3.068.725 € 7.591.141
Total DKK 19.011.00 DKK 1.777.000 DKK 1.153.500 DKK 122.909.500 DKK 424.481.000
€ 2.551.812 € 238.523 € 154.832 € 16.497.919 € 56.977.315
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5. R i s k a s s e s s m e n t
Finally, risk values were calculated varying between 300 DKK/year and 110.000 DKK/
year. In this connection, the risk values calculated for scenarios Sc3 and Sc4 represent the
lower bound of risk values for the Ribe flood defence system. On the other hand, the upper
bound is represented by the risk value based on scenario Sc6.
The risk assessment made clear that the range of risk values depends on the inundation
scenarios and the damage, whichwas determined on the basis of the inundation extension and
depth. The determination of these factors required several assumptions, such as the location
and number of failure events, the time of failure, the water level at the time of failure and a
standardised storm surge hydrograph.
The aforementioned assumptions were not analysed within the damage analysis, as, for
example, the location and number of dike breaches was chosen mainly on the basis of the
overall failure probabilities calculated for the dike sections of the defence system.
6. C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
The aim of this study was to analyse the overall risk of the flood-prone area in Ribe/
Denmark. A hazard analysis has been performed as part of determining the flooding pro-
bability. The probabilistic calculations resulted in a failure probability of Pf = 1 · 10
–5 to
Pf = 1 ·10
–6 for the dike sections. Similar values were obtained when scenario fault trees were
used because the overall flooding probability is primarily governed by the failure probability
of wave overtopping. The failure probability of the sluice and the outlets were in the range of
Pf = 1 · 10–1 which was mainly due to the high failure probability for wave overtopping.
In order to determine the overall flooding probability, the defence system was divided
into 15 sections. The division was based on two selection criteria, the structure type and the
input parameters. Regarding the latter the wave period Tp and the crest height hk were most
relevant. The fault tree calculations only considering the dike sections (without sluice and
outlets) resulted in Pf= 2.5 · 10
–4. However, this simple approach of dividing a defence system
into sections has to be further developed in future, prompted by the following objectives:
– The variation of the relevant input parameters along the defence system (length effect)
has to be considered. Wave attack on the seaward slope may vary locally because of chan-
ging the foreshore geometry. Furthermore, a varying crest height due to consolidation
of different magnitude along the defence system may influence the probability of wave
overtopping.
– The variation of input parameters along the defence system has to be considered in the pro-
babilistic calculations in order to obtain a more accurate overall flooding probability of the
defence system. In this respect, spatial and temporal correlations between different defence
structures (dike, sluice, foreshore etc.) within one defence system have to be considered.
– Moreover, an improved approach of considering the parameter variation and dependen-
cies (length effect) will give reliability-based indications of the location of failure (dike
breach) along the defence line, which will be crucial in the process of defining inundation
scenarios.
Due to the high failure probability of the sluice and the outlets, it was concluded
that the sluice and the outlets represent the weak points of the Ribe flood defence system.
Nevertheless, calculations showed that the limit-state equations and the uncertainty of the
input parameters concerning sluices and outlets require further investigations. This goes
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along with a more accurate estimation of the real wave height and wave period in front of
sluices and outlets.Within the vulnerability analysis only few damage categories have been
considered. For some damage categories the tangible property was difficult to assess. How-
ever, the vulnerability analysis showed that the total damage calculated within each scenario
strongly depends on the definition of the scenarios, the considered damage categories, the
determination of the inundation behaviour and the derived depth-damage functions. There-
fore, further investigations on the following topics should be carried out:
• criteria for the definition of inundation scenarios;
• damage categories, which have not been considered in this study;
• determination of the inundation process, e.g. by using numerical modelling;
• understanding of the breaching process of a clay-covered dike and the flood inundation
process;
• further development of the depth-damage functions and their verification by real data.
Despite these further investigations, the assessment of the inundation propagation and
thus the dimension of the damage are only assessable to a certain degree of accuracy. How-
ever, to calculate the flood risk and to assess the importance of the flood defence system as
a defence structure for the inhabitants and their assets, a vulnerability analysis is indispens-
able.
The presented risk analysis procedure has been considered as starting point of reliabi-
lity-based design of flood defence systems. This study has shown that it is indeed possible
to consider more stochastic parameters when analysing the safety of a flood defence system.
Despite the fact that many questions are still open and problems regarding the feasibility
remain unsolved, the risk analysis procedure has resulted in a considerable increase in infor-
mation about the Ribe flood defence system and the protected hinterland, which certainly
will contribute to improve the decision-making regarding future flood defence systems in
the area.
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Risk Assessment for the Lincolnshire
Coastal Flood Unit
COMRISK Subproject 8
ELISE POBJOY, PETER FLOYD, STEVE HAYMAN
S umm a r y
The North Sea countries (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Great Britain and The Nether-
lands) have a number of different policies towards the assessment and management of flood
risk. COMRISK aims to establish a transfer and evaluation of knowledge and methods through
focussed subject and pilot studies. The UK Subproject Pilot Study examines Lincshore; a major
UK coastal defence scheme between Mablethorpe and Skegness where nearly 9 million m3 of
beach material has been placed since 1994.
The Lincshore defence strategy is based on the maintenance of a design beach profile. By
taking a simplified relationship between the design minimum berm width and the level of storm
resistance (and, hence probability of flooding), it has been possible to show how risk-based
approaches based on risks to people, risks to assets (mainly property damage) and risks to both
people and assets can be developed.
There are numerous ways in which the effects of flooding can be ‘measured’. Within the
UK, great reliance is placed upon extensive modelling to generate flood depths which, in turn,
are used to generate estimates of losses in monetary terms. In this case study, the much simpler
approach of simply counting people in flood compartments close to the defences yielded similar
minimum berm width requirements.
Broader examination has been made of flooding from one of the coastal zones to demons-
trate how a desk-top tool could be generated to assist in the identification of optimal areas for
the placement of recharge during the decision making process. Analysis to examine the effects of
a range of profile variations on the resulting overtopping volumes and consequent flood areas,
depths and hence damages has been used to generate a limited range of data and look-up tables for
interpolation. Limitations, issues encountered and recommendations for development of similar
approaches in the future have been identified.
Z u s a mm e n f a s s u n g
Die Nordsee-Anrainerstaaten (Belgien, Dänemark, Deutschland, Vereinigtes Königreich
und Die Niederlanden) nutzen unterschiedliche Strategien zur Ermittlung und Handhabung
von Flutrisiken. COMRISK bezweckt einen Austausch und die Bewertung von Kenntnissen und
Methoden durch thematische und Fallstudien. Die Fallstudie Lincolnshire (England) untersucht
ein umfassendes Küstenschutzschema zwischen Mabletorpe und Skegness, wo seit 1994 fast neun
Millionen m3 Strandmaterial aufgespült wurde.
Die Lincshore Küstenschutzstrategie basiert auf einem definierten Strandprofil. Anhand
eines einfachen Ansatzes zwischen der minimal erforderlichen Strandbreite im Bemessungsfall
und dem Grad des Sturmwiderstandes (und, in der Konsequenz, die Überflutungswahrschein-
lichkeit), war es möglich zu zeigen wie risikobasierte Ansätze (Risiko für Menschen, Risiko für
Sachwerte und in Kombination) entwickelt werden können.
Viele Ansätze zur Ermittlung der Konsequenzen von Überflutungen existieren. Im Verei-
nigten Königreich liegt großes Vertrauen in dem Modellieren der Überflutungshöhen als Basis
für die Berechnung der monetären Schäden. In dieser Fallstudie konnte durch einfaches Zählen
der Einwohner hinter den Schutzwerken eine vergleichbare benötigte Minimalbreite des Strand-
profils ermittelt werden.
Für eine derNiederungenwurde eine vertiefteUntersuchung derÜberflutung durchgeführt
um aufzuzeigen, wie eine „desk-top“ Module zur Optimierung der Standortsuche für Sandauf-
spülungen entwickelt werden kann.Die Auswirkungen verschiedener Strandprofile auf dieÜber-
laufmengen und resultierendeÜberflutungsflächen, -Tiefen und -Schädenwurden als Grundlage
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für die Erstellung von Nachschlagetabellen für Interpolation analysiert. Schließlich wurden die
Grenzen der Methodik und die behandelten Themen aufgezeigt sowie Empfehlungen für die
Entwicklung ähnlicher Ansätze in der Zukunft definiert.
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1. I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the UK, the Environment Agency has permissive powers to maintain the coastal de-
fences that provide protection to 24 km of the Lincolnshire coastline between Mablethorpe
and Skegness, referred to as the ‘Lincshore’ coastline. Lincshore is the pilot study for Great
Britain under Subproject 8 and has been undertaken jointly by Halcrow and Risk and Policy
Analysts (RPA) for the Environment Agency.
The Lincshore coastal defences provide flood protection to the low-lying coastal plain,
which extends up to 15 km inland and has a recorded history of flooding back to the 13th cen-
tury. The coastal plain covers approximately 35,000 ha of both urban and agricultural land, and
includes over 27,500 residential and 3,500 commercial properties. The coastal frontage is hea-
vily used for recreation and tourism with major tourist resorts at Mablethorpe and Skegness.
Fishing contributes to the local economy and, further inland, land-use is dominated by isolated
rural communities within agricultural holdings. There are a number of conservation and heri-
tage sites protected by the defences on both the Lincshore frontage and the adjacent coast.
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Fig. 1: Location of the study area
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Historically, the natural sand dunes
have formed the coastal defences along
the Lincshore coastline, supplemented by
concrete revetments and seawalls around
residential areas. In 1953 extreme surge
tide levels and severe wave action caused
erosion and breaching of the natural dunes
and erosion of the rear of hard defences,
resulting in their collapse. This led to 12
major breaches with floodwater spreading
several kilometres inland, causing the loss
of over 40 lives andmajor property damage.
Following 1953, many of the seawalls were rebuilt and have required maintenance, repair
and upgrading ever since. During subsequent storm surges, breaking waves still reached the
seawalls, leading to significant overtopping anddamage (althoughnomajor flood event),which
highlighted the flood risks and need for a detailed review of the Lincshore coastal defences.
UK defence systems are planned within a ‚hierarchy‘, cascading from National policy,
through large-scale plans, to strategies, and down to individual schemes. The Lincolnshire
ShorelineManagement Plan (SMP) sets out the high-level policy for the coastline taking into
account coastal processes, human influence, land-use and other environmental matters. For
the Lincshore coastline the preferred policy is to ‘hold the line’.
In 1991, the first Lincshore Sea Defence Strategy was commissioned. The strategy con-
cluded that holding the line through beach nourishment and maintenance of seawalls and
promontories was the preferred long-term defence strategy from technical, environmental
and economic considerations. The strategy was reviewed in 1997 and again in 2003/2004 in
light of the coast’s performance and updated guidance, and in both instances it was concluded
that beach nourishment to provide a 1 in 200 standard of defence should continue as the pre-
ferred coastal defence option (referred to as Option 6b in the latest 2003 Strategy Review).
2. S o u r c e s o f R i s k
At any particular location, the likelihood of flooding will depend on:
• The presence and form of the coastal defences;
• The beach profile and nearshore bathymetry;
• the nearshore wave climate, which in turn is dependent on tidal and meteorological con-
ditions and offshore wind and wave conditions.
The near-shore wave climate also affects the movement of beach material. Sediment
movement along the Lincshore frontage is primarily governed by cross-shore processes,
which tend to dominate during storm conditions. However, the beachmaterial is also subject
to some longshore movement, effectively acting as a loss from one length of coastline, but a
gain to that downdrift.
Coast Defence Structures
The coastal defence structures along the Lincshore coast have been developed overmany
years and hence have a number of different profiles. The flood defences consist mainly of
beaches, groynes, dune systems, seawalls and promontories (Chapel Point, Vickers Point &
Ingoldmells Point). Structural details of the seawall were taken from theAnglian SeaDefence
Survey (MOTT, 1999) which contained photographs, profile sections and descriptive details
of both visual and analytical information for each structure surveyed.
Fig. 2: Flooding in Lincshore during the 1953 storm
surge
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Beach Profile/Sea Bed Conditions
For most of its length, the Lincolnshire coast is characterised by a narrow steep beach
with little sand, backed by seawalls or revetments. The beaches comprise sand of variable
thickness and consistency, overlying clay, which is subject to erosion when exposed. The
available recharge material has a coarser grain size than the original insitu beach material; in
2001 the mean grain size sampled on the beach was 0.4 mm.
Significant Wave Heights
In the latest Strategy Review, the offshore wave data were obtained from the UK Met
Office for a point located near Dowsing Light for the period 1991–2001. Analysis of this data
gave a 1:100 year offshore wave height of 5.82 m. Differences were observed between the
analysis of historic vessel observed records (prior to 1991) and the more recent (lower) Met
Office predictions. Therefore this remains a potential source of some uncertainty, but the
impact is mitigated by the minimal resulting difference in nearshore wave heights.
Tidal Conditions
The mean tidal range for Lincolnshire coast is 4.4m, around a mean sea level of 0.26m
OD (4.01m CD). A joint analysis of water level and wave height extremes was undertaken
for the assessment of defences in the Strategy Review using hourly measured water levels
from Immingham.
Sea Level Rise (SLR) has been included as a constant increase over the appraisal period.
For the Lincshore coastline, situated in the Environment Agency Anglian region, a value of
SLR of 6mm/yr was used in accordance with the latest DEFRA Guidance. Secondary im-
pacts such as changes in wave heights due to an increase in water depths have been examined
in a sensitivity analysis.
Near-shore Wave Climate
The near-shore wave climate is typified by waves from the north-east. Waves were pro-
pagated inshore using Halcrow’s in-house mathematical model, which is based on a new
formulation of the mild slope equation for water waves, allowing for refraction, diffraction,
breaking and bottom friction. The coastline was divided into seven zones, broadly based
upon the management units defined in the SMP (Posford Duvivier, 1996) and the offshore
wave heights were transformed to inshore points within each of the zones. Wave heights
are slightly larger towards the southern part of the coast. The results of the joint probability
analysis for zone 2 are shown in the table below. Despite the different in offshore wave con-
ditions it should be noted that the wave heights in the table below are comparable with those
derived in the 1990 Strategic Approach Study:
Zone Return
Period
Water Level,
WL(mOD)
Future Water Level,
WL+300mm (mOD)
Significant Wave
Height, Hs (m)
Zero Crossing
Tz (s)
2 1 in 1
1 in 10
1 in 20
1 in 50
1 in 100
1 in 200
1 in 300
1 in 500
3.35
4.00
4.15
4.40
4.50
4.65
4.79
5.00
3.65
4.30
4.45
4.70
4.80
4.95
5.09
5.30
2.80
3.20
3.50
3.50
3.70
4.00
4.07
4.10
7.75
8.29
8.67
8.67
8.91
9.27
9.35
9.38
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3. R i s k P a t h w a y s
Flood Events
As already indicated, coastal flooding is caused by seawater overwhelming the defences.
In practice, this can occur either by seawater coming over the top of the defence; and/or
through a breach (i.e. failure) of the defences. The subsequent extent and severity of the
resultant flooding will be governed by numerous factors including the nature and timing of
the flooding. (Eg, there are likely to be far fewer people at risk in the static caravan parks in
winter when storms are more likely).
Failure and Inundation Mechanisms
Different modes of failure (overtopping, undermining, face or toe erosion, overturning,
piping, reduction in bearing capacity) were evaluated. The most prevalent structural failure
mechanism for the seawalls was due to extreme overtopping of the structure. Overtopping of
structures only leads to a breach once certain defined limiting values for discharge rates have
been exceeded. Guidance for critical overtopping discharges for serviceability and ultimate
limit states (CIRIA/CUR, 1991) were used as the means to assess breach failure.
Overtopping analysis was undertaken under a number of return periods to enable a
robust assessment of the limits of the current standard of defence. Discharge quantities for
overtopping of the initial return wall (OT1) and the rear of the embankment (OT3) were
calculated directly from the overtopping modelling package. Overtopping of the intermedi-
ate splash wall (OT2) was calculated by means of a reduction co-efficient, determined as a
function of the crest width and potential presence of a splash wall.
The discharges from the overtopping analysis were reviewed against a number of sour-
ces, including visual reference information of overtopping events for location, quantity and
damage sustained to the defences. The results of the overtopping discharge assessment of
the existing structures were compared against the critical overtopping limits to provide an
assessment of the integrity and standard of each of the defences.
Flood Propagation
A dynamic method was used for flood propagation prediction, which takes account
of the tidal range at the site and spreads the flood volume over consecutive tides by the ap-
plication of hydrodynamic modelling. A digital terrain model (DTM) of the frontage was
Fig. 3: Overtopping analyses of the defences
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developed based on Ordnance Survey profile data (made up of nationwide photogrammetry
estimates and random spot heights), LIDAR data (1 km coastal strip), and Agricultural spot
height co-ordinates and levels from Lindsey Marsh Drainage Board. From the DTM and
OS profile information the location and level of the reservoir boundaries were defined and
converted into ISIS spill lengths, across which flow would take place between adjacent re-
servoirs. Over 100 reservoirs and 700 spill units were established for the flood model for the
coastline to reproduce the hydraulic characteristics of the flood area.
The 1953 documented flood event was used to calibrate the model. The 12 breach loca-
tions and extents were included in the flood model as well as the 1953 surge water levels as
a tidal head boundary. Model calibration (breach widths, secondary defences etc) was then
undertaken to reflect the 1953 flood limits.
Where either OT1 or OT2 exceeded the defined overtopping limits, the structure was
deemed to have failed, and for each length failed, a breach width of 100 m (determined
through a sensitivity analysis of breach widths) was entered into the model. OT3 was mo-
delled as an inflow into the model over the peak of the tide.
Assets have been defined for each reservoir and the economic ‘benefits’ associated with
the provision of standards of defence are dominated by the damages avoided to residential
properties and industrial/commercial properties incurred through flooding. The capital value
of residential assets at risk over the entire Lincshore frontage was over £ 2 billion.
Movement of Beach Materials
In recent decades, wide accreting sandy beaches have been present both to the north of
Mablethorpe and to the south of Skegness (POSFORD DUVIVIER, 1991 and HALCROW, 2003).
Between these locations, the beaches have a history of erosion. Prior to beach recharge, the
main supply of material for these accreting beaches was considered to be off-shore banks
with a limited littoral movement (north to south) of 130,000 m3/year (Posford Duvivier,
1991). Recent coastal process modelling for the site suggests a southerly longshore move-
ment with rates of around 100,000 and 250,000 m3/yr in the northern and southern parts
respectively.
Design Principle
The basic design principle is based around the provision of sufficient beach width to
protect the seawall. The design beach profiles for different levels of protection have been
established by increasing the width of the profile until the overtopping discharge falls below
the acceptable overtopping limits. The volume of overtopping of the chosen design profile is
that which would be expected once the profile had eroded after a storm event; this is calcu-
lated by extrapolating the overtopping between beach and clay profiles in proportion to (the
eroded) volume change. The design berm width was then increased to account for annual
erosion losses, and the cross shore modelling of the beaches determined a need for an average
8m increase in the berm width to account for the 300 mm increase in water level due to SLR
over the strategy period of 50 years.
Using theOctober 2002 beach profiles as a baseline, digital terrainmodelling was under-
taken to determine the volume of material required to build up the beaches to the minimum
profile widths for the 100 year design, the 200 year design and the 300 year design.
Overtopping Assessment
The overtoppingmodelling results show that overtopping rates increase with decreasing
berm width. However, as separate models were used to predict beach draw-down and then
overtopping rates were based on the eroded beach profile, no simple linear correlation was
derived between the starting beach profile and overtopping rates.
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4. B e a c h P e r f o r m a n c e
Nourishment of the Lincshore frontage has been ongoing since 1994. Over the ten year
period, 1994-2003, nearly 9 million m3 of beach material has been placed on the Lincolnshire
coast between Mablethorpe and Skegness. Photographs demonstrate that the beach is now
significantly wider than it was in 1994.
Beach Profiles
One of the key features of Lincshore is that use has beenmade of material with amixture
of grain sizes. This has led to ‘natural’ grading on the beach with medium sand found on the
upper beach, very coarse sand on the middle beach and fine/medium sands on the lower be-
ach (BLOTT & PYE, 2001). A number of data sets on the grain sizes exist, with samples taken
over a number of transects by various parties at differing times and for a variety of purposes.
Correlation between the observed beach profiles and equilibrium beach profiles (based on
DEAN 1991) derived using certain of the data sets suggested that the profiles may be a direct
consequence of the grain size distribution of the material used for beach nourishment and
renourishment. However, this analysis did not fit all the available (different) data sets.
Net Movement of Material
Budgetary constraints for recharge activities mean that the beach still has a substantial
shortfall from the original 1991 design profile. It has been recognised that the annual recharge
is an ongoing commitment, ie it is addressing a shortfall in the sediment budget due to historic
defence measures that have reduced feed to the frontage, and to address climate change in
the longer term.
Considerable resources have been devoted to the collection and analysis of data over
the last 15 years, and whilst it is accepted that there will always be a degree of uncertainty
in predicting material losses from a renourished beach, it has proved difficult to conclusi-
vely relate the observed rate of loss to the rate of renourishment. Between Maplethorpe and
Skegness the mean nourishment rate has been 0.785 million m3/year and (net) losses from the
upper/middle beach (excluding Gibraltar Point), have averaged 0.598 million m3/year. These
losses are predominantly cross-shore. However, despite one anomalous year of data, general
trends can be extrapolated and the degree of uncertainty is within the sensitivities examined
in the Strategy Review.
Fig. 4: Design berm without and with additional material for sea level rise
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5. D e f e n c e O p t i o n A s s e s s m e n t
Within the UK, options for flood and coastal defence schemes and strategies are sub-
jected to a formal appraisal process, including an environmental, technical and economic
assessment (as set out by DEFRA) to ensure that the optimal defence option and standard
is selected. For the Lincolnshire coastline the required indicative standards of protection for
the land usage can only achieved by ‘do something’ options.
Beach Management Options
The preferred Strategy defence option (Option 6b) entails annual beach recharge quan-
tities of around 0.3 million m3 following the initial capital recharge campaign. There are a
variety of methods which could be used to determine where this material could practically
be best placed.
For each length of beach (as characterised by the beach profile), it is possible to estimate
either the shortfall in beach volume between the current and design profile, or the present
standard of defence (as ‘probability of critical overtopping’). Those profiles with the greatest
shortfall of material or lower standard of defence could be given priority for beach recharge.
However, this would not account (explicitly) for the associated risks.
Alternative approaches could be based on risks to either people or assets situated behind
the defences, or even a combination of the two. The management options for material empla-
cement outlined in the previous sub-sections are summarised below.
Summary of Management Options for Material Emplacement
Option Simple? Relevant? Risks to People Risks to Assets
Considered? Considered?
Vol. differences – original design Yes No No No
Volume differences – latest design Yes Yes No No
Maintain standards of defence Yes Yes No No
Risk-based approach
(with focus on risks to people) No Yes Yes No
(with focus on risks to assets) No? Yes No Yes
Combined risk-based approach No Yes Yes Yes
Risk-Based Approach
At a particular location, the risk to people behind the defences is a function of the stan-
dard of defence, the presence of people behind the defences and their vulnerability to floo-
ding (eg flood depth and velocity and nature of buildings). Consideration of a range of flood
events (at a particular location) would enable the baseline risk of death to a hypothetical
individual stood outside for 24 hours a day to be determined and be presented graphically in
the form of a series of ‘risk contours’. These contours should then be passed through a logic
gate to confirm the probability that someone would be present at each location in order to
provide the ‘real’ risk. Those areas with the highest ‘real’ risk could then be given priority
for beach recharge.
Similarly, the risk to assets behind the defences is a function of the standard of defence,
the presence of assets behind the defences and damage-depth relationships. This is a similar
approach to that taken in determining average annual damages (AADs). It should be noted
that taking the AAD values effectively takes account of the flood reservoir location since
the damages are associated with the flood level predicted in each of the flood reservoirs.
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Damages (for a range of extreme events) should be considered on a profile by profile
basis.
Within each flood reservoir, the assets were detailed and the associated monetary da-
mages determined under a range of storm events. The risks to both people and property
obviously decrease with distance from the coast. For Option 6b, the AAD figures indicate
that over half of the total calculated damages occur in flood reservoirs which are located
immediately behind the defences. Furthermore, 95 % of the damages are associated with
the 61 flood reservoirs which, at their closest, are within two kilometres of the defences. It
therefore appeared reasonable to develop a simplified risk-based approach based on those
61 flood reservoirs.
Flood risks to an individual are, primarily, a function of depth and velocity, both of
which are related to location. The overall risk is also a function of the total number of people.
Determining the precise levels of risk to particular people in particular locations is a complex
task and is beyond the scope of this study. However, a simple function was formulated based
on numbers of people and location. A simple risk score was assigned to each flood reser-
voir under consideration. For risk to people this was based on its proximity to the defences
and the number of people at risk. For risk to assets, risk was assigned based on the level of
damage.
Risk Scores for Flood Reservoirs (based on Risks to People)
Boundary of Flood
Reservoir
Number of People within Flood Reservoir
People at Risk = Nr of residential + industrial/commercial properties x 2.5
up to 10 >10 >30 >100 >300 >1000
Adjacent to Defences 0 1 2 3 4 5
Within 2 km of Defences 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Risk Scores for Flood Reservoirs (based on Risks to Assets)
Level of Damage
Predicted Annual Average Damage (AAD)
up to £3k >£3k >£10k >£30k >£100k >£300k
Risk Score 0 1 2 3 4 5
From these risk values, a relationship to the design berm was determined:
Berm Width = 6 x Risk Score + 5
At each location along the Lincolnshire coastline, breaching or overtopping of defences
could affect more than one flood reservoir. The flood reservoirs were ‘mapped’ against each
of the profile numbers in order to develop a means of providing sufficient berm width for
all the flood reservoirs that could be affected from a single stretch of coastline. It was found
that the bermwidth requirements are dominated by the risks associatedwith flood reservoirs
which are immediately behind the defences.
A comparison of the result can be seen below. There was a strong correlation between
the results from both approaches which indicates a strong correlation between the derived
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risk scores. ie, as might have been expected, in areas with relatively high annual average da-
mages there will also be a relatively high level of risk (as both are a function of the numbers
of people/assets at risk and the floodwater depth).
Comparison of the overall minimum berm widths with actual berm widths would en-
able the areas requiring additional recharge material to be identified. A combined approach
could be based on simply averaging the minimum berm widths for each flood reservoir.
6. D e s k - t o p T o o l
A desk-top tool has been developed to assist in the identification of optimal areas for
the placement of limited recharge. The tool examines the flooding associated with Zone 2
(selected as being representative of average conditions along the frontage).
The steps for using the tool are as follows:
• Import latest survey results (or historic surveys held within the spreadsheet can be
used)
• Working through the zone, beach profiles are presented, and by inspection, the user selects
an appropriate toe level for each. Toe levels are collated into a table of results.
• Once all profile information has been collated, the programme interpolates from a look-up
table to determine overtopping volumes for each reservoir and whether a breach is likely
to have occurred.
• The programme then uses a second look-up table to relate the derived overtopping volume
or breach scenario to a consequential value of damages caused by this flooding. These
damages are related to the damages anticipated with the design profile in place, and hence
the value of damages avoided calculated.
Fig. 5: Comparison of berm widths based on risks to people (left), and to assets (right)
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• From the design profile for the different standards of defence (1:50, 1:100, 1:200) and
the beach survey levels, a table of shortfall volumes to different design standards is calcu-
lated.
• From the shortfall volumes and the value of damages avoided, a cost:benefit comparison
for recharging to different standards of defence throughout each reservoir is derived. This
can then be examined in light of any budgetary constraints in order to determine the op-
timal economic solution for the placement of material.
7. K e y F i n d i n g s
Lincshore is a major UK coastal defence scheme which has involved the emplacement
of nearly 9 million cubic metres of material upon the beach between Mablethorpe and Skeg-
ness since 1994. There has been extensive work over a period of time on beach monitoring,
modelling of flood events and comprehensive evaluations of the costs and benefits of various
options for maintaining appropriate standards of defence.
Risk-Based Approaches
Lincshore is based on the maintenance of a design beach volume to protect a hard de-
fence line. The latest design incorporates a minimum berm width to provide, in effect, the
required level of storm resistance (and, thus, reduce the probability of flooding). However,
the strong temporal variability in the beach response and influence of coastal geomorpho-
logy, storm sequencing and persistence make it difficult to identify a simple relationship
between design bermwidths and probabilities of flooding, which has proved to be an obstacle
to the development of a ‘calibrated’ example of a risk-based approach for the Lincolnshire
coastline.
Fig. 6: Screen shot of desk-top tool to assist in identifying optimal locations for recharges (left), and
locations of the profiles in the screen shot (right)
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Nevertheless, on the simplified assumption that the probability of flooding is directly
proportional to the berm width, risk-based approaches have been developed based on risks
to people, risks to assets (mainly property damage) and risks to both people and assets. The
results from all three approaches were very similar and could provide an alternative (simpli-
fied) basis on which to allocate beach material along the coastline.
Desk-Top Tool Development
A number of points or note came out of the development of the desk-top tool:
Uncertainty in Analysis
The tool uses a combined assessment of drawdown and overtopping to determine an
overtopping volume for the eroded beach profile. The degree of accuracy of the overtop-
ping calculations is generally appreciated to be order of magnitude, hence the validity of
comparison with a single critical overtopping value to assess whether or not a breach has
occurred is questionable. Calibration with real events would help to improve confidence,
but (fortunately) there is limited data on breach failure scenarios. This does, however, mean
that the prediction of circumstances when breach and overtopping failure would occur is
uncertain, and a full system model of flood risk is required to enable testing of a wide range
of combinations of beach state and forcing conditions to assess the sensitivity of management
assumptions to the underpinning analysis and assumptions.
Potential for Changes to the System
The analysis used is founded on an assessment of the response of the beach defence
system for the current wind and wave climate and existing bathymetric levels, with beach
gradings based on the current understanding of available recharge sources. The tool does not
allow for these parameters to be varied, nor does it account for whether erosion rates at this
location are likely to be high, medium, low or what would happen to the material if placed
there in the near or more distant future. As described, the coastal system is very complex and
material can remain stored in offshore banks for some time, making assessment of movement
trends difficult. However, as the purpose of the tool is for short-termmanagement decisions,
this is not viewed as a major constraint.
Reservoirs with Damages
The majority of the damages from breaches and/or flooding in Zone 2 occur within a
limited number of reservoirs, located adjacent to the coast and which cover the urban areas
of Mablethorpe and Sutton on Sea.
Look-up Tables
The look-up tables used in the desk-top tool are based on coarse interpolation between a
limited number of model runs to generate data for a range of toe levels, overtopping volumes,
flood lmits and damages. To get a comprehensive table of the full range of beach profiles,
forcing conditions, breach/non-breach scenarios, flood pathways and relative overtopping
contributions form adjacent coastal reservoirs to determine independent and in-combination
events for the entire coastline would require a vast amount of modelling.
Data Management System
Examination and review of the scheme has been ongoing for the last 15 years. An effi-
cient data management system is vital to collate the vast amounts of data associated with a
project spanning over this length of time. Any database system should permit comments to
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be added pertaining to the source, reliability and methodology adopted and enable identifi-
cation of any issues to be noted as records are collated and any assessments of the raw data
or trends are undertaken.
Recommendations
There are numerous ways in which the effects of flooding can be ‘measured’. Within the
UK, great reliance is placed upon extensivemodelling to generate flood depthswhich, in turn,
are used to generate estimates of losses in monetary terms. In this instance, the much simpler
approach of counting people in flood compartments close to the defences yielded similar
minimum berm width requirements. Consideration should therefore be given to the ability
of the appraisal method to deliver the required results in an efficient manner.
A desktop tool has been developed which enables a strategic approach to recharging
the beach and allows the sensitivity of flood risk to beach condition in each coastal cell to be
tested to identify trends. Such a tool could be useful for Flood managers to provide short-
term management decision support as a relative measure of qualitative benefits of alternative
recharge locations when there are budgetary constraints. However, it does not consider lon-
ger term impacts of the wider geomorphology of the system and therefore does not replace
the deterministic assessment of failure required to put forward the longer-term business case
for the recharge works.
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Risk Assessment for the Island of Langeoog
COMRISK Subproject 9
HOLGER BLUM, FRANK THORENZ
S umm a r y
A risk analysis based on available data and methods is conducted for the flood prone areas
of the Island of Langeoog protected by coastal defences. By executing a hazard analysis the
danger of flooding due to failure of a coastal defence element is determined. A statistical analysis
is used to determine the surge water levels for certain occurrence probabilities. Deterministic
failure calculations of the coastal defence system are executed considering various failure modes.
A vulnerability analysis for the area protected by a coastal defence system including the village
Langeoog is executed on a micro scale level. Elements at risk like buildings, vehicles, life stocks
within the investigation area are considered to be endangered. The results of the valuation, the
estimated damages and the specific risk based on flooding scenarios are presented. The influence
of uncertainties of major input data, assumptions and chosen scenarios on the estimated damage
and the calculated risk are exemplarily determined and discussed. Based on the results of risk
calculation possible measures to reduce the risk of Langeoog are recommended.
Z u s a mm e n f a s s u n g
Für die sturmflutgefährdeten Gebiete der Insel Langeoog, die durch Küstenschutzanlagen
geschützt sind, wird eine Risikoanalyse auf der Basis verfügbarer Daten und Methoden durch-
geführt. In einer Gefährdungsanalyse wird die von einer Flutung im Falle des Versagens einer
Küstenschutzanlage ausgehende Gefährdung geschützter Werte bestimmt. Hierfür liefert eine
Extremwertanalyse der Wasserstände für bestimmte Überschreitenswahrscheinlichkeiten die
Sturmflutwasserstände. Bei der Ermittlung des Versagen der Elemente des Küstenschutzsystems
wurden verschiedene Versagensmechanismen berücksichtigt. Eine Vulnerabilitätsanalyse für den
vomKüstenschutzsystem geschützten Bereich der Insel, inklusive der Ortslage, erfolgt über einen
mikroskaligen Ansatz. Die Ergebnisse der Bewertung, der Schadenschätzung und das spezifische
Risiko basierend auf Szenarien werden dargestellt. Der Einfluss von Unsicherheiten der Ein-
gangsdaten, Annahmen und gewählten Szenarien auf die Größe des spezifischen Risikos werden
über exemplarische Sensitivitätsstudien ermittelt und diskutiert. Abschließend erfolgt eine Emp-
fehlung von möglichen Maßnahmen zur Reduzierung des Risikos.
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analyses, Langeoog
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1. I n t r o d u c t i o n
The island of Langeoog is one of seven inhabited sandy barrier islands located in front
of the Lower Saxony mainland coast in the southern German Bight. It is characterized by
dune areas in the north and lowlands in the south. Langeoog covers a terrestrial area of
20 km2; 7.7 km2 are protected against storm surges by a ring of dunes and dikes. The village
of Langeoog has an extent of 1.5 km2 and is inhabited by approximately 2000 persons con-
stantly living on the island. The most important economic factor is tourism. The drinking
water supply is based completely on the fresh water lens in the dune areas protected by the
coastal defence system.
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Fig. 1: Langeoog overview – Topographic map 1:50000
2. O b j e c t i v e s
The situation of an island concerning coastal defence and risk management issues differs
significantly from the situation on the mainland coast. The coastal defence elements form a
protective ring for flood-proned areas. Hence a failure of one element might lead to a floo-
ding of the whole area, see Fig. 1.
The following main issues shall be investigated within the subproject:
• an inventory of the existing coastal defence measures as well as of physical and socio-eco-
nomic conditions in the Langeoog flood unit
• a state of the art risk assessment ,
• recommendations for measures to reduce the risk of flooding i.e. to increase the safety
standard
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3. M e t h o d s
Fig. 2 gives an overview of the various steps used in the study [NLWKN 2005] to come
up with a risk analysis. A hazard- and a vulnerability analysis are used to gather the infor-
mation needed for a risk calculation. In the following the two analysis and their main sub-
processes are described.
3.1 H a z a r d a n a l y s i s
The hazard analysis is the methodical, comprehensible and formal procedure to evaluate
the threat of specific events, conditions, processes or actions in a specific area. It is determined
as a combination of hazard (intensity) and frequency (probability) of a specific threat.
3.1.1 E x t r e m e v a l u e a n a l y s i s o n w a t e r l e v e l
An extreme value analysis on data of Norderney gauge station is conducted based on
water level set up caused by storm surges for a time series of 108 years. The momentum
119
Fig. 2: Flow diagram risk analysis
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method is applied on four statistical distribution functions to determine the best fitting dis-
tribution and the associated parameters. A transfer function yields the extreme storm surge
water levels at Langeoog.
Since a failure of the coastal defence system is expected for water levels that are at least
equal to or higher than the design water level of NN + 5.10 m, an extrapolation of the stati-
stical distribution up to the return period of T = 10,000 years is calculated.
This extrapolation interval is significantly higher than the recommended extrapolation
interval of three times the time series duration (WANG / LEMEHAUTE 1983 after EAK 2002)
which yields 324 years in this case. Confidence intervals are determined for all investigated
distribution functions. The Chi-Squared Test is conducted to assess the fitting quality of the
distribution functions. Results of the Chi-Squared Test and the width of the 95%-confidence
interval showed the Log-Normal distribution function best fitting. Therefore this function
is applied for calculating the water levels related to certain return periods used in the further
investigation.
The chosen Log-Normal distribution yields a water level of NN + 5.68 m for a 1/10,000
years storm surge event which is nearly 0.6 m higher than the legal design water level at
present. The 95 %-confidence interval shows a margin of 1.14 m. The return period of the
present legal design water level is determined to approximately 1,000 years, see Fig. 3.
3.1.2 F a i l u r e c a l c u l a t i o n
The calculation of failure for the coastal defence system was conducted by means of
numerical models: ProDeich (KORTENHAUS&OUMERACI 2002) andUNIBEST-DE (STEET-
ZEL 1993, Delft Hydraulics 1995) are used to determine the damages to the dike and dune,
respectively. The failure is calculated with a deterministic approach by determining the surge
height leading to a failure of the coastal defence section, e.g. by overtopping, or an under-run
120
Fig. 3: Extrapolation of set up based on Log-Normal distribution
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of aminimumdunewidth. UNIBEST-DE is a profile based time dependent numerical model
to simulate beach and dune erosion. The model provides among others the potential erosion
volume and the post-storm beach and dune shape. For the parts of the coastal defence system
consisting of dikes, the ProDeichmodel and theVBA-based deterministic tool for calculating
the fault tree are applied which contains functions for several failure modes for dikes.
Additionally to the storm surge level input data are needed to run the numerical models.
These data describe the geometry and characteristic of the defence elements and the wave
conditions. Cross profiles based on a terrestrial survey and derived from a digital elevation
model are integrated into comparable sections. Theweakest profile represents the section and
is used for the hazard analysis. Six dune cross profiles and three dike profiles are selected.
The significant wave height used as input data for calculations of dune erosion at the
north and north-west orientated beach sections is based on the comparison between wave
atlas data (MAI 2002) and the results of rough calculation formulars (NIEMEYER 1979). A
medium value of Hs 7.0 m is used. The wave period Tp of 11.3 s is estimated by using the
functional relation between Hs and Tp implemented in UNIBEST-DE. These figures are
used for all surge levels higher than the present legal design water level.
All dike sections are located in lee-situations, sheltered against undamped wave attack:
The Flinthörndeich by a dune area, the Hafendeich by harbour breakwaters and due to its
southeast orientation. The eastward orientation of the Ostdeich and the relative shallow
water of the Wadden Sea area in front of the dike lead to moderate / slight wave conditions.
Since a measured wave climate is not available the sea state conditions are roughly estimated
based on the wave atlas ofWangerooge (MAI&DAEMRICH 2004). This wave atlas covers also
the southern and the south-eastern region of the Langeoog investigation area of this project
as a peripheral area. Due to this and limited applicability of the used wave model SWAN in
Wadden Sea areas, non implementation of diffraction (WL|Delft 2005) and the fact that the
wave climate is calculated for a water level below the statistic derived water level (chapter
3.1.1) a set of possible higher values (Hs and Tp) are additionally considered (Tab. 1). This
second calculation is run with wave heights and periods added a margin of corresponding
0.5 m and 0.5 – 1.0 s.
The hydrograph used in the dune erosion simulation is identical to the hydrograph
described in chapter 3.22 (see Fig. 5).
The hazard analysis concerning the dune sections and dikes under investigation taken
the assumptions above into account yields the following:
• Failure of the dune belt occurs in the north of the Pirola valley at a storm surge water level
of NN + 5.68 m with a return period of 10,000 years.
• The Hafendeich, a mild sloped dike with a crest height of NN + 5.60 m, fails as well at the
storm surge water level with a return period of 10,000 years due to overtopping.
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Lokation
Estimated figure based on
MAI & DAEMRICH (2004)
Increased value-uncertainties due to
model restrictious
Hs [m] Tp [m] Hs [m] Tp [m]
Flinthorn 1.0 3.5 1.5 4.5
Hafendeich 0.6 3.0 1.0 3.5
Ostdeich 0.5 3.0 1.0 3.5
Tab. 1: Used wave conditions for ProDeich calculations
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3.2 V u l n e r a b i l i t y a n a l y s i s
The vulnerability analysis is characterised by three sub-processes: The valuation analysis
and the simulation of flooding which is mainly based on the failure scenario and the results
of the hazard analysis. The third sub-process is the damage estimation.
3.2.1 V a l u a t i o n a n a l y s i s
The valuation analysis is the systematic, comprehensible and formal procedure to evalu-
ate the damage potential, expressed as the (monetary) value of the elements at risk quantita-
tively or qualitatively which are potentially threatened by a specific event in a specific area.
For the valuation analysis theMERK-method (REESE et al. 2003), a micro scale approach
is used that allows identifying and mapping of elements at risk on the level of separate buil-
dings. By means of extensive field work, damage potentials within the investigation area of
Langeoog are mapped and analyzed (UNIVERSITY OF KIEL 2004). The field work pro-
vides the essential information about the buildings, the land use and infrastructure facilities
to determine the damage potential. The building data contain the following information:
Number of storeys, structure of the building (e.g. terraced house), use of the attic storey,
equipment, age of the building and use of the single storeys and if necessary of the basement.
More than 2200 elements are identified as risk objects, e.g. houses and adjoining buildings.
All elements and land uses are classified and valuated. The information is transferred into
a geographic information system (GIS) and linked with the height information derived from
a digital elevationmodel. The elements are classified into three intangible categories, i.e. guest
beds, jobs and inhabitants, and nine tangible, that means monetarily assessable, categories.
These categories are: Buildings, building inventory (household effects), real estate values,
vehicles, land use (traffic areas, agricultural land, forest land, recreational land), livestock
assets, gross value added, fixed assets and stock value, see Fig. 4.
The total of all values up to a level of NN + 19.5 m amounts to · 1,115.89 million. Up to
a level of NN + 5.5 m which can be regarded as the flood prone zone the total value amounts
to · 931.52 million. Four of nine damage categories, namely buildings, inventory of buildings,
real estate and fixed assets, contain 92.8 % of the surveyed potential flood prone values.
3.2.2 S i m u l a t i o n
As basis for a flooding simulation two scenarios both showing an occurrence probability
of 10–4 years–1 are defined: “Dune Pirola valley” for the dune area and “Hafendeich” for the
dikes. In these scenarios major boundary conditions have to be assumed such as constant
breach width and time of breaching. The breach width is set to 20 m in the dune belt and
100 m in the dike.
The hydrograph of the storm surge (Fig. 5) is determined using increase and decrease
rates of the wind set-up according to GÖNNERT (2003) and the mean tidal hydrograph of
Langeoog.
The flow through the breach into the protected area and through a cascade of reservoirs
is calculated using a broad crested weir equation implemented in a MS Excel spreadsheet
based tool. Parameters of the flooded area are derived of a digital elevationmodel bymeans of
GIS analysis. The inflow volume and correspondingwater level of the scenario “Hafendeich”
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Fig. 4: Damage categories of the valuation analysis (from: UNIVERSITY OF KIEL 2004)
Fig. 5: Hydrograph of the storm surge at Langeoog
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comes to approximately 8millionm3 leading to floodwater levels of NN+ 4.9 m in the south
western area of Langeoog and NN + 4.27 m in the central parts of the village (Fig. 6). The
flooding simulation of the scenario “Dune Pirola valley” is limited to the dune valley south
of the dune belt because of its relevance for estimation of damage to the fresh water lens and
drinking water supply.
3.2.3 D am a g e e s t i m a t i o n
The damage estimation is a systematic, comprehensible and formal procedure. On basis
of the damage potential and under consideration of the general conditions of specific events,
conditions, processes or actions the damage expectancy of the elements at risk in a specific
area is quantitatively or qualitatively evaluated.
Based on the results of the hazard analysis and of the simulation of flooding, the speci-
fic estimated damage to every risk element in the investigation area is determined by means
of depth-damage functions. The depth-damage functions are used to determine the degree
of damage for specific risk elements. These functions describe the dependence between the
degree of damage and the water level which causes this damage. The applied functions are
taken from the MERK-report.
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Fig. 6: Flooded area scenario “Hafendeich”
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The scenario “Hafendeich” yields estimated damages of · 55.16 million. Taking into
account all registered inhabitants, i.e. permanent and secondary residence, 2229 persons are
affected and 214 inhabitants should be evacuated. Fig. 7 and 8 show the spatial distribution
of damages using a generalizing 300 x 300 m evaluation grid.
The damages to buildings show the major part of the total estimated damages followed
by the damages to private inventory and fixed assets. The accumulate damage of these three
categories amounts to · 49.5 million which is about 83.4 % of the total estimated damage in
the scenario, see Fig. 9.
In comparison with the tourism resorts investigated in the MERK report the estimated
damage figures of the scenario “Hafendeich” show nearly the same ratio and ranking of the
major damage categories, i.e. buildings, private inventory, fixed assets and damages to traffic
and recreational used areas. Tab. 2 shows the total sum of estimated damages, the number
of affected inhabitants and the ratio of the damage categories in relation to the total. Addi-
tionally, the ranking of the first four categories by their contribution to the total damage is
shown in brackets.
Since all damage estimations are influenced by scenario assumptions, a variation of the
breach width and of the calculated flood water level in the polders is conducted to show the
influence of accuracy of flood simulation which depends on the used numeric model and the
accuracy of the model topography: A variation of breach width in scenario Hafendeich from
80 m to 120 m influences the water level in all polders up to a range of 0.32 m.
The variation of the water level within the flooded area for this scenario is executed
with constant values within the interval -0.5 m to 0.5 m by steps of 0.1 m. Changes in the
total amount of estimated damage (elements at risk) of -28 % and 32 % show the strong
dependency of estimated damage from flooding water level (cp. Fig. 10). For all categories
an increasing water level leads to rising estimated damages. The strong increase in damages
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Fig. 7: Damage to buildings (“Hafendeich”) Fig. 8: Total estimated damage (“Hafendeich”)
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Tab. 2: Comparison of estimated damage between „Hafendeich“
scenario and scenarios in the MERK report
COMRISK MERK
Langeoog-
Hafendeich
Timmendorfer
Strand
TS-1
Timmendorfer
Strand
TS-2
St. Peter-
Ording
SPO-1
St. Peter-
Ording
SPO-2
Total [Mio *] 55.16 47.95 116.99 0.88 69.2
Affected inhabitants
[persons]
2229 476 1987 1271 1954
Rate of total estimated damage [%]
Buildings 39.9 (1) 57.9 (1) 57.5 (1) 16.7 (3) 40.6 (1)
Private inventory 23.1 (2) 8.6 (4) 13.7 (3) 17.6 (2) 22.0 (2)
Fixed assets 19.8 (3) 16.8 (2) 15.1 (2) 5.5 (4) 21.9 (3)
Damages to traffic
areas and recrea-
tional land
12.8 (4) 0.9 1.6 58.3 (1) 6.3 (4)
Stock value 2.9 1.3 1.0 0.9 1.6
Gross value added 1.0 11.7 (3) 8.8 (4) 0.9 4.7
Lifestock assets 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1
Vehicles 0.2 2.8 2.0 0.1 0.59
Evacuation costs 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.1 0.42
Fig. 9: Ratio of damage categories to total damage in scenario “Hafendeich”
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Fig. 10: Estimated damages by categories for variations of the flood water level of scenario “Hafen-
deich”
Fig. 11: Ratio of categories for variations of water level (based on “Hafendeich”)
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to buildings is remarkable. This increase is absolute and relative higher than the increases of
the other categories. This is shown in Fig. 11 where the ratios of the categories in relation
to the total estimated damage are compared. For a water level variation of +0.5 m the ratio
of the category “damage to buildings” results in 47 % of the total estimated damage. This
underlines the fact that damages to buildings are a major aspect in hazard analysis using the
MERK-approach.
In addition to the MERK-method used for valuation and damage estimation in scenario
“Hafendeich”, the impact of the scenario “Dune” on the drinking water supply and on the
fresh water lens due to saltwater intrusion after a flooding of the wells field is exemplarily si-
mulated bymeans of the numerical groundwater model FEFLOW (IUG 2004) under certain
boundary conditions. The main results of the simulations are that a complete destabilisation
of the freshwater lens in the investigated cases is not expected. In one scenario which is the
calculated worst case 10 of 16 wells might be affected by heightened chloride concentration
in the groundwater. The drinking water supply for inhabitants and guests which is based
completely on the freshwater lens might be partly continued with the remaining unaffected
wells. Additional technical measures are expected to be necessary. More detailed simulations
are regarded to be necessary to improve the outcomes concerning the risk calculation due to
a complex groundwater situation.
3.3 R i s k c a l c u l a t i o n
The risk is defined as a product of vulnerability multiplied by the probability of failure
of the coastal defence system according to KORTENHAUS et al. (2002). In the context of this
study the probability of failure for the coastal defence elements is assumed to be equal to the
occurence probability of the surge water level leading to failure of the coastal defence element
based on a deterministic calculation. This is determined to 1/10.000 years.
The risk calculation for the area under consideration yields 5500 ·/year. Based on this
calculated risk figure three different risk zones are mapped by grid cells of 300 x 300 m to
illustrate the relative risk distribution within the investigated area. Considering the margin
of estimated damage due to the variation of flood water level by –/+ 0.5 m within the polders
the risk figure varies from approximately 4000 ·/year up to 7300 ·/year. Taking thewide range
of the confidence interval (cp. 3.1.1, fig. 3) into account, it becomes clear that risk figures
calculated with the methods described above could differ significantly.
4. C o n c l u s i o n s a n d r e c omm e n d a t i o n s
The implementation of risk based methods in this study shows a different approach
to investigate the functionality of coastal defences compared to the present one applied in
Lower Saxony. On basis of certain boundary conditions and assumptions, necessary to
conduct this study, differences in reliability of the different types of coastal defences can
be monitored.
The study provides hints on potential weak points in the coastal defence system of
Langeoog offered by a risk analysis. Therefore this approach provides an additional decision
making tool for pointing out priorities for future reinforcements of the coastal defences. Ad-
ditionally it should be stressed that by application of standard design procedures the criteria
for safe constructions are fulfilled at present.
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The assumption of scenarios and the execution of parameter variations in case of lack
of data or methods provided important additional knowledge concerning the uncertainty
margin of calculated risk figures. Due to a lack of input data andmethods several assumptions
were necessary to conduct this study:
• For statistical analysis of hydraulic boundary conditions reliable data onwave climatewere
not available. The time series for water levels allows only a limited extrapolation of the
distribution function with relatively high uncertainties concerning long return periods, for
example a confidance interval range of 1.14 m for a 1 in 10,000 years event.
• Definition of the failure mode for dune erosion and some input parameters for the Pro-
Deich tool, e.g. geotechnical parameters.
• Scenario definitions to determine the resulting flooding caused by a failure of a coastal
defence system. The number of failures, i.e. breaches at the same time or same event, their
location and dimension are deemed to be the most important parameters.
• Flooding simulation of the three considered sub-areas is conduced based on a GIS de-
scription of the flooded area. The discharge is calculated assuming a cascade of reservoirs.
This leads to a relative rough scale of the model compared with the valuation scale. Thus
it results in uncertainties of calculated water depths at the threatened objects.
• Uncertainties and limitations are implied in the MERK-method, for example the evacu-
ation rate, the limited number of valuated risk element categories. The last mentioned
limitation includes the fact that most of the intangible risk element categories are not con-
sidered.
To improve the accuracy of the risk assessment the following aspects should be taken into
account:
• Improving the data of hydraulic boundary conditions especially wave climate statistics and
of statistics for extreme values
• Enhancement and determination of boundary conditions for dune erosion calculation
• Further investigation of failure mechanisms on different types of dikes (e.g. revetments
and geotextile enforcements) and implementation of other constructions like dike locks to
improve the limit state equations of the ProDeich model and assessment of the uncertain-
ties
• Gathering of detailed soil parameters of the coastal defence elements
• Application of a numerical simulation model to calculate the flooding based on a 1D2D-
approach taking the process of time dependent flood propagation into account. This will
lead to reduced uncertainties concerning the flood water level in the polders.
• More detailed insights in the breaching process of sea dikes and dunes which are clay
covered and/or protected by a revetment and in the breaching process of dune belts.
• Further investigation on depth – damage functions especially evacuation rates and costs of
cleaning and re-establishing on a site specific basis should be carried out.
The application of a risk analysis shows additional potentials of minimizing the risk in case
of failure of the coastal defence system. Measures within the protected area seem to be useful
to minimize flood propagation and therewith estimated damage due to flooding. From the
technical point of view following aspects should be focussed on:
Potential weak points in protective dunes:
Additional investigations concerning the effects of morphological changes on the ero-
sion of beach and nearshore are necessary to define more exact boundary conditions for
dune erosion processes.Whether the definition of a certain minimum beach profile or a more
complex statistical time dependent approach for the beach evolution is appropriate, needs
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further investigation. Furthermore the period under consideration, for example one surge
or a winter season with several storm events, is supposed to have significant effects on the
calculation of safety for the dunes as coastal defences.
Weak points of dike openings:
Especially the railway opening located in the harbour area with only single safety, no
redundancy and a low laying threshold was monitored to be a potential weak point of the
dike ring. A malfunction or human error, i.e. a forgotten closure in case of emergency, may
lead to total failure of the system. The storm surge forecast service and the adherent alarm
chain at present do take these points into account. But further investigations and enhance-
ments of methods are needed for a more detailed determination of failure probability, espe-
cially concerning the factor ‘human error’.
Flow paths and technical prevention measures:
The reduction of flood propagation and/or the closure of potential flow paths in the pro-
tected area by technical means seem to be an additional way to minimize the risk in the inves-
tigated area. More detailed investigations on flood propagation by means of advanced models
and a more detailed topography including technical constructions provide a basis to develop
appropriate measures for reducing the negative impacts of flooding. An examination of the
dewatering system of the polders and the village will help to detect flow paths which might be
activated in case of flooding. This demands the application of appropriate software tools.
Potential measures in the investigation area to block flow paths are the closure of a gap
in the Heerenhus dunes south of the Pirola valley which would build an effective barrier
to prevent parts of the drinking water supply and the village from flooding in case of brea-
ching of the dunes north the Pirola valley. The heightening of street levels might significantly
reduce the overflow volume from one polder to another.
Contingency plans:
Detailed height information of the area under investigation provides an improved basis
for the catastrophe management authorities to monitor the most endangered areas and the
potential escape routes. A more detailed flooding determination in case of failure of the
coastal defences at certain locations will provide further valuable information.
5. O u t l o o k
The project outcomes provide substantial information concerning the feasibility of
conducting a risk analysis, showing potentials and lacks. Data and methods produced in
this study can be used as a support for decision making providing additional insights for
future defence planning, detecting weak spots in the defence system and priority settings for
reinforcement of costal defences. Furthermore the project delivers an important input for
catastrophe management to improve contingency plans.
Open questions concerning methods and data reliability in hazard and in vulnerability
analysis have been elaborated and showed the need for further investigations. To enhance
the accuracy of risk analysis a focus should be on the accuracy of data and methods like
hydrological and morphological conditions, failure modes for technical constructions and
valuation methods. For the latter intangible damage categories like human health, damages
to ecological and cultural value are not taken into account in this study due to a lack of
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methods. For further improving of risk analysis procedures and evaluation whether and how
to consider these aspects might be useful.
The conducted analysis provides a detailed insight in the flood prone area and hints that
prevention measures to reduce the effects of failure of the coastal defences might be suitable
to reduce the risk to a certain level. This exemplarily shows the intensive links between
coastal defence planning on one hand and spatial as well as land utilisation planning on the
other and the need for common procedures.
The approaches for risk calculation applied in the four pilot studies of the COMRISK
project, promoted by an intensive exchange of experiences between the partners, showed
different boundary conditions and methods to proceed within the involved countries. This
provides further evaluation of partner experiences in order to develop improved approaches
of risk analysis for flood prone coastal lowlands in the North Sea region. Taking future
developments in flood prone areas like effects of climate change into account, a worthy
contribution for implementation of the ICZMRecommendation can be expected. Therefore
a project initiative is launched within the Interreg IIIb North Sea program called SAFE-
COAST (Sustainable Coastal Risk Management in 2050).
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Seven national and regional coastal risk management authorities from the North Sea coun-
tries conducted the INTERREG IIIB project “COMRISK – common strategies to reduce the
risk of storm floods in coastal lowlands”. COMRISK aimed at improved coastal risk manage-
ment in the North Sea region (NSR) through a transfer and evaluation of knowledge and me-
thods as well as pilot studies. Nine subprojects with specific thematic and regional foci and the
final conference COMRISK2005 all contributed to this aim. This paper synthesizes the main
findings of the project, describes its “main messages”, and gives an outlook for further work.
Z u s a mm e n f a s s u n g
Sieben nationale und regionale Küstenschutzbehörden aus den Nordsee-Anrainerstaaten
führten das INTERREG IIIB Projekt „COMRISK – gemeinsame Strategien zur Reduzierung
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mit spezifischen thematischen und regionalen Schwerpunkten und die Schlusskonferenz COM-
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1. I n t r o d u c t i o n
Since 1996, leading public managers and officers from national and regional adminis-
trations in Denmark, Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium and the United Kingdom con-
fer on transnational aspects of coastal risk management in the so-called North Sea Coastal
Managers Group (NSCMG). It became clear that, despite major differences in the physical,
socio-economic, cultural and institutional setting, the challenges that national and regional
administrations face in safeguarding societies against storm surges are very similar through-
out the North Sea region. In order to achieve a sharing of knowledge and more balanced
and sustainable approaches, a comprehensive and comparative assessment and evaluation
of national and regional coastal risk management practices was agreed upon. These consi-
derations led to the initiation of the project “COMRISK – common strategies to reduce the
risk of storm floods in coastal lowlands”. Seven public coastal risk management institutions
from the member states co-operated in the project. It was implemented under the Com-
munity Initiative Programme INTERREG IIIB of the European Union that co-finances
(with 50 %) transnational projects for specific regions. In all, about 30 organisations (project
partners, consultants, local administrations, etc.) were directly involved in the project. More
than 40 individuals (project team, consultants and contact groups) actively contributed to the
project outcomes, and about 150 more persons were involved through workshops, expert
questionnaires, etc. One positive impact that COMRISK achieved is that these individuals
and institutions are able to benefit, in their daily work, from this transnational sharing of
information and knowledge.
Risk is a combination of the probability (or frequency) of occurrence of a defined
hazard and the magnitude of the consequences of the occurrence. Coastal risk management
constitutes of a range of topics that vary from strategic like national risk policies to more
technical, for example, the dimensions and performance of flood defence schemes. The
themes that were assessed and analyzed in the COMRISK subprojects one to five were:
(1) policies and strategies, (2) strategic planning, (3) perception and participation, (4) perfor-
mance indicators, and (5) hydraulic boundary conditions. For each of the topics, in a first
step the national and/or regional state of the art was assessed and put into the context. In a
next step, a comparison was conducted that focussed on challenges and opportunities in the
national and regional practices. Finally, if appropriate, recommendations were established.
In the COMRISK subprojects six to nine, risk analyses were conducted for four case sites:
Flanders (B/NL), Ribe (DK), Lincshore (UK) and Langeoog (GER). These studies followed
a broadly similar approach although each had distinct aims and objectives. In each case, as a
first step, the physical and socio-economic conditions were characterized, and an inventory
of existing flood and coastal defence measures was established. With these data, risk assess-
ments using newest probabilistic techniques were then carried out. Finally, recommendati-
ons concerning the application and/or improvement of the risk assessment techniques were
established. The subprojects are described in detail in the previous chapters of this volume.
This paper synthesizes the main findings of the subprojects, present the key messages to
emerge, and gives an outlook for further work.
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2. P r o j e c t s y n t h e s i s
2.1 D i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e c o n t e x t s
From all subprojects it became clear that the national and regional settings in the North
Sea countries, i.e., the physical, socio-economic, cultural and institutional context, are
extremely diverse. For example, the scale of flooding and the affected population size differ
substantially between The Netherlands and Denmark. This variance in the context explains
most of the observed differences in the implemented policies and strategies for coastal risk
management.However,within the varying settings there is certain freedomof policy choices. It
is recommended that this freedom should be used to increase the number of risk management
options and, therewith, the robustness of the policy. For example, apart from focussing on
technical solutions, non-structural options like floodwarning systems, self-help (where the af-
fected take preparatory actions themselves), insurance/compensation, and control of develop-
ment in flood-prone areas might be included into the policies and strategies. It is interesting to
note that the technical solutions applied in the North Sea countries such as sea dikes and sand
nourishments are very similar (although the design criteria vary substantially, see below).
The COMRISK project has identified many areas of common interest to those de-
veloping flood risk management strategies and policies in the partner countries. Continued
co-operation and collaboration is needed to ensure that these common interests are fully
exploited. Harmonization on all aspects of coastal flood risk management seems not feasible
due to the differences in the contexts and approaches in the five countries. Definition of
a common strategy however does not have to mean harmonization of policies. Although
future harmonisation of policies and strategies should not be avoided when desirable and
feasible, at the moment it is more appropriate to focus on further mutual understanding and
mutual learning.
2.2 C omm u n i c a t i o n o f r i s k s
Our study found that coastal risk perception, or the awareness of coastal risks, is rela-
tively underdeveloped, despite major efforts of the responsible administrations. This indi-
cates that the information flow from the responsible administration towards the population
is either insufficient, does not reach the recipients or is not taken seriously. There, still, is
an apparent deficit in risk communication. One of the reasons may be the different defini-
tions that experts (from science and administration) and the society apply. Experts talk in
terms of quantifiable technical risk such as return intervals, probability of breaching and so
on. These may not match the way risk is perceived by the population – will my house be
damaged? Hence, it is recommended that risk should be translated into the language of the
society. Instead of communicating safety standards (which may give a false impression of
absolute safety), reference should be made to personal living surroundings and to personal
consequences. Further, options for personal action (self-help) should be presented.
Moreover, people indicate that they are not adequately informed about the risks of
storm floods and are sceptical about their ability to influence planning decisions. To increase
the quality of information, it should be neutral, objective, plain, targeted, comprehensive and
understandable. Further, a mix of information tools should be used in combination. To over-
come the scepticism about the possibilities to influence planning decisions, the involvement
of external facilitators can be helpful.
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2.3 S t r a t e g i c p l a n n i n g : s a f e t y s t a n d a r d s v e r s u s r i s k
b a s e d a p p r o a c h e s
Strategic planning is carried out in all North Sea countries in order to determine an ap-
propriate programme of measures to implement stated policy aims and objectives. However,
the process of Strategic Planning is approached differently within each COMRISK partner
country. These differences reflect different risk perceptions, societal expectations and cultu-
ral traditions. For example, throughout the continental European partners legislative instru-
ments provide the primary planning tools. Defence measures are designed to withstand a
stormwater level with a specified probability of occurrence. The German states and Belgium
presently define one safety standard for all theirmajor coastal flood defence schemes,whereas
inDenmark and TheNetherlands some socio-economic considerations lead to regionally va-
riable safety standards. For example, in the densely populated province of South-Holland, a
1:10,000 year storm water level should be stopped, whereas in the province of Friesland the
safety standard is the 1:4,000 year water level (WET OP DE WATERKERING, 1996).
As an alternative to safety, a risk-based approach can be applied to establish a basis for
consistent and transparent decision-making with respect to defence measures. Risk may be
defined here as themultiplication of the probability of occurrence of a defined event (e.g. dike
breaching) and the magnitude of the consequences of the event (i.e., the damages resulting
from the flooding). With this concept, instead of one water level that should be resisted, a
pre-defined acceptable risk is allowed for. Adapting risk criteria would imply that defence
schemes are designed according to the protected values. In result, the financial means may be
invested more effectively. In order to arrive at the same acceptable risk, the sea dike in front
of a heavily utilized polder would need to be higher (i.e., the probability of breaching lower)
than the dike in front of a polder with a low population density.
Within England and Wales a risk-based approach is adopted based on analyses of the
benefits and costs of action compared with the consequences of doing nothing. A guideline
for assessing the benefits is provided in the so called “Multi-Coloured Manual” (PENNING-
ROWSELL et al., 2003). In Denmark and The Netherlands regionally varying safety standards
reflect some risk considerations (see above). In Germany, this risk-based approach is not
adopted because it leads to disagreements with the affected population as it can negatively
affect equal opportunities.
The differences among the safety and risk based approaches are, amongst others, reflec-
ted in the way expenditure is prioritised. Within the context of a safety standards approach
for example, prioritisation of expenditure is given little prominence within the strategic plan-
ning process and it is difficult (and may be politically undesirable) to prioritise improvement
of one defence over an other. The approach adopted in England and Wales, however, has a
primary focus on prioritising actions in order of economic efficiency.
A fully risk based approach would require acceptable risk criteria to be defined. The
societal definition of an acceptable risk is highly complex as it varies strongly depending
on, for example, age, sex, lifestyle, etc. Therefore, this problem should be solved within
a coherent, transparent, adaptive and widely accepted framework for tolerable flood risk
assessment. This would also need to consider questions of values, equities and affordability.
A starting point for the development of such a framework may be the so-called ALARP-
or ALARA-concepts which are widely accepted across many disciplines (see contributions
OUMERACI and ALE in this Volume). Public discussion has an important role to play in
establishing an appropriate approach and leads to better acceptance of the decision.
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2.4 M o n i t o r i n g o f p e r f o r m a n c e
Associated with the setting of safety or risk standards is the performance of the structu-
ral and non-structural measures that implement those standards. In all countries performance
indicators are applied inmonitoring programmes for structural schemes. For example, for sea
dikes a maximum allowable overtopping rate (typically 2 l/s/m) not to be exceeded under a
given design event is defined and monitored. Most countries are moving towards flood risk
assessment based not just on predictions of the probabilities of defence overtopping under
given events but also on prediction of the probability of an overall defence failure (e.g. dike
breaching), the flooding consequences and their assessment in socio-economic terms (see
above). It is possible to evaluate measures based on their effectiveness in reducing the eco-
nomic risk from flooding, and their efficiency in reducing national or regional flood risk per
Euro invested. This is the basis of the national appraisal of flood and coastal riskmanagement
expenditure in England and Wales.
Our study found that most of the outcome performance indicators used by coastal risk
managers in the North Sea countries are appropriate for their purpose. In many cases these
focus on specific parts of the flooding system. In risk management terms it is convenient
to think in terms of the sources, pathways and receptors of flooding. Sources relate to the
extreme loads such as sea levels and wave heights. Pathways or barriers relate to the flood
defence and inundation routes through which flood water reaches the receptors - these are
the people, property and environments which can be harmed by flooding. During the study,
it was convenient to categorise performance measures in this way and this provided a good
framework to compare indicators in different countries.
In most of the NSR countries there is some kind of national or regional database in
which coastal risk management data is held. Generally this includes socio-economic data
as well as hydro- and geomorphologic data. In some cases there are also records of flood
defence works and costs and information about planned works. However, much of the raw
data that are collected and stored in databases are, on the whole, not tailored to the needs of
Performance Evaluation. Additional processing and/or data collection is generally needed
to isolate specific performance indicators. Many of the databases were developed for other
purposes and were now being adapted to meet the needs of risk and performance manage-
ment. For this purpose, however, the information and even the structure of the databases are
not necessarily ideal.
2.5 M e t h o d s t o d e t e r m i n e h y d r a u l i c b o u n d a r y c o n d i t i o n s
An inventory of the methods used to determine the hydraulic boundary conditions
for designing or assessing the safety of sea defences was conducted. Based on the results of
this inventory the various methods have been analysed and compared for a sea dike and a
dune profile on the North Sea coast in The Netherlands. Though the general approach to
determine the hydraulic boundary conditions is fairly similar, the differences in details of
the methods can lead to crest heights that can vary several meters for the same return period.
Major factors for these differences in the crest height of sea dikes are the statistical methods
to assess the designwater level, the quality of the prediction of the nearshorewave parameters
and the various parameters in run-up and overtopping formulae. The approaches in the safety
assessment of dune coasts are quite different, though a number of methods go back on the
same research from the 1980-ies.
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Due to these differences, results of the various risk-assessments that were conducted in
COMRISK are hardly comparable. Thus, a common approach to risk assessment might lead
to adaptations in safety-assessment methods in the various countries. On the other hand the
knowledge questions, i.e. to reduce uncertainties in risk-analysis, are rather similar in the
various countries. Joint research and further exchange of knowledge can and might lead to a
convergence of the methods for risk assessment used in the various countries.
2.6 R i s k a s s e s s m e n t
In COMRISK subprojects six to nine risk assessments were conducted for four case
sites. Each site had distinct physical and socio-economic characteristics. A scheduler over-
view of the conducted risk assessments in the four study areas is given at the end of this paper.
It becomes clear, that each subproject applied different techniques and models to assess the
risk. In consequence, the outcomes of the subprojects cannot be compared directly. Three
basic aspects were considered in all projects, the extreme loads (sources), failure mechanisms
and the flooding process (pathways), and the potential damages (receptors). One basic mes-
sage from the case studies is that, for all three aspects, the uncertainties are large. The pro-
babilitydistributionsofmostof thefailuremechanisms like theerosionof thegrasscoveronsea
dikes are still not known precisely and, thus, have to be assumed. Further, major differences
in the calculated risk result from the unknown breach development (e.g., one breach or
several breaches, final breach width). This strongly influences the flooding (e.g., speed, flood
height and extension) and, therefore, the degree of damage. As a final example, in some cases
little is known about the actual damage that appears in dependency of the height and duration
of the flooding (the so called depth-damage-curves). If summed up, all these uncertainties
result in risk values thatmay vary several orders ofmagnitude, depending upon the assumpti-
ons that were made. From a technical point of view, using probabilistic techniques, it may be
appropriate to address and consider these kinds of uncertainties. This certainly represents a
challenge for coastal flood risk managers. It is clear that complexity and level of detail of risk
analysis should be appropriate to the flooding system, the level of uncertainty, and the needs
of decision-makers. The analysis should not be over-complicated. The project also conclu-
ded that uncertainties must be understood and managed to make better decisions. Managing
uncertainty includes the whole process of identifying sources of uncertainty, modelling their
effects, communicating uncertainties and allowing decision-makers to account them. Further
research and guidance is needed to assess and reduce uncertainty, and to make sure that
decision-makers are fully aware of uncertainties in data, information and knowledge.
At the same time, the risk assessments as applied in the project brought a number of sig-
nificant improvements. The sensitivity analyses of the failure mechanisms gave new insights
in the respective relevance of each single failure mode as well as the failure development, i.e.
“weak spots” could be detected. Further, the vulnerability analyses substantially increased
the information and knowledge about the flood-prone areas, as “hazard areas” could be
identified. The established data and information may be used as a decision supporting tool,
i.e., as arguments for appropriate defence schemes. Further, they may be used for informing
the public and as a basis for contingency plans. It is recommended to continue the research
on risk analysis, especially on reducing and handling the uncertainties, and harmonizing the
different approaches that were tested in the subprojects six to nine.
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3. C o n c l u s i o n s
Based upon the COMRISK investigations and results, the international project team
established technical, managerial and policy level statements. These were presented and,
partly controversially, discussed during the final session of the conference COMRISK2005.
Discussions during the course of the Conference included opportunity for delegates to chal-
lenge or support the initial set of statements. This peer review of a broad group of coastal
flood risk experts and policy makers provided a unique opportunity to tune and refine the
statements. Taking this into account, the project team‘s overall conclusions are as follows:
• Risk, being probability and consequences of flooding, should provide the basis for flood
management decisions.
• Concerning the large uncertainties that exist in assessing coastal risks, it is concluded that
these must be understood and managed to make better decisions. Managing uncertainty
includes the whole process of identifying sources of uncertainty, modelling their effects,
communicating uncertainties and allowing decision-makers to account them. Further re-
search and guidance is needed to assess and reduce uncertainty, and to make sure that
decision-makers are fully aware of uncertainties in data, information and knowledge.
• With respect to the uncertainties, the conducted level of risk analysis should be appropriate
to the flooding system, the level of uncertainty, and the needs of decision-makers. The
analysis should not be over-complicated.
• It is concluded that common methods for risk assessments should be established. It is,
however, recognised that risk-based criteria depend on the physical and socio-economic
contexts which differ strongly among the countries. Hence, common criteria are not re-
commended.
• People living in flood-prone areas tend to ignore or disclaim the risks of flooding. In this
respect, it was agreed that the right information should be provided to the right people at
the right time to raise awareness without raising alarm.
• More risk based performance indicators are needed in order to translate policy aims into
flood risk objectives, and to evaluate changes in flood risk.
• Uncertainties are not a barrier to good policy making. Policies should take proper account
of uncertainty, and risk assessments should identify and report on all relevant uncertain-
ties.
• Finally, it is concluded that harmonization on all aspects of coastal flood risk management
seems not feasible due to the differences in the contexts and approaches in the five coun-
tries. Definition of a common strategy however does not have to mean harmonization of
policies. Although future harmonisation of policies and strategies should not be avoided
when desirable and feasible, at the moment it is more appropriate to focus on further mu-
tual understanding andmutual learning. The COMRISK project has identified many areas
of common interest to those developing flood risk management strategies and policies in
the partner countries. Continued co-operation and collaboration is needed to ensure that
these common interests are fully exploited.
4. O u t l o o k
More than 16 million Europeans who live in about 40,000 km2 of coastal lowlands in the
North Sea region as well as major economic activities depend upon a sustainable coastal risk
management. In future, as demonstrated by the FORESIGHT program in the United King-
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dom (OFFICE OF SCIENCE ANDTECHNOLOGY, 2004), the coastal risks will increase substanti-
ally. Both the protected values and the natural coastal hazards in the coastal lowlands will rise
due to utilization pressure and climate change (IPCC, 2001). In COMRISK, the present state
of national and regional coastal risk management was established and recommendations for
improvements made. Possible future developments were not directly considered. This topic
will be addressed in a follow-up project SAFECOAST. This INTERREG IIIB project starts
in July 2005 and broadens the scope of COMRISK in two ways. Firstly, the activities will
be based on a time horizon 2050, applying physical and socio-economic scenarios. Secondly,
the criteria of Integrated Coastal Zone Management will be addressed in an own subproject
(EUROPEAN UNION, 2002). For this, the COMRISK partnership has been extended
with some new partners. Major issues, as extracted from COMRISK, will be the testing of a
more standardized method to assess the coastal risks, and the establishment of appropriate
information material. Apart from COMRISK, SAFECOAST will be based on the policy
recommendations as established in the EUROSION project. The EUROSION project was
initiated in 2001 by the European Parliament with a view to evaluate the social, economical
and ecological impact of coastal erosion on European coasts and assess the need for action
(www.eurosion.org).
With COMRISK, for the first time, an interregional project of national and regional
coastal risk management authorities in the North Sea region has looked for transnational
improvements. With this study, almost 200 directly and indirectly involved individuals and
about 30 public and private institutions that work on coastal risk management in the North
Sea region have actually benefited from this transnational sharing of information and know-
ledge. In the long-term, this will lead to a quality improvement and harmonisation of coastal
risk management in the North Sea region.
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Integrated Risk-Based Design and Management
of Coastal Flood Defences
HOCINE OUMERACI
S umm a r y
The main obstacles encountered in the practical implementation of a sustainable protection
against coastal floods and the peculiarities of coastal systems and processes are first discussed
from the view point of the deficiencies in scientific knowledge, predictability and modelling
tools.
The main requirements for a new design and management concept for sustainable flood
defences are then derived, leading to an integrated probabilistic risk analysis (PRA)-based con-
ceptual framework for the design and safety assessment of coastal flood defences. This concept is
based on the risk source-pathway-receptor model, including (i) the prediction of flood risk, (ii)
the assessment of tolerable flood risks and the risk analysis and (iii) the management of residual
risk as an integral part of the overall design process. The scientific and modelling challenges
within each component of the integrated concept (risk sources, risk pathways, risk receptors) are
systematically addressed, also including the assessment of risk acceptances
Z u s a mm e n f a s s u n g
Zunächst werden die Hauptschwierigkeiten bei der praktischen Implementierung eines
nachhaltigen Hochwasserschutzes im Küstenraum sowie die Besonderheiten der küstenbezoge-
nen Systeme und Prozesse aus der Sicht der Defizite im Wissensstand, der Vorhersagbarkeit und
der operationellen Modelle aufgezeigt.
Die Formulierung der Hauptanforderungen an ein neues Konzept für die Bemessung
nachhaltiger Hochwasserschutzwerke führt zu einem integrierten probabilistischen und risiko-
basierten Konzept für die Bemessung neuer und die Sicherheitsprüfung vorhandener Hochwas-
serschutzwerke. Das Konzept basiert auf demModell „Risikoquellen-Risikowege und Risikoaus-
wege“ mit drei Hauptkomponenten: (i) Vorhersage der Flutgefährdung und der Vulnerabilität
der geschützten bzw. zu schützenden Gebiete (berechnetes Flutrisiko); (ii) Evaluierung der tole-
rablen Flutrisiken und Risikoanalyse; (iii) Management der Flutrisiken als integraler Bestandteil
des gesamten Konzeptes für die Bemessung bzw. Sicherheitsüberprüfung. Die Diskussion der
wissenschaftlich/technischen Herausforderungen hinsichtlich der Risikoquellen, Risikowege und
Risikoempfänger bilden denHauptteil des Beitrages, wobei auch auf den wichtigen, noch offenen
Aspekt der Riskoakzeptanz eingegangen wird.
K e yw o r d s
Coast, risk management, flood defence, probabilistic risk analysis, risk source-pathway-
receptor model
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1. D e s i g n o f F l o o d D e f e n c e s i n t h e C o n t e x t o f S u s t a i n a b l e
D e v e l o pm e n t a n d P r o t e c t i o n o f C o a s t a l Z o n e s
Coastal zones, including estuaries, represent unique and vital transition areas between
the marine and terrestrial environment and are therefore favoured as valuable habitats by
both humans and wild life. In fact, almost 40 % of the world population are concentra-
ted within a 100 km wide coastal strip, including 65 % of the large cities with more than
2.5 million inhabitants (OUMERACI, 2000). Worldwide, coastal, river and flash floods are
responsible for more than 50 % of the fatalities and for about 30 % of the economic losses
caused by all natural disasters. Moreover, the increasing storm surge activities which are ob-
served since many decades will certainly continue to increase in terms of frequency, duration
and intensity. This may lead to the increase of the probability of flood hazards.
On the other hand, the still increasing socio-economic pressure on the use of coastal
zones with the subsequent increase of the needs for more infrastructures (industry, trans-
portation, amenities, housing, etc.) has led to an increasing conversion of these vital zones
to a built environment, and thus to a vulnerability increase. Subsequently, flood risks which
consist of both flood hazard probability and vulnerability are expected to dramatically in-
crease if no appropriate countermeasures are undertaken.
It is obvious, that appropriate solutions to mitigate coastal flood risks can only be found
within the general context of sustainable development and protection of coastal zones. Some
of the challenges towards the development of future models which are implied by the appli-
cation of the sustainability principles to flood protection are briefly mentioned in Fig. 1.
The search for appropriate solutions meeting the sustainability principles becomes even
more difficult due to some peculiarities and conundrums of the coastal system which may be
summarized as follows (Fig. 1):
1) Although coastal zones occupy only 6 % of the total surface of our planet, the value of
the coastal ecosystems represent almost 40 % of the value of all marine and terrestrial
ecosystems (OUMERACI, 2000). This would suggest that conservation and preservation of
coastal ecosystems should have a higher priority than the socio-economic use of coastal
zones which is generally associated with an increasing need for more infrastructure and
coastal defence structures. This will particularly require integrated methodology tools to
achieve a proper balance between socio-economic needs and environmental integrity.
2) The coastal processes (hydrological, hydrodynamical, morphological and ecological)
and their interactions are highly complex and stochastic. They are essentially non-linear,
dynamic and three dimensional with a high level of spatial and temporal variability. They
occur at a very broad range of space and time scales and are very sensitive to climate vari-
ability and human inferences. These will particularly require models with a high level of
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integration of the diverse physical, ecological and socio-economic issues and interactions
over a broad range of scales. Moreover, these models should account for the high tempo-
ral/spatial variability of the processes, for possible 3D-effects and the inherent stochastic
variability of the influencing parameters and processes.
3) The use and protection of coastal zones, including prioritization, will always be subject
to changes (moving target in both time and space!) as well as to conflicts and compromi-
ses. This will require adaptive tools/models to account for the evolving socio-economic
demands and the evolving impact of human interventions on the apparently natural pro-
cesses. Account should also be made for the sudden dramatic changes which might result
from decadal to centennial/millennial slow changes and accumulations.
4) The knowledge, data and models used at any stage of decision making (design, opera-
tion, management) are never complete, permanently evolving and always subject to large
uncertainties from diverse sources. Therefore explicit account should be made for these
uncertainties, including the inherently low level of predictability of the modelling tools,
the inherent stochastic variability of the input parameters as well as the human and orga-
nisation errors.
Given these peculiarities and the requirements implied by the sustainability principles it
is obvious that a protection against floodingwhich fulfils both socio-economic efficiency and
environmental integrity at longer term can only be achieved by within an integrated design
and management framework which is based on probabilistic risk analysis (Fig. 1).
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2. P RA - B a s e d I n t e g r a t e d C o n c e p t f o r t h e D e s i g n o f
S u s t a i n a b l e C o a s t a l F l o o d D e f e n c e s
Beside the general motivations mentioned in the introductory section, the necessity of a
more rational and integrated design approach, fulfilling the sustainability requirements will
be briefly outlined before starting with the description of the suggested design concept.
2.1 N e c e s s i t y o f N e w D e s i g n C o n c e p t
The protection against floods and the design of coastal flood defences have a long tradi-
tion worldwide. In spite of the wide variety of design methods and safety standards adopted
in each country, the design criteria for flood defences structures are still essentially based on
the so-called design water levels associated with exceedance frequencies which are specified
by design standards and regulations. The specified exceedance frequency is implicitly inter-
preted as a probability of failure of the defence which is again equated to a flooding proba-
bility. Such approaches are too simplistic as:
1) they may lead to too high and expensive defence structures, because the structure must
not necessarily fail when the design water level is exceeded;
2) they may result in an incorrect safety assessment, because the defence structure may also
fail, even if the design water level will not be exceeded. The adopted safety coefficients are
often arbitrary, lacking rationality and transparency;
3) they do not only ignore totally or partially the failure mechanisms likely to lead to
flooding, but also the vulnerability of the flood-prone areas. Only in few countries such
as in the Netherlands, the vulnerability is implicitly considered by allocating different
exceedance frequencies, depending on the vulnerability of the flood-prone areas.
2.2 B a s i c R e q u i r e m e n t s f o r t h e N ew D e s i g n C o n c e p t
In order to substantially help moving the design of sustainable flood defences from an
academic debate into the realm of concrete work, performance and return, a new design con-
cept in line with a sustainable flood protection is urgently needed, including all the necessary
methods and modelling tools, which should at least fulfil the following requirements:
1) To ensure that the prospective design approach and associated tools are consistent and
transparent enough for a wide acceptance in practice, they should be based on a sound
knowledge of all relevant processes and interactions at any stage – from the sources to
the receptors of the flood risk –, including all constraints, possible changes and their pre-
dictions. Therefore, the prospective design approach/tools should possibly be based on
process-oriented research.
2) To account explicitly in the design process for all uncertainties, including those associated
with the prediction over a brad range of scales under the constraints of evolving socio-
economic demands and human inferences as well as under the constraints of the more
uncertain climate variability and its local implication, reliability analysis and reliability-
based tools are necessarily required.
3) To offer more choices and transparency in the design process and to bridge the gap
between technician and non-technical decision makers, the reliability analysis must be
extended to risk analysis. The flood risk being defined as a combination of the probability
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of the flood hazard (risk sources and risk pathways) and the vulnerability of the flood
areas (risk receptors), the risk analysis should preferably be carried out according to the
risk source-pathway-receptor approach, thus allowing to act on both risk components
(hazard and vulnerability) to reduce flood risk.
4) To reduce flood risk, a proper balance of all options (retreat, accommodation and protec-
tion) and measures (structural and organisational; prior, during and after flood event) is
required. Therefore, risk managementmust be an integral part of the design of new flood
defences and of the safety assessment of existing defences.
5) To ensure that all processes and conflicting interests, which may affect one or both risk
components (hazard and vulnerability), are properly assessed and accounted for, an inte-
grated approach is required.
6) To help developing unified safety concepts and thresholds between sustainable and non-
sustainable flood protection schemes, an appropriate measure for acceptable vulnerabili-
ties and risks should be developed which also allows a comparison with tolerable values
in other sectors such as transportation, chemical industry, nuclear power plants, etc. This
will also be particularly important in the case of risk analysis associated with multi-ha-
zards. Therefore, a transparent framework for the assessment of acceptable flood risk with
appropriate methodologies/modelling tools and with clear implications for regulatory ac-
tions should be an integral part of the new design concept.
7) To make the new design concept broadly applicable at various levels, the entire approach
for a detailed design level should be simplified for a feasibility and a preliminary design
level, including the associated requirements for the data and the modelling tools to be
used. (Tiered approach).
A possible design concept which can fulfil most of the aforementioned requirements is sug-
gested in Fig. 2. This concept is based on risk-source-pathway-receptor approach, including
four major steps:
1) Prediction of flood risk: It consists of the predicted flooding probability which is obtained
from the risk sources and the risk pathways and of the predicted potential damages and
losses which require a sufficient knowledge of the vulnerability of the flood-prone areas,
including their temporal variability and uncertainties.
2) Evaluation of the tolerable flood risk: It consists of the tolerable damages and losses and
of the tolerable probability of their occurrence. Both require a very good knowledge of
the socio-economic/ecological resilience and of the risk perception/communication in
the flood-prone areas which depend on a large variety of aspects, including individual,
societal, political and legal issues. The variability of these aspects and the uncertainties
associated with their assessment should be properly accounted for.
3) Evaluation of the residual risk through comparison of the predicted and acceptable flood
risk. An appropriate measure for the level of residual risk should be developed which
clearly describes the penalty associated with both underdesign and overdesign. This of
course will have clear implications for future safety factors to be adopted in the design
standards and regulations.
4) Management of the residual risk through structural and non-structural measures before,
during and after the flood event. One of the key features of this design concept is the
incorporation of the risk management as an integral part of the entire design process.
In fact, no optimisation over the life-cycle of the flood defences is possible without the
knowledge of the residual risk and its management.
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The practical implication of these four major steps require, however, a scientific know-
ledge, methodologies and modelling tools which are not yet sufficiently available and which
therefore need to be developed. The research challenges associated with the risk sources,
pathways, receptors and acceptance are discussed in Section 3 below.
3. S c i e n t i f i c , M o d e l l i n g a n d F u r t h e r C h a l l e n g e s
3.1 C h a l l e n g e s A s s o c i a t e d w i t h R i s k S o u r c e s
The “risk sources” essentially provide the hydraulic boundary conditions which are
required to assess the design loads and the probability of failure of the flood defence compo-
nents. These are generally dependent on the prevailing tidal, meteorological and topographic
conditions.
On coastlines with shallow shelf areas (e.g. North Sea) a combination of high tides storm
surges, wind waves and mutual interactions generally represent the major sources of coastal
flood risks:
WL = MSL + tide + surge + waves + topo + inter (3.1)
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The resulting water level (WL), which is temporarily and spatially variable, may be
considered a resulting sea state.
The mean sea level component MSL essentially varies over long time periods as a result
of climate changes (10–25 cm in past century) and is therefore subject to very large uncer-
tainty. For a given climate change scenario the effect of changes in water depth due to MSL-
rise on the tidal, surge and wave components can be quantified with some confidence for a
well-defended (not morphologically very active) coast.
The astronomically generated tidal component tide is rather deterministic and much
easier to quantify. The same applies for topographic effects on tides.
Much more difficult to determine is, however, the meteorologically induced surge com-
ponent surge (BODE & HARDY, 1997). Although simultaneous computation of the tidal and
surge components are now routine in present 2D and 3D baratropic storm surge models
(SSM) which seem to hindcast water levels with acceptable accuracy, there is still a serious
lack in the understanding/modelling of the processes involved in the interaction of the surge
and wave components waves. In fact, the latter is still calculated separately (RESIO & CAR-
DONE, 1999).
The wind wave and wind wave-induced component waves is calculated by high reso-
lution wave models, including wave transformation over and by rather simple topographic
features. Methods also exist to estimate the joint probability of wave heights and wave peri-
ods, but higher resolutionmodels for wave transformation over amore complex topography,
including the effects on the joint statistics of wave heights, periods and directions are urgently
needed.
The contribution of the topography-induced effects topo to the resulting sea state WL is
generally considered by means of models for the transformation of the tidal, surge and wind
waves. Although morphological models are available to predict the topographic changes
during storms, the susceptibility of sea bed and coastal features to progressive changes (e.g.
migration of sand bank) and to sudden changes (e.g. breaching of barriers islands) is still not
properly considered in the long-term simulations of sea state. Coupled surge, wind-wave
and morphological models over a broad range of scales represent an ideal alternative for
this purpose and are thus to be kept in perspective. Meanwhile, considerable improvements
of the assessment of the extreme design sea state may be achieved through the joint run of
existing models.
The contribution inter of the mutual interactions between the various components still
remains the most unknown, despite the now routine linking of tidal and surge components
in present operational storm surge models and despite the substantial progress in recent
research on the physics of air-sea interactions and on the coupling of surge and wind-wave
models. The coupling will certainly take a long way to be implemented in operational pre-
diction models. Meanwhile, rather pragmatic approaches for the assessment of the joint pro-
bability of extreme water levels and waves for coastal engineering design emerged (HAWKES
et al, 2002; DE VALK et al, 2001). These approaches certainly represent an important step
toward the practical implementation of the PRA-design concept in Fig. 2, although much
more remains to be done. In further research focus should rather be put on those approaches
in which the critical step of extrapolation of the multivariate input data to extreme values is
undertaken at the earliest and prior to any transformation, i.e. at the level of the offshore or
regional climate. This is in fact more generic than extrapolation at the level of local nearshore
climate or structure variables. In fact, the extrapolations offshore can be used for any type
of sea defences at any location and for any structure function. This is also potentially more
accurate as structure variables and nearshore climate are subject to much mort constraints
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which may result in anomalies in the tails of the distribution function. In contrast, tails of
offshore climate are generally smoother and easier to extrapolate. Substantial improvement
of the predicted extremes is achieved through Monte Carlo simulations of large samples of
wave height, wave period and water level, using fitted distribution and by incorporating
additional non-simultaneous data (HAWKES et al, 2002).
Within the particular context of such joint probability approaches the greatest research
challenges are directed towards the following aspects:
1) Assessment of the uncertainties associated with transformation of the multivariate dis-
tributions functions through a sequence of models up to the failure probability function,
including their explicit incorporation in the latter. This is particularly important, because
it is much more difficult than transforming data.
2) Physical justification of the extrapolation of the fitted distribution to high extremes.
3) Introduction of the time factor, including the temporal dependence between successive
variables and their time dependence. This is particularly important for failure tree analysis
as well as for many failure modes which depend on the entire load history during a storm
or which are caused by stepwise deterioration (e.g. dune regression, dike breaching).
Within the context of Eq. (3.1) the greatest challenge is to overcome the difficulties toward a
complete understanding and modelling of all components, possibly also including contribu-
tions from other sources (e.g, from river discharges). These difficulties essentially arise from
the very large differences in scales of the temporal (and spatial) variability associated with the
formative components, of which the last two in Eq. (3.1) are present over a very broad range
of scales (up to millennia). Particular challenges worth to be mentioned are:
1) Investigation of the effect of the increasingly high non-stationarity of the climate signals
suggesting that the assumption is no longer defensible and that long-term changes in
the distribution models are very likely even for time scales in the decadal range. This is
particularly crucial for very vulnerable flood-prone areas where design return period of
103–104 years and design life time of 100 years are not uncommon.
While sensitivity studies might indeed provide a first useful insight into the effect of
climate changes on the extreme distributions, the systematic deviation from the fitted
distribution, suggesting further population in the extreme distributions, can only be
quantified through long hindcast simulation and a joint run of storm surge models, wave
models and morphological models forced by (a) routine meteorological and other data
which will provide the “natural” variability and (b) data including the results from a high
resolution regional climate model which will provide the effects of climate changes. First
attempts in this direction recently started to emerge, but without any consideration of the
morphological changes. The effect on the tidal rangewas found negligibly small (FLATHER
&WILLIAMS, 2000). The runs with the climate effect on extreme wind and extreme surge
level estimates from observational records were found to dramatically deviate from the
fitted distribution (VAN DEN BRINK et al, 2003; VAN DEN BRINK et al, 2004).
2) Improvement of the physical understanding of the relative contributions of the compon-
ents in Eq. (3.1) and the underlying formative factors, including the range of their variabi-
lity, their limits compatiblewith thephysical lawsandwithin the contextof thegeophysical
and anthropogenic processes. Rather than mainly focusing on more sophisticated distri-
butionmodels which will doubtfully be useful, this should have the highest research prio-
rity, because the resultswill build the basis for a physically sound combinatorial approach.
The latter will enable the extreme joint probabilities to be obtained from the simulation of
a large number of physically possible and unusual combinations of the constitutive factors
and components compatible with the geophysical and anthropogenic context rather than
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only from curve fitting and extrapolation without any explicit and complete account of
the physical causes of observed records and of the possible changes of the climatic, mor-
phological and other conditions circumscribing the potential of extreme sea states. It is in
fact rather surprising that extrapolations to 103, 104 and even 105 years events determined
in this manner are still accepted – even in regulatory documents – although it is widely
known that decisions based onwrong numbers resulting from sophisticatedmathematical
analyses (extreme value theory and multivariate analysis) represent themselves an additi-
onal hazard which may substantially contribute to increase the flood damages and losses.
3.2 C h a l l e n g e s A s s o c i a t e d w i t h R i s k P a t h w a y s
Themain goal of the risk pathways is to predict flooding probability EMBEDEquation.
DSMT4 Pf
c which results from the failure of one or more components of the entire defence
system (Fig. 2). This will particularly require reliable methods and models to predict:
1) the loading and resistance parameters of the defence components
2) the associated failures, including their interdependence and contribution to the initiation
of the top failure event (e.g. breaching, flooding)
3) the breach growth, the subsequent flood propagation and the damaging effects
4) the overall performance (failure probability) of the flood defence system which may be-
come very complicated, depending on the number, configuration and degree of interde-
pendence of the defence components.
Among the R & D challenges associated with these four issues the following are worth to
be mentioned.
3.2.1 W a v e O v e r t o p p i n g , B r e a c h I n i t i a t i o n a n d G r o w t h
f r o m L a n d w a r d S i d e
Except in the case of particular (moveable) defence structures such as storm surge bar-
riers where flood may occur as a result of malfunctions due to human and organisation
errors (OUMERACI et al., 2001) disastrous floods generally result from the breaching of flood
defences. Keeping in mind that most sea dike breaches in the past (e.g. storm surge of 1953
in The Netherlands and 1962 in Germany) were initiated from the landward side by wave
overtopping (SCHÜTTRUMPF&OUMERACI, 2004a) the highest research priority with respect
to wave loading should be directed towards a proper modelling of wave overtopping, pos-
sibly in combination with overflow (OUMERACI et al, 1999).
The available empirical/analytical wave overtopping formulae (e.g. SCHÜTTRUMPF &
OUMERACI, 2004b) and numerical models (e.g. HUBBARD & DODD, 2002) are restricted to
a 2D-situation, including a number of further limitations which make their application in
limit state equations for the failure modes associated with breach initiation questionable.
Fig. 3 illustrates the 3D-structure of the overtopping flowwith a complex tongue shape. Not
only the 3D-modelling of such a single overtopping event is required (Fig. 3), but also the
sequencing and distribution of the overtopping tongues along the defence (Fig. 4). For the
inception of the erosion on the rear slope (Fig. 6a) it is also important to know, whether the
overtopping tongue falls on a water free slope or on the water layer of the previous overtop-
ping tongue (Fig. 4). Moreover, the effect of the incipient erosion on the crest and rear slope
on the overtopping flow distribution may also become significant (Fig. 5). In this case, the
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interaction between the flow and the development of the erosion should also be modelled, if
a reliable prediction of breach initiation has to be achieved.
Furthermore, the prediction of breach development induced by wave overtopping still
represents an unsolved problem, although the initial conditions at the defence line constitute
one of the greatest uncertainties in flood propagation models and thus in the assessment of
the warning time and the damaging effects.
The large experience available in dam engineering with dam-break flood wave models
(Morris & Hassan, 2002) cannot be simply extrapolated to coastal flood defences, due to
several reasons such as (i) the initial conditions of the flood wave which interacts with the
breach growth, (ii) the limited breach width along the defence line and (iii) the 3D-character
of the flood wave in a coastal plain. Therefore, substantially new knowledge towards the
physical understanding and proper modelling of the breaching process must be generated
before embarking into the detailed modelling of flood propagation and its damaging effects
on typical obstacles in the protected areas.
Due to the very strong interaction between the expected extreme hydrodynamic condi-
tions (high water levels, strong currents and high storm waves) and soil strength parameters
(large Shield’s parameter, variable shear strength, etc.) associated with very high erosion and
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Fig. 3: Three-dimensional structure of
overtopping flow
Fig. 4: Distribution of wave overtopping flow
along a sea dike
Fig. 5: Wave overtopping and erosion along an estuary dike
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transport rate during the breaching process, serious scale effects would be expected, if com-
mon small-scale models are used. On the other hand, it will not be possible to achieve the
required understanding of the physical processes by using only field experiments for which
the control of the forcing functions (water levels, currents and waves) and the boundary con-
ditions cannot be controlled. Therefore, hydraulic model tests at almost full-scale in a large
wave facility remains the sole alternative. Based on the experimental results, generic models
of the development of the breach initiated bywave overtopping (Fig. 6c,d)must be developed
from a structural and hydro-geotechnical engineering perspective for a class of typical flood
defences, including homogenous and non-homogeneous earth structures.
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3.2.2 W a v e I m p a c t , B r e a c h I n i t i a t i o n a n d G r o w t h f r o m
S e a w a r d S i d e
A breach may also be initiated from the seaward side by various mechanisms, depending
on the type of slope revetment. For most of the revetments and particularly for clay-covers
of sea dikes as widely used in The Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, etc., the most common
failure mode consists in erosion holes induced by breaching wave impacts along the dike
(Fig. 7a,b).
It is therefore needed to develop a better understanding of the propagation of the im-
pact pressure through cracks/voids (Fig. 7a) in the revetment into the dike core (Bruce et al,
Fig. 6: Development of breach initiated from landward side by wave overtopping
(a) Crest and rear slope erosion
(b) Failure modes
(d) Breach growth(c) Dike breach
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2000) and of the mechanisms by which the revetment is “blown out” by the pressure pulses.
Generic limit state equations can then be developed for these failure mechanisms and a set of
typical defences and revetments. There is also a crucial need to develop a prediction model
for the distribution of the holes along the defence and to understand under which conditions
theses holes may lead to breach initiation (Fig. 7b in the back). Since the breach will develop
differently from the case shown in Fig. 6d, generic models are required for the development
of the breach induced from the seaward side by wave impacts for a class of typical flood
defences and revetments (Fig. 7c).
3.2.3 A d v a n c e d F a u l t T r e e A n a l y s i s
Conventional fault trees describe the occurrence probability of a specific failure mode
(top event) and all the ways in which that top event can be reached; i.e. the relative contri-
butions of prior failure modes to the probability of the top event. Particularly for the cases
where the load and resistance parameters are time dependent, the time duration of the fai-
lure mechanisms as well as their time sequencing and actual links which are not taken into
account by conventional failure tree analysis may be crucial for the outcome. Kortenhaus
(2003) performed a fault tree analysis, including 25 failure modes of a sea dike with flooding
as a top event, by comparatively applying a conventional approach and a so-called “scenario
approach”. In the latter, time sequencing of the time dependent failure modes is achieved by
building “scenario blocks“ in the fault tree. A “scenario block” consists of a combination of
those non-discrete failure modes which strongly depends on the time duration and on each
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(a) Impact propagation through cracks
(b) Erosion holes by impacts along sea dike
(c) Breach growth initiated from seaward side by wave impacts
Fig. 7: Erosion holes induced by wave impacts along a sea dike
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other (e.g. progressive erosion and breach initiation). As expected the annual probability of
the top event obtained by an improved fault tree including “scenario blocks” was more than
two orders of magnitude higher than that obtained from a conventional fault tree (Korten-
haus, 2003). A more recent case study for a North Sea dike performed by Kortenhaus (2004)
has shown that the difference between the two approaches may indeed reach two orders of
magnitude with respect to the probability of the top event or even three orders of magnitude
with respect to the probability of the failure immediately following the “scenario blocks“
(see simplified fault trees in Fig. 8).
Moreover, fault trees must also include the key failure modes which are not or hardly
amenable to common limit state equations (e.g. failures of moveable barriers due to human
and organisation errors). “Quantification” of the failure probability by elicitation of expert
opinions or/and simulations may considerably improve confidence (COOKE, 1991; OUME-
RACI et al., 2001).
To further reduce the drawbacks of conventional fault tree analysis which is time consu-
ming and rather subjective as the outcome is strongly dependent on the expertise and skills
of the analyst, innovative methodologies and techniques are urgently needed. These should
particularly help moving this conventional analysis from an art to science, from a fragile
and very sensitive tool to a more robust and widely affordable approach for practitioners.
Complementarily the research should also be directed towards examining the feasibility of
integrated system dynamic models and GIS-approaches to obtain a modelling framework
capable of coping with space and time dependent processes (see Section 3.2.4 below).
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Fig. 8: Fault tree analysis: conventional vs. “scenario” approach
a) Conventional fault tree analysis b) Fault tree analysis with “scenario” approach
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3.2.4 F a i l u r e P r o b a b i l i t y o f E n t i r e D e f e n c e L i n e a n d
P h a s e d D e f e n c e S y s t e m s
In practice, a flood defence rarely consists of a single or homogenous structure over its
entire length. Generic methodologies and techniques are still lacking for the definition of
“homogenous” segments of the defence line with respect to the load and resistance parame-
ters as well as for the specification of the degree of interdependence of adjacent segments with
respect to various mechanisms (structural support offered to adjacent segments, simultane-
ous hydraulic load effects, flood propagation, etc.). The same holds true for the modelling of
the performance (probability of failure) of the entire defence line. The occurrence of a breach
along a certain defence segment may be stochastically independent, but the breach along
the nearby segment may strongly depend on the breach which occurred along the adjacent
segment (Fig. 9).
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Fig. 9: Distribution of breaches along a defence line
Moreover, the time sequencing of both breaches will have a significant effect on the
flood propagation and thus on the subsequent damages in the protected area. Therefore, the
prediction of the defence performance must be conducted in close connection with the risk
receptor analysis (Fig. 11).
Beside the “segmentation” and the modelling of the performance of the entire defence
line, specification of the degree of a phased defence system and modelling of the perfor-
mance of the entire defence system represent a further and much greater research challenge.
Examples of such coastal flood systems as commonly applied in Germany are given in
Fig. 10, showing for instance that the performance of the main defence line strongly depends
on the high foreshore or dune fronting it.
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Fig. 10: Example of coastal flood defence systems in Germany (North Sea and Baltic Sea)
The degree of spatial correlation between the defence components will also depend upon
the respective along and across shore distance between the components and how they are
tied to each other in plan view (links, bonds, etc.). Therefore, due consideration of both
cross sectional and along shore (plan view) representations of the defence components is
required to formulate appropriate correlation functions. Keeping in mind the research chal-
lenges associated with advanced fault trees mentioned in Section 3.2.3, the simplified flow
chart in Fig. 11 is tentatively suggested to illustrate the degree of complexity and the range of
difficulties of the problems associated with the prediction of the performance of entire and
complex defence systems. These difficulties are also well illustrated by a case study (BUIJS et
al, 2003) which represents one of the first serious attempts in this direction. That and further
case studies show that the performance of an entire defence system is too complex to be
addressed by conventional approaches and modelling. Therefore, an appropriate modelling
framework is needed which is capable to cope with the complex failure mechanisms in time
and space, including all interactions between the component of the defence system and inte-
grating the expected damages directly caused by flood propagation. Such a framework might
be obtained by coupling system dynamic models to cope with the time dependent processes
and GIS-based approaches to cope with spatial modelling. Cellular automata have also been
suggested, but they are appropriate for discrete event simulations rather than for continuous
time simulations.
Such a modelling framework will also enable to simulate the performance of the entire
defence system over the intended design life time and thus to account explicitly for the long-
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term change of the failure probabilities which would necessarily result from the long-term
changes of the load and resistance parameters. This issue is particularly crucial for probability
discounting as optimisation can only be achieved by considering life-cycle costs.
3.3 C h a l l e n g e s A s s o c i a t e d w i t h R i s k R e c e p t o r s
The prime objective of the risk receptor analysis is to predict the expected damages and
losses which will result form the predicted flood event (Fig. 2) This will require a consistent
methodology with the necessary models and predictive/analytical tools for the vulnerability
atmultiple levels of the receptors, including the resilience of the ecological and social systems.
Among the variety of candidate research issues the following research and modelling chal-
lenges may be mentioned: (i) physics of direct damages caused by flood propagation, (ii) loss
of life and human injuries, (iii) environmental and cultural damages induced by inundation,
(iv) integration of all expected flood losses.
3.3.1 P h y s i c s o f D i r e c t D am a g e s C a u s e d b y F l o o d P r o p a g a t i o n
The research efforts should primarily be directed towards modelling the interaction
between breach growth and flood propagation from one or more breaches (Fig. 9), but also
towards the damaging effects of the flood wave on a variety of a set of typical obstacles and
topographic features, including scour, erosion, sedimentation and infiltration. As a result, a
set of high resolution models (including modelling of turbulence and fluid-sediment-struc-
ture interactions) for the prediction of direct physical damages should be obtained.
3.3.2 L o s s o f L i f e a n d H um a n I n j u r i e s
Besides the socio-economic and ecological importance of the flood-prone area, the
safety of flood defences primarily depends on the number of people at risk. Among the
so-called intangible losses, human injuries and loss of life are, however, the most difficult to
predict and to valuate.
The difficulties associated with the prediction essentially arise from the fact that the
probability of drowning/injuries is not only a function of the flood propagation and inun-
dation characteristics (depth, discharge, rising rate, etc.) but also of the warning, evacuation
and further risk reducing measures. Therefore, appropriate models are urgently needed for
the prediction of loss of life and human injuries by simulating the hydraulic conditions of
the flood together with the associated risk reduction measures, including the explicit account
for all other influencing factors such as reaction time, infrastructure capacity, traffic manage-
ment, etc. A first step in this direction has been undertaken by JONKMAN et al. (2003). The
lack of appropriate data for validation will, however, constitute a crucial bottleneck. In fact,
the international flood disaster database (www.cred.be) is not appropriate for the detailed
assessment of loss of life given certain flood and risk management circumstances. Although
the valuation of human life is questionable from the ethical view point, the problem is often
formulated in terms of the amount society is willing to pay for saving life. Values between 1
to 10 million US$, depending on considerations associated with aversion of risk, have been
reported.
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Fig. 11: Performance of entire flood system and integration methodology for flood risk prediction
Various methods to predict and to valuate intangible losses are available in the literature.
A systematic review and analysis will help to derive the approaches which are most approp-
riate for coastal flood and the need for improvement/new development.
3.3.3 E n v i r o nm e n t a l a n d C u l t u r a l D am a g e s I n d u c e d
b y I n u n d a t i o n
Quantitative assessment of the damages caused by flood propagation and inundation
in terms of degradation of natural resources such as ground/ground water contamination,
loss of ecosystem integrity and functioning (including ecosystem services and goods such as
organic matter production, nutrient cycling, physical structuring, biodiversity and loss of
visual amenity). A key research challenge is the development of reliable methodologies/tools
to assess the degree of degradation and the resilience of the damaged ecosystem. The damage
to historic buildings and further cultural goods may also represent a substantial part of the
flood damages and must therefore also be assessed.
3.3.4 I n t e g r a t i o n o f E x p e c t e d F l o o d L o s s e s
To quantify and integrate the expected flood losses from various sources, new metho-
dologies/techniques must be developed which are widely accepted by decision-makers, po-
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liticians and public at large. Tangible direct/indirect economic losses are generally tractable
with common CBA-techniques. The key challenges are rather the methods (i) to evaluate
the so-called intangible losses such as human injuries, loss of life, environmental and cultural
losses, social and psychological impacts and (ii) to integrate these with the more tangible
economic losses in order to get a complete overall picture of the vulnerability which is then
fully quantified on a sound and transparent basis. In fact, previous experience has shown that
common CBA-techniques supplemented by Utility Analysis and Life Quality Methods are
often not very appropriate.
3.4 C h a l l e n g e s A s s o c i a t e d w i t h R i s k A c c e p t a n c e
The prime goal of the risk acceptance analysis is to assess the acceptable flood risk
which may be considered as target flood risk Rtf. This target risk and its comparison with
the predicted flood risk Rcf are required to develop an appropriate measure of the residual
flood risk (Oumeraci, 2001), which can be used for design, safety assessment and decision-
making on the most appropriate risk reduction measures. Due to the socio-cultural, legal,
political and socio-economic dimensions of the issue, the assessment of acceptable flood risk
certainly represents one of the most complex, most difficult and most important steps in any
risk-based design and safety assessment. Therefore, this problem can only be solved within
a coherent, transparent, adaptive and widely accepted framework for tolerable flood risk
assessment. A good starting point for the development of such a framework is the so-called
ALARP-concept (As LowAsReasonably Practicable) which is widely accepted across many
disciplines (Fig. 12).
The key research challenges will be (Figs. 12 & 13):
1) to define the lower and upper bound of the ALARP-zone for flood risks. To achieve a wide
consensus in accordance with the acceptable risks in other sectors (e.g. dam engineering,
offshore engineering, nuclear power plants, transportation, etc.) it is indispensable that
the prospective assessment methodologies and modelling tools are robust, coherent and
transparent, enabling a comparison with the risk tolerated in other sectors. For this pur-
pose, it would be useful to assess the acceptable probability of the flood hazard Ptf and
the acceptable vulnerability T(D) separately. This might also be important from the legal
point of view. In fact, from the human rights perspective the responsible authorities have
to reduce the vulnerability to an acceptable level, but not necessarily the flood risk.
2) to explicitly account for risk aversion. Weight factors have often been suggested, but more
consistent methods are required to account for differences in acceptance/penalisation of
certain risks as compared to others and to help achieving a better consensus on acceptable
risks across many sectors and disciplines.
3) to explicitly account for uncertainties in both components of the acceptable flood risk.
This is particularly important for high risks near the upper bound of the ALARP-zone
where large uncertainties might shift the assessed acceptable risk outside the ALARP-
zone (Fig. 12 right)
A tentative generic flow diagram which may also be used for the assessment of
acceptable flood risks is roughly outlined in Fig. 13 to show that for the various steps, use
can bemade of techniques/tools already available inCost Benefit Analysis (CBA), Reliability
andMulti-Criteria Decision Theory, but also to point out that a number of further improve-
ments and new developments are still needed.
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Fig. 12: Key challenge towards an advanced ALARP-concept for acceptable flood risk assessment
Fig. 13: Tentative flow diagram for a framework of acceptable flood risk assessment
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4. C o n c l u d i n g R em a r k s
Keeping in mind that one of the key features of the proposed PRA-based design frame-
work is the focus on the improved understanding/modelling of the underlying processes
which may lead to disastrous floods (e.g. joint probabilities of risk sources, breach initi-
ation, breach growth, subsequent flood propagation and damages), including the explicit
account of all uncertainties at every design stages, the following key research challenges may
be stressed:
1) To overcome the major problems encountered in risk source prediction (Fig. 14), a consis-
tent modelling strategy with proper models and uncertainty analyses is required to pre-
dict the effects of climate/geophysical/morphological interdecadal changes on the joint
probability distributions of storm surge water levels and waves, including joint design
extremes. For the long-term, coupling of improved climate/storm surge/wind waves/
morphological models must be kept in perspective.Meanwhile, substantial improvements
might be achieved by the joint run of these models in their available or improved versions.
This will at least provide the physical insight needed for instance to justify/improve the
extrapolation to high extremes.
2) Most of the problems associated with risk pathway analysis are due to the lack of consis-
tent modelling strategies, proper models and integration methodologies. With respect to
the loading issue, the modelling of wave overtopping and wave impact, including their
temporal/special distribution along the defence lines represents the greatest challenge. A
further challenge is the modelling of the interactions between the various failure modes
Fig. 14: Practical problems associated with risk source prediction
Die Küste, 
Heft 70 (2005), Special Editon COMRISK,  Seiten 184, E 35 255 Lit.
and of all the ways leading to breach initiation from both landward and seaward side by
wave overtopping and wave impact, respectively. Generic models for the prediction of
breaches, their growth and their temporal/spatial distribution along the defence com-
ponents, including the effect of breach growth on flood propagation for a set of typical
defence components and systems. Advanced fault trees or other alternative tools will be
needed to account for the time duration, the time sequencing and the actual links of the
failure mechanisms within each defence component and within more complex defence
systems.
3) Most difficulties encountered in the vulnerability analysis and risk acceptance assessment
primarily arise from the high degree of complexity and multi-disciplinarity of the various
processes/issues involved. Therefore, research should be oriented towards developing
consistent methods and models to predict and valuate the intangible flood losses, more
coherent methodologies to integrate tangible and intangible losses, direct and indirect
costs, but also a robust and transparent framework with the required modelling and ana-
lysis tools for the assessment of acceptable flood risks.
Besides all these challenges which are primarily associated with modelling and integration
methodologies the greatest challenge will be to simplify as much as reasonably practica-
ble (e.g. without loosing any important issue!), so that the prospective design and safety
assessment approach will be comprehensible and affordable by practitioners and further
prospective end users. Many of these challenges are expected to be met within the next five
years by the recently initiated EU-Integrated Project “FLOODsite” on river, flash and coas-
tal/estuarine flood management (SAMUELS et al, 2004), including 36 leading institutions from
13 EU-countries (www.floodsite.net). This synergetic transnational partnership and colla-
boration will substantially contribute to forge the transition to a more integrated design
and safety assessment of flood defences, which includes risk management as an integral part
of the design process and which is based on an interdisciplinary sound ground to meet the
sustainability requirements.
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Risk is of all Time
BEN J. M. ALE
S umm a r y
Risk is everywhere and always has been. Although these risks seem new, industrial risk,
environmental risk and health risk have been around since the origin of mankind. Men always
have been trying to minimise these risk and manage them where possible. The risks of modern
technological society can be managed with the means this society has developed. But today just
as always the decision to reduce risk is political. Risk reduction policies are difficult to maintain
over prolonged periods of time. This holds especially for high consequence low probability
events. The absence of occurrences over long periods of time reinforces the illusion that these
events are impossible and will not happen. Until disaster strikes again!
Z u s a mm e n f a s s u n g
Risiko ist, und war immer, allgegenwärtig. Obwohl diese Risiken neu erscheinen, existie-
ren industrielle, Umwelt- und Gesundheitsrisiken seit Anfang der Menschheit. Der Mensch hat
immer versucht, diese Risiken zu minimieren und managen wo immer möglich. Mit den Risiken
der modernen technologischen Gesellschaft kann mit den entwickelten Verfahren umgegangen
werden. Heute wie in der Vergangenheit ist die Entscheidung zur Risikominimierung eine politi-
sche. Strategien zur Risikominimierung sind schwer über längere Zeiträume zu handhaben. Dies
trifft insbesondere zu für sehr folgenschwere aber nur sehr seltene Ereignisse. Das Ausbleiben von
solchen Ereignissen über längere Zeiträume stärkt die Illusion, dass sie nicht möglich sind und
nicht eintreten werden. Bis zur nächsten Katastrophe!
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Risk, risk management, risk perception, bowtie models
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1. I n t r o d u c t i o n
It is said that the present society is a risk society (BECK, 1986). And indeed some risks
are new. And because of the global connectivity of our societies, many risks are shared by
all. That does not take away though, that may ancient risks have had a similar standing in the
society in which they where dominant. They formed a threat to the whole – known – world
and all – known – societies were exposed.
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Between 1347 and 1350 the plague or the Black Death wiped out one third of the po-
pulation of Europe (CENTRAAL BUREAU VOOR DE STATISTIEK, 2004). In the 17th century the
average life expectancy was 25 years and to become 45 was an exception.
Also what now is called industrial risk has roots in the early centuries. Already Plinius
described illnesses among slaves (RAMAZZINI, 1700). In 1472 Dr U. Ellenbog fromAugsburg
wrote an eight page note on the hazards of silver, mercury and vapours of lead (ROSEN, 1976).
Ailments of the lungs found in miners were described extensively by Georg Bauer (AGRI-
COLA, 1556). In the seventeenth century a significant part of the crew of ships sailing the East
andWest Indies never made it home. As recent as 1918 the Spanish flue killed 170,000 people
in the Netherlands alone.
The Netherlands has a long history of having to deal with the threat of floods. In the
middle ages several groups, such as Hugenotes and Jews, fled to the Netherlands because
they were oppressed by their government. These people literally stepped down from the
Central European Plane into the Low Lands, the swamp that is the Netherlands. The only
authorities that were accepted for a long time were the „waterboards“. These were deemed
necessary to manage the flood defences. The oldest waterboards were those of Schieland
(1273), Rijnland (1286), and Delfland (1319). Nowwith 478 people per km2 one of the den-
sest populated area‘s in the world and housing a harbour of Rotterdam, Schiphol Airport
and a third of the refinery capacity of Europe managing the risks of resulting from the close
proximity of people and industry has become just as important an activity as managing the
risks of flooding.
Attempts to avoid unnecessary risk also has been part of human activities from as long
as history is written. Those who had something to loose surrounded themselves and their
possessions with walls, castles, guards and armies. If you had enough money you went out-
side of the city to escape the plague. And societies have put people into power in order to
protect them from a long time ago.
This does not take away that worldwide and in absolute numbers the number of disasters
and the associated costs increase. At the same time the population of the earth increases, sug-
gesting that people more and more live in less and less suitable locations (OECD, 2003).
This raises the question why risk management looks so different today andwhywe have
so much difficulty getting to an organised policy on risk, whether we are in public office, in
government or in private enterprise. For this we first look at the evolution of risk especially
in the 20th century. We look at the development of risk perception research and findings
and then we look at methodologies to understand the genesis of accidents and strategies to
eliminate them or reduce the probability.
2. I n d u s t r i a l r i s k
In theNetherlands some large scale accidents with explosives materials occurred as well.
In 1654 the centre of Delft was demolished by the explosion of a powder tower. This explo-
sion, which could be heard 80 km away, created the “horse market”, which still exists as an
open space (Fig. 1).
In 1807 a similar explosion took place. Now a barge laden with black powder exploded
in the centre of Leiden. The van der Werf park today is still witness of this event. 150 people
were killed among who 50 children, whose school was demolished by the blast. This explo-
sion led to an imperial decree by Napoleon. The emperor stated that from then on a permit
was needed for having an industrial facility. Three classes of industry were designated:
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• Industries that were considered too dangerous to be inside a city. The authorities would
indicate a location.
• Industries for which location inside a city could be considered if it could be demonstrated
that there was no danger for the community.
• Industries that always could be located inside city limits.
In addition Napoleon stated that objections of future neighbours should be noted and
addressed by the authority that made a decision. As the explosion in Leiden involved a
ship, similar measures were taken with regards to the transportation of explosives and other
dangerous materials. Interestingly the safety regulations in France can be traced back to the
same imperial decree.
3. R i s k m a n a g e m e n t
The origin of modern risk management lies in the industrial accidents after World War
II. In 1966 a fire in a storage facility for LPG in Feyzin, France killed 18 and wounded 81.
This accident led to re-emphasis on design rules for bottom valves on pressure vessels. In the
realm of physical planning no actions from the French or the European authorities seemed
to have resulted from that accident.
Ten years later a number of similar accidents occurred: Flixborough (1974, 28 dead),
Beek (1975, 14 dead) and Los Alfaques (1978, 216 dead). These accidents showed that the
Feyzin accident was not a unique freak accident. Apparently LPG and other flammable
substances could pose a serious threat to the workforce and to the surroundings.
In 1979 Prime-Minister van Agt, just as his predecessors, wrote a letter to parliament
about the development of environmental policies as integral part of the nation’s policies. In
Fig. 1: The big thunder of Delft in 1654
Die Küste, 
Heft 70 (2005), Special Editon COMRISK,  Seiten 184, E 35 255 Lit.
176
this letter he introduced “External Safety” as separate from occupational safety. The Prime-
Minister introduced and announced three elements of a new policy:
• appointment of the minister of environment as co-ordinator for hazardous materials,
• founding of a new separate policy body dealing with external safety, and
• announcement of new legislation covering external safety.
At the same time a major change in the energy market appeared imminent. This among
other lead to amajormarket push for LPG asmotor fuel. In 1978 a tank car exploded in a tank
station. Although nobody was hurt in this accident, it became apparent that the population
around the stations should be limited. The chief inspector for the environment decided not to
wait for legislation. He issued an instruction for his inspectors to not approve a permit unless
the conditions for distances and population densities as indicated in the Table 1 were satisfied
(HIMH, 1981). This was the first explicit zoning measure around a hazardous activity.
A further potential increase in the transport of LPG through the Netherlands resulted
from the desire to use LPG as feedstock for the production of ethylene. A committee was
charged with developing a policy. A study was commissioned into the safety of the whole
chain from import to final use. It became apparent that a policy aimed at insuring that no
accident ever would harm the population would not be compatible with the limited space in
the Netherlands. The committee decided that there should be a level of risk below which it is
neither desirable nor economical to strive for further reduction. This statement implied that
the level of risk should be established and that acceptability limits should be set.
At the same time authorities in the Rijnmond area started to be worried about the safety
of the population around the large petro-chemical complexes in the area. Taking the Canvey
Island study as an example (HSE CANVEY, 1978; HSE CANVEY, 1981), the Rijnmond autho-
rity embarked on a study to establish whether quantification of risk was feasible and would
give results that would be useful in decision-making. The results (CREMER and WARNER,
1981) were promising with regards to the usefulness of the results. The quantification of
risk as a routine exercise was judged not to be feasible unless information technology could
be used to take away the burden of the many complicated calculations and reduce the time
needed.
The Rijnmond Authority together with the ministry of environment embarked on the
venture towards an automated method for quantification of risk. Now, twenty plus years
later the process still is not fully automated. Such a level of automation no longer is desired
either. But the techniques developed since together with the rapid development of computa-
tional capability has lead to workable systems with reasonable return times.
Tab. 1: Zoning around LP G station
Distance to tank and/or fillingpoint (m) Allowed building
Houses Offices
0 – 25 none none
25 – 50 max 2 max 10 people
50 – 100 max 8 max 30 people
100 – 150 max 15 max 60 people
> 150 no limit no limit
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3.1 Risk matrices
The division of risk in three bands introduced by Napoleon can be found back in the
risk matrices that are used frequently to support and structure decision making (Fig. 2). In
these matrices the two dimensions of risk: probability and consequences are separated out
and plotted against each other. Any combination of consequence and probability is a point
in this two dimensional space. Alternatively the risk profile of any activity can be plotted as
a so-called complementary cumulative distribution curve (CCDC). In such a curve the pro-
bability of exceeding certain consequences are given as a function of these consequences.
The plot area can be divided into three areas: acceptable, conditionally acceptable and
unacceptable. Whenever the risk is not in the acceptable area measures have to be taken or at
last contemplated. Of particular interest is the region in the lower right hand corner of the
matrix where those risks are located of which the consequences cannot be borne. These risks
have to be transferred e.g. by insurance, or have to be eliminated – regardless how low the
probability - as the consequences would lead to ruin.
In practice any consequence proves to be acceptable when the probability is sufficiently
remote and the advantages to be gained by embarking the risky activity are sufficiently large.
Fig. 2: Risk matrix
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Therefore the red or unacceptable area is seldom demarcated by a vertical line. Rather the
limit is some sort of sloping line as depicted by the dotted line in the figure.
The use of risk matrices is not restricted anymore to the chemical industry. Many appli-
cations are found in finance and insurance industries (MACARTHY et al., 2004).
3.2 C r i t e r i a
Having decided that risk quantification is the way to go the inseparable counterpart had
to be developed as well. Questions to be answered included were what to do with the results,
and how to make sure the analyses would actually be made and used in decision making. Re-
gional and local authorities as well as industry asked for guidance regarding the acceptability
of risk. The bases for this guidance was found in documents and decisions taken earlier.
An important base line was found in decisions made regarding the sea defences of the
Netherlands. In 1953 a large part of the south west of the Netherlands was flooded as a result
of a combination of heavy storms, high tides and insufficient strength and maintenance of
the diking system. Almost two thousand people lost their lives and the material damage was
enormous especially because the Netherlands was still recovering from World War II. The
Netherlands embarked on a project to strengthen the sea defences, including a drastic shor-
tening of the coastline by damming off all but one of the major estuaries of the Rhine/Maas
delta. The design criteria were determined on the basis of a proposal of the so-called “Delta
Committee” who proposed that the dikes should be so high that the sea would only reach
the top once every 10,000 years (DELTA COMMISSIE, 1960). The probability of the dike col-
lapsing is a factor of 10 lower. The probability of drowning is another factor of 10 lower, so
that the recommendation of the Delta Committee implies an individual risk of drowning in
the areas at risk of 1 in a million per year. This recommendation was subsequently converted
into law.
This value of risk was reaffirmed when a decision had to be taken about the construction
of the closure of the Oosterschelde estuary. For reasons of preserving the ecosystems the
design was changed from a closed solid dam, to a movable barrier. This barrier should give
the same protection as the dams. In this manner Dutch parliament had a history of debating
safety in terms of probabilistic expectations, which came in handy when industrial risk had
to be discussed.
The value of 1 in a million per year corresponds to about 1% of the probability of being
killed on the road in the mid 80-ties. This became the maximum acceptable addition to the
risk of death for any individual resulting from industrial accidents.
For societal risk the anchor point was found in the “interim viewpoint” regarding LPG
points of sale mentioned above. When combined with value already chosen for individual
risk this led to the point 10 people killed at a frequency of 1 in 100,000 per year. As societal
risk usually is depicted as an FN curve having the frequency of exceeding N victims as a
function of N, the limit had to be given the same form. Thus the slope of the limit line had
to be determined. It was decided to incorporate the apparent aversion against large disas-
ters in de the national limit by having the slope steeper than –1. Several values circulated in
literature at the time, ranging from –1.2 to –2 (FARMER, 1967; MELEIS and ERDMAN, 1972;
TURKENBURG, 1974; WILSON, 1975, OKRENT, 1981; RABASH, 1985; SMETS, 1985; HUBERT
et al., 1990). In the end it was decided to adopt a slope of –2 for the limit line. In order to
bind the decision space at the lower end of the risk spectrum limits of negligibility were
set for individual risk and societal risk alike at 1% of value of the acceptability limit. The
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resulting complex of limit values was laid down in a policy document called “premises for
risk management”.
The accident in Bhopal, where some 3000 people were killed as a result of a release of
methyl isocyanate, helped to promote the adoption of European legislation. The SEVESO
directive, named after a small village in Italy where dioxine was relaesed in an accident,
became the vehicle to implement these policies into law in the Netherlands just as in many
other members of the EU. The “Hazards ofMajor Accidents Decree” demanded that top tier
establishments would submit a safety report, in which a quantified risk analysis performed
according to the set standards, would be presented. This information then subsequently
could be used by local planners for zoning decision and by the emergency services for disaster
abatement planning.
Fig. 3: Risk triangle and criteria
On 13 may 2000 an explosion occurred in a fireworks storage and trading facility in En-
schede, the Netherlands. Twenty-two people were killed and some 900 injured. The material
damage was approximately 400 MEuro. This lead to a further re-enforcement of the policy
in the Decree on External Safety of Establishments (BEVI), in which the risk limits were
again specified (Fig. 3).
4. P e r c e p t i o n
A major factor influencing the people’s reaction to potentially hazardous activities is
what generally is described as risk perception.
In part these perceptions are driven by the way, by which information is processed by
our brain. One of the features is that information that strengthens existing ideas is more rea-
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dily absorbed than information to the contrary. In Table 2 the mortality of various activities
is given. The numbers are applicable for the Netherlands. From the table it can be seen that
the probability of any Dutchman to be killed by an accident in a chemical plant not being an
employee is 6 orders ofmagnitude smaller than the probability of dying of a smoking induced
illness (if he or she is a smoker).
On the basis of these numbers a decision maker has a fair point when assuming that the
probability of him being confronted with a disaster in the chemical industry is remote and
hardly probable. Especially when one notes that the present Netherlands are only some 200
years old
In the table also the probabilities are given of winning the main prize for five of the
nation’s lotteries. One can see that winning the „sponsorlottery“ is three orders ofmagnitude
smaller than being the victim of a chemical accident.Nevertheless these lottery tickets are rea-
dily sold and there regularly is a winner. Apparently the probability of winning this lottery is
considered bymany remote but possible, or even probable. This difference in appreciation of
the numerical information is closely related to the psycho-social theories of risk perception.
According go these theories there are many factors shaping the perception of risky activities
(VLEK, 1996; SLOVIC, 1999; SJOBERG, 2000). The top 10 of the most listed are:
• Extent and probability of damage
• Catastrophic potential
• Involuntariness
• Non-equity
• Uncontrollability
• Lack of confidence
• New technology
• Non-clarity about advantages
• Familiarity with the victims
• Harmful intent
Tab. 2: Probabilities of death and probabilities of winning lotteries
Activity Winning a lottery Probabilty (/yr)
Smoking 5*10-3
Traffic 8*10-5
Lightning 5*10-7
Bee-Sting 2*10-7
Flood 1*10-7
Staatsloterij 1*10-7
Bankgiroloterij 4*10-8
Lotto 2*10-8
Falling Aircraft 2*10-8
Postcodeloterij 1*10-8
Chemical Industry 6*10-9
Sponsorloterij 3*10-12
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Combining these factors with the mortality discussed above reinforces that people are
more willing to accept a certain small loss than an uncertain large loss. And because the
probability of a large disaster is small, long periods of time may elapse after one disaster
before another strike. In this period the notion that improbable equals impossible is steadily
reinforced and thus the impetus that exists shortly after a disaster to do something about it
disappears.
As the factors that influence the judgement of a risky activity are different for differing
activities it cannot be expected that a single set of risk criteria is applicable to all activities.
Nevertheless a policy may look more organized as the set of applicable criteria is small.
On the other hand it is argued that these factors make it impossible to set general stan-
dards, as every situation and every activity is different. In a more extreme stance it is argued
that risk is a social construct rather than something that in principle can be determined
scientifically. In this view there are so many subjective choices made in risk analyses that
they cannot be called objective science at all (VAN ASSELT, 2000). Scientists are just other
lay-people. There judgement is influenced by the same factors, but in addition they let their
science influence by their political judgements. It is no surprises that the more objectivist
risk analysts argue that scientific judgements and political judgements are not the same thing
and that objective quantification of risk is a scientific exercise. Indeed such objectivity is
necessary to make cost benefit based decisions. In such argumentation the value of the risk
should be as objective as the – monetary – value of potential risk reducing measures (TENGS
et al., 1995).
Any policy should conform to general principles of justice and democracy, be it setting
a speed limit or a limit on risk. The results should be predictable for the stakeholders and for
the public and execution should be measurable against objective standards. This holds even
when arguments are formulated in more qualitative terms such as “As Low As Reasonably
Achievable” or “gross disproportionality”. It should always be borne in mind that any sta-
keholder in any regulatory system can resort to getting a dispute settled in court.
How valid the arguments may be, they nevertheless are of great help to stakeholders that
have no interest in having risks limited by a government policy in the short run. And as the
last accident disappears in past history the pressure to be firm on risk dissolves.
4.1 B o w - t i e s
Whenever a strategy or policy is defined that asks for reduction of risk, an analysis has
to be made of what would be the optimal place to interfere with the causal chain from cause
to accident and consequences in order to obtain the desired reduction. Bowtie models are
tools for integrating broad classes of cause-consequence models. The familiar fault and tree-
event tree models are ‘bowtied’ in this way; indeed, attaching the fault tree’s ‘top event’ with
the event tree’s ‘initiating event’ originally suggested the bowtie metaphor. The bowtie may
be conceived as a ‘lens’ for focusing on causal chains and ‘projecting’ these onto the space
of consequences. These consequences will ultimately be factored into decision problems for
risk management. Hence the bowtie’s consequence side forms an interface with the decision
models. Decisions taken will reflect backwards to causes. This structure not only has pro-
ven a worthwhile concept in accident prediction, it also has proven its worth in analysing
past accidents and suggesting improvements to prevent further re-occurrence (GROENEWEG,
1998) (Fig. 4).
The selection of the centre of the bow-tie is crucial for the analysis. Any event can be
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taken as this centre. The causes and consequences of this event form the bow-tie and form
a slice out of all the things that happen in this world.. Any event can be considered a cause
and any event can be considered a consequence. Events can therefore serve as causes and as
consequences in many bow-ties, each with its own centre. However: once the centre is cho-
sen, no other events will be visible in the bow-tie than those which are in the causal chains
running through the centre.
This could raise some interesting questions. What has to be considered as the centre
event of a – lethal – accident of a parachute jumper. The moment that his parachute did not
open, the moment that his parachute was packed in the wrong way or the moment that the
reserve parachute failed to open. Any of these three approaches leads to a valid bow-tie, and
to a valid quantification of his risk of falling, but the analysis will be much more detailed on
some aspects and much less detailed on others depending on the choice of the centre event.
As a result the options for remedial action will be different.
4.2 E v e n t s a s b a r r i e r s
When the a certain consequence is deemed unacceptable or when the probability of a
certain outcome is deemed too high, measures have to be taken to either take away the causes
or block the progression from cause to accident. The classical way of presenting this and
handling this in a mathematical way is to combine the path originating from a cause with
Fig. 4: Bow-tie and Murphy’s law
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a path from a safeguard into an „AND“-gate, which means that the cause and the failure
of the safeguard have to occur simultaneously to result in the consequence. This concept
however proved to be difficult to grasp for decision makers. Therefore these safeguards are
often depicted as barriers in the path from cause to consequence (Figure 5), an idea originally
developed by Haddon, who introduced the barrier concept in 1973 (HADDON, 1973). The
number of barriers in the path then could form the basis for a layer of protection analysis
(LOPA). In any case this way of presenting layers of protection proves to be helpful for de-
cisionmakers. When in an analysis a path is detected that does not have any barriers in it, it
constitutes a – latent – deficiency in the system that according to Murphy‘s law will sooner
or later lead to ruin.
Fig. 5: And-gate representation (A) and barrier representation (B) of the same causal configuration
5. C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
Modern times are not necessarily more risky than earlier times. There have been many
threats to humanity that indeed wiped out significant portions of the known population. Life
expectancy has not been as high as it is today, at least in the „first“ world. There are some new
risks and may be contrary to historic times it is now known for sure that the known world
is all the world there is. But the historic people thought the same.
All over history it has been difficult to maintain risk containment or risk management
strategies for prolonged periods of time. For low probability large consequence type risks
this is to a significant extent inherent to the way the human brain processes information.
Every day a disaster does not happen the idea gets reinforced that it cannot happen at all.
Nevertheless there are many good methods to systematically deal with risks and many
are part of the policy of governments. Due to the dense population and the intensive use of
space in the Netherlands, the Dutch authorities have an advanced position in governmental
risk management, which combines the sue of quantitative analytical methods with set criteria
and rules for justifying risk taking by authorities.
Risk analysts have a role to play in the discussion about risks. They are in a position to
point out that the absence so far of an accident does not mean its impossibility. And they
should do so in the interest of the innocent bystanders, who are the people of who the lives,
health and property are at stake.
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